본문

서브메뉴

Estimating a Dynamic Game of Political Advertising- [electronic resource]
Estimating a Dynamic Game of Political Advertising - [electronic resource]
Estimating a Dynamic Game of Political Advertising- [electronic resource]

Detailed Information

자료유형  
 학위논문파일 국외
최종처리일시  
20240214100349
ISBN  
9798379755454
DDC  
320
저자명  
Arnold, Andrew.
서명/저자  
Estimating a Dynamic Game of Political Advertising - [electronic resource]
발행사항  
[S.l.]: : University of Pennsylvania., 2023
발행사항  
Ann Arbor : : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses,, 2023
형태사항  
1 online resource(84 p.)
주기사항  
Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-12, Section: A.
주기사항  
Advisor: Sieg, Holger.
학위논문주기  
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Pennsylvania, 2023.
사용제한주기  
This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
초록/해제  
요약This dissertation studies the effect of political advertising on the outcomes of elections to the U.S. Senate between 2000 and 2018. I first provide descriptive empirical evidence that candidates' advertising choices are driven by their own ideologies and political experience, as well as by their opponents' advertising and their standings in the polls. I then develop and estimate a dynamic game of political advertising with endogenous ad content, namely whether an ad is positive or negative. Parameter estimates show that incumbents have a substantial fundraising advantage over challengers. Positive advertising that similarly benefits challengers and incumbents reinforces this incumbency advantage, while negative advertising that disproportionately benefits challengers works against it. A counterfactual public campaign financing policy that eliminates incumbents' fundraising advantages decreases the incumbent reelection rate by 3.6 percentage points. Hypothetical temporary bans on negative advertising increase the incumbent reelection rate, but decrease ideological extremism among the challengers who replace them.
일반주제명  
Political science.
키워드  
Political advertising
키워드  
Political experience
키워드  
Reelection rate
키워드  
Financing policy
키워드  
Ideologies
기타저자  
University of Pennsylvania Economics
기본자료저록  
Dissertations Abstracts International. 84-12A.
기본자료저록  
Dissertation Abstract International
전자적 위치 및 접속  
로그인 후 원문을 볼 수 있습니다.

MARC

 008240612s2023      us  |||||||||||||||c||eng  d
■001000016931925
■00520240214100349
■006m          o    d                
■007cr#unu||||||||
■020    ▼a9798379755454
■035    ▼a(MiAaPQ)AAI30426869
■040    ▼aMiAaPQ▼cMiAaPQ
■0820  ▼a320
■1001  ▼aArnold,  Andrew.
■24510▼aEstimating  a  Dynamic  Game  of  Political  Advertising▼h[electronic  resource]
■260    ▼a[S.l.]:▼bUniversity  of  Pennsylvania.  ▼c2023
■260  1▼aAnn  Arbor  :▼bProQuest  Dissertations  &  Theses,  ▼c2023
■300    ▼a1  online  resource(84  p.)
■500    ▼aSource:  Dissertations  Abstracts  International,  Volume:  84-12,  Section:  A.
■500    ▼aAdvisor:  Sieg,  Holger.
■5021  ▼aThesis  (Ph.D.)--University  of  Pennsylvania,  2023.
■506    ▼aThis  item  must  not  be  sold  to  any  third  party  vendors.
■520    ▼aThis  dissertation  studies  the  effect  of  political  advertising  on  the  outcomes  of  elections  to  the  U.S.  Senate  between  2000  and  2018.  I  first  provide  descriptive  empirical  evidence  that  candidates'  advertising  choices  are  driven  by  their  own  ideologies  and  political  experience,  as  well  as  by  their  opponents'  advertising  and  their  standings  in  the  polls.  I  then  develop  and  estimate  a  dynamic  game  of  political  advertising  with  endogenous  ad  content,  namely  whether  an  ad  is  positive  or  negative.  Parameter  estimates  show  that  incumbents  have  a  substantial  fundraising  advantage  over  challengers.  Positive  advertising  that  similarly  benefits  challengers  and  incumbents  reinforces  this  incumbency  advantage,  while  negative  advertising  that  disproportionately  benefits  challengers  works  against  it.  A  counterfactual  public  campaign  financing  policy  that  eliminates  incumbents'  fundraising  advantages  decreases  the  incumbent  reelection  rate  by  3.6  percentage  points.  Hypothetical  temporary  bans  on  negative  advertising  increase  the  incumbent  reelection  rate,  but  decrease  ideological  extremism  among  the  challengers  who  replace  them.
■590    ▼aSchool  code:  0175.
■650  4▼aPolitical  science.
■653    ▼aPolitical  advertising
■653    ▼aPolitical  experience
■653    ▼aReelection  rate
■653    ▼aFinancing  policy
■653    ▼aIdeologies
■690    ▼a0501
■690    ▼a0615
■71020▼aUniversity  of  Pennsylvania▼bEconomics.
■7730  ▼tDissertations  Abstracts  International▼g84-12A.
■773    ▼tDissertation  Abstract  International
■790    ▼a0175
■791    ▼aPh.D.
■792    ▼a2023
■793    ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T16931925▼nKERIS▼z이  자료의  원문은  한국교육학술정보원에서  제공합니다.
■980    ▼a202402▼f2024

Preview

Export

ChatGPT Discussion

AI Recommended Related Books


    New Books MORE
    Statistics for the past 3 years. Go to brief

    Подробнее информация.

    • Бронирование
    • не существует
    • моя папка
    • Первый запрос зрения
    • Non-Book Loan Application
    • Nighttime Book Loan Application
    материал
    Reg No. Количество платежных Местоположение статус Ленд информации
    TF09009 전자도서 My Folder 부재도서신고 비도서대출신청

    * Бронирование доступны в заимствований книги. Чтобы сделать предварительный заказ, пожалуйста, нажмите кнопку бронирование

    Books borrowed together with this book

    Related Popular Books

    Available after logging in.