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Violence and Polis Formation on Crete in the Age of Hoplite Warfare, 700-400 BCE- [electronic resource]
Violence and Polis Formation on Crete in the Age of Hoplite Warfare, 700-400 BCE - [electr...
Violence and Polis Formation on Crete in the Age of Hoplite Warfare, 700-400 BCE- [electronic resource]

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자료유형  
 학위논문파일 국외
최종처리일시  
20240214100456
ISBN  
9798380324564
DDC  
571
저자명  
Obert, Jesse.
서명/저자  
Violence and Polis Formation on Crete in the Age of Hoplite Warfare, 700-400 BCE - [electronic resource]
발행사항  
[S.l.]: : University of California, Berkeley., 2023
발행사항  
Ann Arbor : : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses,, 2023
형태사항  
1 online resource(270 p.)
주기사항  
Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-03, Section: A.
주기사항  
Advisor: Mackil, Emily.
학위논문주기  
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 2023.
사용제한주기  
This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
초록/해제  
요약This dissertation presents a new understanding of organized violence, or warfare, on the Greek island of Crete in the Archaic and Classical periods and explores how violence impacted the development of some of the earliest Greek city-states, or poleis. At a crossroads between the Aegean and the rest of the Mediterranean, Crete has the earliest Greek law codes and some of the earliest pieces of the hoplite panoply. However, the relationship between these two developments, war and politics, has never been explored in depth. In part, the hesitancy of the academy is due to the hoplite orthodoxy and a narrow reading of our literary sources. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, scholars have begun to challenge and dismantle these entrenched paradigms. The evidence for violence on Crete between 700 and 400 BCE, what Anthony Snodgrass describes as the Age of Hoplite Warfare, remained immense and disjointed, across many different subfields. To address this complexity, I collected, managed, and studied this evidence using a digital database. Through a detailed analysis of the archaeological, historical, literary, epigraphic, and artistic data, I develop a new model for Greek warfare, propose a new way to bridge the conflicting narratives in our evidence, and trace the history of Cretan warfare over the Archaic and Classical periods. Through network analysis and statistical modeling, the database for violence on Crete illustrates that Cretan warfare was a collection of beliefs and practices, a series of ideologies. Rather surprisingly, there is no evidence for combatants or real battles on Crete until the very end of this period and a plethora of evidence for wealthy warrior elites. This evidence presents two remarkably different types of combat styles and military practices embedded within two different archaeological contexts - extra-urban versus urban sanctuaries. A third ideology of violence emerged once poleis began to institutionalize ancient warfare in the late sixth and fifth centuries BCE. All three ideologies of violence promoted certain world views about warriorhood, masculinity, and eliteness both on and off the battlefield. In extra-urban ritual spaces, warriors practiced a collaborative style of warfare in which every warrior, regardless of their political affiliation, was seen as an equal. These warriors had lighter equipment, omphalos-type shields, and were depicted working together against a common natural or mythological enemy. Artists illustrated these characters with the shield-as-body motif - their shields completely obstructed their torsos, leaving the viewer with the impression that they were inhuman shield people with arms, legs, weapons, and heads. These warriors were identity-less and nonanatomic, meaning that they had no indicators of biological sex such as genitalia or facial hair. I refer to the ideology evidenced at extra-urban sanctuaries as the "ideology of camaraderie" and argue that the anonymity of warriorhood was tied to the isolation and inaccessibility of extra-urban sanctuaries themselves. Many of these ritual spaces were high in the mountains, far from any urban infrastructure, and participating in rituals within these spaces would have cost a certain amount of starting capital. If someone could afford to travel to an extra-urban sanctuary, make a dedication, and participate in the seasonal rituals, then they were welcome to consider themselves part of this nonanatomic warrior elite. Warfare in urban ritual spaces, on the other hand, was heavy, exclusive, and individualistic. Urban warriors advertised their personal wealth and prowess in defeating other urban warriors. Their armor celebrated their male anatomic features, especially their torsos and groins. They claimed to be independent juggernauts, and covered themselves with encumbering armor that would have obstructed their mobility, sight, and hearing. To actually fight in this way, they needed to rely on a team of attendants and supporters, but the art in urban spaces never depicts these lower-class individuals. According to the urban ideology of violence, warfare was only accessible to elites. This highly competitive ideology of violence emerges in our evidence alongside the earliest poleis. Elites, it seems, used organized violence as a means to establish and enforce strict social hierarchies between elites and non-elites. This system used combat as a means to forge positive bonds with non-elites by targeting other elites and celebrating their defeat. In the urban sanctuaries, however, elite warriors excluded non-elites and portrayed violence as an elite-only activity, thereby forging positive bonds with other privileged elites who already had access to these limited ritual spaces. Urban warfare, therefore, was tied to the social functioning of the earliest poleis and created a delicate system whereby elites used inter-elite competition and violence to maintain their privileged status. Moreover, these elites appear to have navigated both the extra-urban and urban ideologies simultaneously. Although we might expect these ideologies to be at odds, they seem to have complimented each other and even appear in mortuary contexts side-by-side. The consistent thread in both urban and extra-urban spaces was that organized violence was an elite-only activity: only elites could afford the regular pilgrimage to extra-urban spaces and only elites could afford the full bronze armor panoply. I argue that elites monopolized violence both within and beyond their poleis to gatekeep membership into their elite group, what many scholars call the andreion and Gunnar Seelentag has recently described as a cartel. They set the entry cost of warriorhood extremely high to maintain control over their communities and retain a monopoly over violence. Although elites could present themselves as egalitarian in extra-urban spaces, they celebrated their martial skill within their polis to prove that they deserved to be in the elite cartel. Through this cartel, they crafted predatory laws that guaranteed their privileged positions within the community and elicited consent for the continuation of this system from non-elites.However, the invention of coinage and the economic intensification of the island in the late sixth century BCE led to the gradual institutionalization of elite violence. This process was piecemeal and inconsistent, but several poleis evidently sought to preserve their economic and military security. Elites were enlisted to protect their poleis, and poleis began to control how elites dedicated their war booty, which had become a focal point for elite competition within the urban space. This seems to be an attempt on behalf of the community to direct the economic benefits of organized violence towards sanctuaries that the polis could control and draw from during economic emergencies, rather than distant sanctuaries beyond their reach. This institutionalization of war booty created the third and final system of organized violence that emerges in our evidence in these periods.Cretan poleis never attempted to control how or where elites committed organized violence. Indeed, the gradual institutionalization of violence follows the ideological trajectory of the earlier systems. But by the late fifth century BCE, Cretan warfare was not a financially beneficial practice for individual warriors because in some cases, all the war booty was seized by the polis. Yet our Athenian sources report that Cretans were particularly focused on collecting war booty and eager to fight for profit. Within the history of the Cretan ideologies of violence, this inconsistency makes sense: for Cretan elites, the accumulation of wealth through violence was the best way to achieve social recognition and prove belonging within elite groups. Rather than a means to impose political will, Cretan warfare was an important avenue for elite competition through the accumulation of war booty. The ideological history of Cretan warfare and its role in the formation of ancient poleis has dramatic implications for our understanding of violence and politics in ancient Greece. The Weberian model of the ancient city-state requires reassessment, as the earliest Cretan poleis seem not to have had a monopoly over the legitimate use of force. Indeed, Cretan elites monopolized violence, and the institutionalization of organized violence was extremely patchwork.
초록/해제  
요약Moreover, Cretan warriors had a dramatic impact on mainland Greek communities. In the late fifth and early fourth centuries BCE, elite Cretan warriors fought alongside the Athenians, Spartans, and Persians as highly organized, reliable, and adaptable warriors. They had an outsized influence in ancient conflicts because their socio-political systems incentivized the leisured class to pursue martial success and war booty by conflating eliteness and warriorhood. The success of the Cretans in the armies of the Athenians and Spartans seems to have contributed to the widespread adoption of professional military groups within Greece. Half a century later, Alexander the Great would use an army of professional forces to conquer Persia. The ideologies of violence on Crete are important to this story because they explain why Cretan elites were so committed to organized violence, emphasize the political power of warriorhood within Greek poleis, and illustrate how ancient warfare could directly impact the history of the eastern Mediterranean more broadly.
일반주제명  
Ancient history.
일반주제명  
Archaeology.
일반주제명  
Classical studies.
키워드  
Crete
키워드  
Digital humanities
키워드  
Hoplite
키워드  
Polis
키워드  
Violence
키워드  
Warfare
기타저자  
University of California, Berkeley Ancient History & Mediterranean Archaeology
기본자료저록  
Dissertations Abstracts International. 85-03A.
기본자료저록  
Dissertation Abstract International
전자적 위치 및 접속  
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■040    ▼aMiAaPQ▼cMiAaPQ
■0820  ▼a571
■1001  ▼aObert,  Jesse.
■24510▼aViolence  and  Polis  Formation  on  Crete  in  the  Age  of  Hoplite  Warfare,  700-400  BCE▼h[electronic  resource]
■260    ▼a[S.l.]:▼bUniversity  of  California,  Berkeley.  ▼c2023
■260  1▼aAnn  Arbor  :▼bProQuest  Dissertations  &  Theses,  ▼c2023
■300    ▼a1  online  resource(270  p.)
■500    ▼aSource:  Dissertations  Abstracts  International,  Volume:  85-03,  Section:  A.
■500    ▼aAdvisor:  Mackil,  Emily.
■5021  ▼aThesis  (Ph.D.)--University  of  California,  Berkeley,  2023.
■506    ▼aThis  item  must  not  be  sold  to  any  third  party  vendors.
■520    ▼aThis  dissertation  presents  a  new  understanding  of  organized  violence,  or  warfare,  on  the  Greek  island  of  Crete  in  the  Archaic  and  Classical  periods  and  explores  how  violence  impacted  the  development  of  some  of  the  earliest  Greek  city-states,  or  poleis.  At  a  crossroads  between  the  Aegean  and  the  rest  of  the  Mediterranean,  Crete  has  the  earliest  Greek  law  codes  and  some  of  the  earliest  pieces  of  the  hoplite  panoply.  However,  the  relationship  between  these  two  developments,  war  and  politics,  has  never  been  explored  in  depth.  In  part,  the  hesitancy  of  the  academy  is  due  to  the  hoplite  orthodoxy  and  a  narrow  reading  of  our  literary  sources.  Since  the  beginning  of  the  twenty-first  century,  scholars  have  begun  to  challenge  and  dismantle  these  entrenched  paradigms.  The  evidence  for  violence  on  Crete  between  700  and  400  BCE,  what  Anthony  Snodgrass  describes  as  the  Age  of  Hoplite  Warfare,  remained  immense  and  disjointed,  across  many  different  subfields.  To  address  this  complexity,  I  collected,  managed,  and  studied  this  evidence  using  a  digital  database.  Through  a  detailed  analysis  of  the  archaeological,  historical,  literary,  epigraphic,  and  artistic  data,  I  develop  a  new  model  for  Greek  warfare,  propose  a  new  way  to  bridge  the  conflicting  narratives  in  our  evidence,  and  trace  the  history  of  Cretan  warfare  over  the  Archaic  and  Classical  periods.  Through  network  analysis  and  statistical  modeling,  the  database  for  violence  on  Crete  illustrates  that  Cretan  warfare  was  a  collection  of  beliefs  and  practices,  a  series  of  ideologies.  Rather  surprisingly,  there  is  no  evidence  for  combatants  or  real  battles  on  Crete  until  the  very  end  of  this  period  and  a  plethora  of  evidence  for  wealthy  warrior  elites.  This  evidence  presents  two  remarkably  different  types  of  combat  styles  and  military  practices  embedded  within  two  different  archaeological  contexts  -  extra-urban  versus  urban  sanctuaries.  A  third  ideology  of  violence  emerged  once  poleis  began  to  institutionalize  ancient  warfare  in  the  late  sixth  and  fifth  centuries  BCE.  All  three  ideologies  of  violence  promoted  certain  world  views  about  warriorhood,  masculinity,  and  eliteness  both  on  and  off  the  battlefield.  In  extra-urban  ritual  spaces,  warriors  practiced  a  collaborative  style  of  warfare  in  which  every  warrior,  regardless  of  their  political  affiliation,  was  seen  as  an  equal.  These  warriors  had  lighter  equipment,  omphalos-type  shields,  and  were  depicted  working  together  against  a  common  natural  or  mythological  enemy.  Artists  illustrated  these  characters  with  the  shield-as-body  motif  -  their  shields  completely  obstructed  their  torsos,  leaving  the  viewer  with  the  impression  that  they  were  inhuman  shield  people  with  arms,  legs,  weapons,  and  heads.  These  warriors  were  identity-less  and  nonanatomic,  meaning  that  they  had  no  indicators  of  biological  sex  such  as  genitalia  or  facial  hair.  I  refer  to  the  ideology  evidenced  at  extra-urban  sanctuaries  as  the  "ideology  of  camaraderie"  and  argue  that  the  anonymity  of  warriorhood  was  tied  to  the  isolation  and  inaccessibility  of  extra-urban  sanctuaries  themselves.  Many  of  these  ritual  spaces  were  high  in  the  mountains,  far  from  any  urban  infrastructure,  and  participating  in  rituals  within  these  spaces  would  have  cost  a  certain  amount  of  starting  capital.  If  someone  could  afford  to  travel  to  an  extra-urban  sanctuary,  make  a  dedication,  and  participate  in  the  seasonal  rituals,  then  they  were  welcome  to  consider  themselves  part  of  this  nonanatomic  warrior  elite.  Warfare  in  urban  ritual  spaces,  on  the  other  hand,  was  heavy,  exclusive,  and  individualistic.  Urban  warriors  advertised  their  personal  wealth  and  prowess  in  defeating  other  urban  warriors.  Their  armor  celebrated  their  male  anatomic  features,  especially  their  torsos  and  groins.  They  claimed  to  be  independent  juggernauts,  and  covered  themselves  with  encumbering  armor  that  would  have  obstructed  their  mobility,  sight,  and  hearing.  To  actually  fight  in  this  way,  they  needed  to  rely  on  a  team  of  attendants  and  supporters,  but  the  art  in  urban  spaces  never  depicts  these  lower-class  individuals.  According  to  the  urban  ideology  of  violence,  warfare  was  only  accessible  to  elites.  This  highly  competitive  ideology  of  violence  emerges  in  our  evidence  alongside  the  earliest  poleis.  Elites,  it  seems,  used  organized  violence  as  a  means  to  establish  and  enforce  strict  social  hierarchies  between  elites  and  non-elites.  This  system  used  combat  as  a  means  to  forge  positive  bonds  with  non-elites  by  targeting  other  elites  and  celebrating  their  defeat.  In  the  urban  sanctuaries,  however,  elite  warriors  excluded  non-elites  and  portrayed  violence  as  an  elite-only  activity,  thereby  forging  positive  bonds  with  other  privileged  elites  who  already  had  access  to  these  limited  ritual  spaces.  Urban  warfare,  therefore,  was  tied  to  the  social  functioning  of  the  earliest  poleis  and  created  a  delicate  system  whereby  elites  used  inter-elite  competition  and  violence  to  maintain  their  privileged  status.  Moreover,  these  elites  appear  to  have  navigated  both  the  extra-urban  and  urban  ideologies  simultaneously.  Although  we  might  expect  these  ideologies  to  be  at  odds,  they  seem  to  have  complimented  each  other  and  even  appear  in  mortuary  contexts  side-by-side.  The  consistent  thread  in  both  urban  and  extra-urban  spaces  was  that  organized  violence  was  an  elite-only  activity:  only  elites  could  afford  the  regular  pilgrimage  to  extra-urban  spaces  and  only  elites  could  afford  the  full  bronze  armor  panoply.  I  argue  that  elites  monopolized  violence  both  within  and  beyond  their  poleis  to  gatekeep  membership  into  their  elite  group,  what  many  scholars  call  the  andreion  and  Gunnar  Seelentag  has  recently  described  as  a  cartel.  They  set  the  entry  cost  of  warriorhood  extremely  high  to  maintain  control  over  their  communities  and  retain  a  monopoly  over  violence.  Although  elites  could  present  themselves  as  egalitarian  in  extra-urban  spaces,  they  celebrated  their  martial  skill  within  their  polis  to  prove  that  they  deserved  to  be  in  the  elite  cartel.  Through  this  cartel,  they  crafted  predatory  laws  that  guaranteed  their  privileged  positions  within  the  community  and  elicited  consent  for  the  continuation  of  this  system  from  non-elites.However,  the  invention  of  coinage  and  the  economic  intensification  of  the  island  in  the  late  sixth  century  BCE  led  to  the  gradual  institutionalization  of  elite  violence.  This  process  was  piecemeal  and  inconsistent,  but  several  poleis  evidently  sought  to  preserve  their  economic  and  military  security.  Elites  were  enlisted  to  protect  their  poleis,  and  poleis  began  to  control  how  elites  dedicated  their  war  booty,  which  had  become  a  focal  point  for  elite  competition  within  the  urban  space.  This  seems  to  be  an  attempt  on  behalf  of  the  community  to  direct  the  economic  benefits  of  organized  violence  towards  sanctuaries  that  the  polis  could  control  and  draw  from  during  economic  emergencies,  rather  than  distant  sanctuaries  beyond  their  reach.  This  institutionalization  of  war  booty  created  the  third  and  final  system  of  organized  violence  that  emerges  in  our  evidence  in  these  periods.Cretan  poleis  never  attempted  to  control  how  or  where  elites  committed  organized  violence.  Indeed,  the  gradual  institutionalization  of  violence  follows  the  ideological  trajectory  of  the  earlier  systems.  But  by  the  late  fifth  century  BCE,  Cretan  warfare  was  not  a  financially  beneficial  practice  for  individual  warriors  because  in  some  cases,  all  the  war  booty  was  seized  by  the  polis.  Yet  our  Athenian  sources  report  that  Cretans  were  particularly  focused  on  collecting  war  booty  and  eager  to  fight  for  profit.  Within  the  history  of  the  Cretan  ideologies  of  violence,  this  inconsistency  makes  sense:  for  Cretan  elites,  the  accumulation  of  wealth  through  violence  was  the  best  way  to  achieve  social  recognition  and  prove  belonging  within  elite  groups.  Rather  than  a  means  to  impose  political  will,  Cretan  warfare  was  an  important  avenue  for  elite  competition  through  the  accumulation  of  war  booty.  The  ideological  history  of  Cretan  warfare  and  its  role  in  the  formation  of  ancient  poleis  has  dramatic  implications  for  our  understanding  of  violence  and  politics  in  ancient  Greece.  The  Weberian  model  of  the  ancient  city-state  requires  reassessment,  as  the  earliest  Cretan  poleis  seem  not  to  have  had  a  monopoly  over  the  legitimate  use  of  force.  Indeed,  Cretan  elites  monopolized  violence,  and  the  institutionalization  of  organized  violence  was  extremely  patchwork.  
■520    ▼aMoreover,  Cretan  warriors  had  a  dramatic  impact  on  mainland  Greek  communities.  In  the  late  fifth  and  early  fourth  centuries  BCE,  elite  Cretan  warriors  fought  alongside  the  Athenians,  Spartans,  and  Persians  as  highly  organized,  reliable,  and  adaptable  warriors.  They  had  an  outsized  influence  in  ancient  conflicts  because  their  socio-political  systems  incentivized  the  leisured  class  to  pursue  martial  success  and  war  booty  by  conflating  eliteness  and  warriorhood.  The  success  of  the  Cretans  in  the  armies  of  the  Athenians  and  Spartans  seems  to  have  contributed  to  the  widespread  adoption  of  professional  military  groups  within  Greece.  Half  a  century  later,  Alexander  the  Great  would  use  an  army  of  professional  forces  to  conquer  Persia.  The  ideologies  of  violence  on  Crete  are  important  to  this  story  because  they  explain  why  Cretan  elites  were  so  committed  to  organized  violence,  emphasize  the  political  power  of  warriorhood  within  Greek  poleis,  and  illustrate  how  ancient  warfare  could  directly  impact  the  history  of  the  eastern  Mediterranean  more  broadly.
■590    ▼aSchool  code:  0028.
■650  4▼aAncient  history.
■650  4▼aArchaeology.
■650  4▼aClassical  studies.
■653    ▼aCrete
■653    ▼aDigital  humanities
■653    ▼aHoplite
■653    ▼aPolis
■653    ▼aViolence
■653    ▼aWarfare
■690    ▼a0579
■690    ▼a0324
■690    ▼a0434
■71020▼aUniversity  of  California,  Berkeley▼bAncient  History  &  Mediterranean  Archaeology.
■7730  ▼tDissertations  Abstracts  International▼g85-03A.
■773    ▼tDissertation  Abstract  International
■790    ▼a0028
■791    ▼aPh.D.
■792    ▼a2023
■793    ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T16932426▼nKERIS▼z이  자료의  원문은  한국교육학술정보원에서  제공합니다.
■980    ▼a202402▼f2024

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