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The Epistemology of Moral Responsibility- [electronic resource]
![The Epistemology of Moral Responsibility - [electronic resource]](/Users/Baul/Images/book.png)
The Epistemology of Moral Responsibility- [electronic resource]
상세정보
- 자료유형
- 학위논문파일 국외
- 최종처리일시
- 20240214101651
- ISBN
- 9798380478700
- DDC
- 100
- 서명/저자
- The Epistemology of Moral Responsibility - [electronic resource]
- 발행사항
- [S.l.]: : University of California, San Diego., 2023
- 발행사항
- Ann Arbor : : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses,, 2023
- 형태사항
- 1 online resource(231 p.)
- 주기사항
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-04, Section: A.
- 주기사항
- Advisor: Vargas, Manuel.
- 학위논문주기
- Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2023.
- 사용제한주기
- This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
- 초록/해제
- 요약In this dissertation I argue that philosophical theorizing about moral responsibility has not paid sufficient attention to the epistemic dimensions of our practices of responsibility. This dissertation asks how we pursue justification and agreement about moral responsibility in our actual social practices, and, finding those pursuits often less than ideal, further asks how we ought to do so. In chapter one I seek to vindicate these claims by reviewing the extant moral responsibility literature, pointing out at various junctures what I call "paths not taken" and "epistemic lacunae." In chapter two I engage with work in contemporary social, cognitive, and moral psychology to sketch a picture of how we actually pursue judgments about responsibility, psychologically speaking. With this "ping-pong" model in hand, I identify some particularly common and robust "epistemic disruptors" that undermine our ability to hold one another responsible in the ways which philosophical theories often imagine.In particular, I focus on the way in which blame judgments are susceptible to these disruptions. Given this set up, chapters three and four of the dissertation deal with some practical upshots for the ethics of blame. In chapter three I argue for introducing the norm of Powerful Restraint, which suggests that in contexts where there are large gaps in social power, the powerful should refrain from blaming downward. In chapter four I further motivate this kind of revisionism and asymmetry, focusing on the ways in which our currently constituted practices of responsibility intersect with issues in the contemporary literatures on pragmatic encroachment and cultivated ignorance.
- 일반주제명
- Philosophy.
- 일반주제명
- Epistemology.
- 일반주제명
- Metaphysics.
- 키워드
- Blame
- 키워드
- Ethics of blame
- 기타저자
- University of California, San Diego Philosophy
- 기본자료저록
- Dissertations Abstracts International. 85-04A.
- 기본자료저록
- Dissertation Abstract International
- 전자적 위치 및 접속
- 로그인 후 원문을 볼 수 있습니다.
MARC
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■020 ▼a9798380478700
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■040 ▼aMiAaPQ▼cMiAaPQ
■0820 ▼a100
■1001 ▼aArgetsinger, Henry.
■24510▼aThe Epistemology of Moral Responsibility▼h[electronic resource]
■260 ▼a[S.l.]:▼bUniversity of California, San Diego. ▼c2023
■260 1▼aAnn Arbor :▼bProQuest Dissertations & Theses, ▼c2023
■300 ▼a1 online resource(231 p.)
■500 ▼aSource: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-04, Section: A.
■500 ▼aAdvisor: Vargas, Manuel.
■5021 ▼aThesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2023.
■506 ▼aThis item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
■520 ▼aIn this dissertation I argue that philosophical theorizing about moral responsibility has not paid sufficient attention to the epistemic dimensions of our practices of responsibility. This dissertation asks how we pursue justification and agreement about moral responsibility in our actual social practices, and, finding those pursuits often less than ideal, further asks how we ought to do so. In chapter one I seek to vindicate these claims by reviewing the extant moral responsibility literature, pointing out at various junctures what I call "paths not taken" and "epistemic lacunae." In chapter two I engage with work in contemporary social, cognitive, and moral psychology to sketch a picture of how we actually pursue judgments about responsibility, psychologically speaking. With this "ping-pong" model in hand, I identify some particularly common and robust "epistemic disruptors" that undermine our ability to hold one another responsible in the ways which philosophical theories often imagine.In particular, I focus on the way in which blame judgments are susceptible to these disruptions. Given this set up, chapters three and four of the dissertation deal with some practical upshots for the ethics of blame. In chapter three I argue for introducing the norm of Powerful Restraint, which suggests that in contexts where there are large gaps in social power, the powerful should refrain from blaming downward. In chapter four I further motivate this kind of revisionism and asymmetry, focusing on the ways in which our currently constituted practices of responsibility intersect with issues in the contemporary literatures on pragmatic encroachment and cultivated ignorance.
■590 ▼aSchool code: 0033.
■650 4▼aPhilosophy.
■650 4▼aEpistemology.
■650 4▼aMetaphysics.
■653 ▼aBlame
■653 ▼aEthics of blame
■653 ▼aMoral responsibility
■653 ▼aSocial epistemology
■653 ▼aPhilosophical theories
■690 ▼a0422
■690 ▼a0393
■690 ▼a0396
■71020▼aUniversity of California, San Diego▼bPhilosophy.
■7730 ▼tDissertations Abstracts International▼g85-04A.
■773 ▼tDissertation Abstract International
■790 ▼a0033
■791 ▼aPh.D.
■792 ▼a2023
■793 ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T16934767▼nKERIS▼z이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.
■980 ▼a202402▼f2024
