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Strategic Search and Exploration- [electronic resource]
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Strategic Search and Exploration- [electronic resource]
상세정보
- 자료유형
- 학위논문파일 국외
- 최종처리일시
- 20240214101603
- ISBN
- 9798380384919
- DDC
- 231
- 저자명
- Khalfan, Nawaaz.
- 서명/저자
- Strategic Search and Exploration - [electronic resource]
- 발행사항
- [S.l.]: : University of Pennsylvania., 2023
- 발행사항
- Ann Arbor : : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses,, 2023
- 형태사항
- 1 online resource(104 p.)
- 주기사항
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-03, Section: A.
- 주기사항
- Advisor: Vohra, Rakesh;Mailath, George J.
- 학위논문주기
- Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Pennsylvania, 2023.
- 사용제한주기
- This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
- 초록/해제
- 요약This dissertation extends models of search and exploration to account for strategic interactions typical of important economic environments. Foundational models of search and exploration seldom consider multiple searchers or explorers, mostly treat the options being searched as exogenous, and are often solved with dynamic programming which can obfuscate some properties of the optimal search behaviour. This dissertation extends our understanding of the economic behaviour by incorporating strategic features into these models and studying optimum and equilibrium behaviour.The first chapter studies strategic private exploration games with destructive ties. In a strategic exploration game, players determine the order in which they explore available options, with the objective of maximizing the sum of rewards they discover first. Exploration is private in the sense that players cannot condition the order in which they explore on their competitor's strategy. This chapter describes equilibria in private exploration games where simultaneous discovery eliminates the available reward. Symmetric equilibria in these games are easy to compute and depend on the diversity of expected rewards and the number of competitors.The second chapter outlines optimal allocation when inspection is noisy. Here, a principal receives an unknown reward from allocating to an agent who has private information about the reward. Prior to allocating, the principal may elicit a report from the agent and inspect them at a cost, but must do so without transfers. When the private information is noisy, the mechanism that maximizes the principal's expected return segments signals into two groups, inspects high types, allocating to them only if the inspected return is sufficiently positive, and doesn't inspect low types, compensating them with a small probability of allocation. This relates to a number of applied settings such as employer hiring strategies, public grant mechanisms, and portfolio investment rules.In the final chapter, Weitzman's canonical search problem is mapped into a linear program and Pandora's rule is re-derived. This demonstrates the applicability of the polyhedral approach, and contributes to the adaption of Pandora's rule to a wider class of problems.
- 키워드
- Exploration
- 키워드
- Game theory
- 기타저자
- University of Pennsylvania Economics
- 기본자료저록
- Dissertations Abstracts International. 85-03A.
- 기본자료저록
- Dissertation Abstract International
- 전자적 위치 및 접속
- 로그인 후 원문을 볼 수 있습니다.
MARC
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■00520240214101603
■006m o d
■007cr#unu||||||||
■020 ▼a9798380384919
■035 ▼a(MiAaPQ)AAI30575982
■040 ▼aMiAaPQ▼cMiAaPQ
■0820 ▼a231
■1001 ▼aKhalfan, Nawaaz.
■24510▼aStrategic Search and Exploration▼h[electronic resource]
■260 ▼a[S.l.]:▼bUniversity of Pennsylvania. ▼c2023
■260 1▼aAnn Arbor :▼bProQuest Dissertations & Theses, ▼c2023
■300 ▼a1 online resource(104 p.)
■500 ▼aSource: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-03, Section: A.
■500 ▼aAdvisor: Vohra, Rakesh;Mailath, George J.
■5021 ▼aThesis (Ph.D.)--University of Pennsylvania, 2023.
■506 ▼aThis item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
■520 ▼aThis dissertation extends models of search and exploration to account for strategic interactions typical of important economic environments. Foundational models of search and exploration seldom consider multiple searchers or explorers, mostly treat the options being searched as exogenous, and are often solved with dynamic programming which can obfuscate some properties of the optimal search behaviour. This dissertation extends our understanding of the economic behaviour by incorporating strategic features into these models and studying optimum and equilibrium behaviour.The first chapter studies strategic private exploration games with destructive ties. In a strategic exploration game, players determine the order in which they explore available options, with the objective of maximizing the sum of rewards they discover first. Exploration is private in the sense that players cannot condition the order in which they explore on their competitor's strategy. This chapter describes equilibria in private exploration games where simultaneous discovery eliminates the available reward. Symmetric equilibria in these games are easy to compute and depend on the diversity of expected rewards and the number of competitors.The second chapter outlines optimal allocation when inspection is noisy. Here, a principal receives an unknown reward from allocating to an agent who has private information about the reward. Prior to allocating, the principal may elicit a report from the agent and inspect them at a cost, but must do so without transfers. When the private information is noisy, the mechanism that maximizes the principal's expected return segments signals into two groups, inspects high types, allocating to them only if the inspected return is sufficiently positive, and doesn't inspect low types, compensating them with a small probability of allocation. This relates to a number of applied settings such as employer hiring strategies, public grant mechanisms, and portfolio investment rules.In the final chapter, Weitzman's canonical search problem is mapped into a linear program and Pandora's rule is re-derived. This demonstrates the applicability of the polyhedral approach, and contributes to the adaption of Pandora's rule to a wider class of problems.
■590 ▼aSchool code: 0175.
■653 ▼aExploration
■653 ▼aGame theory
■653 ▼aStrategic interactions
■653 ▼aSymmetric equilibria
■653 ▼aEmployer hiring strategies
■690 ▼a0511
■690 ▼a0501
■71020▼aUniversity of Pennsylvania▼bEconomics.
■7730 ▼tDissertations Abstracts International▼g85-03A.
■773 ▼tDissertation Abstract International
■790 ▼a0175
■791 ▼aPh.D.
■792 ▼a2023
■793 ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T16934379▼nKERIS▼z이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.
■980 ▼a202402▼f2024
