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Essays in Industrial Organization
Essays in Industrial Organization
상세정보
- 자료유형
- 학위논문 서양
- 최종처리일시
- 20250211152752
- ISBN
- 9798383417256
- DDC
- 310
- 저자명
- Lu, Sen.
- 서명/저자
- Essays in Industrial Organization
- 발행사항
- [Sl] : Rice University, 2024
- 발행사항
- Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2024
- 형태사항
- 128 p
- 주기사항
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-02, Section: B.
- 주기사항
- Advisor: Fox, Jeremy.
- 학위논문주기
- Thesis (Ph.D.)--Rice University, 2024.
- 초록/해제
- 요약This dissertation consists of two chapters on the partial identification in empirical industrial organization. Chapter 1: Game-theoretic entry models usually impose strong restrictions on the predetermined information structure of the game. This paper introduces a new method for the identification and inference of payoff parameters in static entry games, while being agnostic about the latent information structure. I examine a static entry game, assuming that all potential entrants are symmetric. I introduce a modification of Bergemann and Morris's (2016) solution concept, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium (BCE), which I refer to as Symmetric BCE, and provide a tractable and sharp characterization of the identified set of payoff parameters. I apply the method to driving schools, investigating the impact of the number of operating firms on the profitability of potential entrants. I conduct two counterfactual experiments to evaluate the effects on the number of operating firms: firstly, a simulation of market size reduction, and secondly, amplifying the market size effect by 30%. The empirical results indicate that the new, robust method still provides informative insights. Moreover, using the notion of Symmetric BCE, as opposed to BCE, reduces the computational burden, making identification and inference feasible even with a moderate number of players.Chapter 2: This paper proposes a new approach to partial identification of the semi-parametric multinomial choices model in a panel data setting, where the analyst uses covariate data on a subset of choices. This multinomial choice model allows for an arbitrary joint distribution of choice specific unobservables, so IIA-like property is not assumed. I show that the within-group comparison proposed by Pakes and Porter(2024) can be modified to account for the observation structure. I show that the new within-group comparison leads to a set of conditional moment inequalities. My main finding shows that the set of conditional moment inequalities characterizes the sharp identified set of the index parameters. In Monte Carlo simulations, the finite sample performance is presented.
- 일반주제명
- Statistics
- 키워드
- Entry games
- 기타저자
- Rice University Economics
- 기본자료저록
- Dissertations Abstracts International. 86-02B.
- 전자적 위치 및 접속
- 로그인 후 원문을 볼 수 있습니다.
MARC
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■006m o d
■007cr#unu||||||||
■020 ▼a9798383417256
■035 ▼a(MiAaPQ)AAI31532868
■035 ▼a(MiAaPQ)0187rice5163Lu
■040 ▼aMiAaPQ▼cMiAaPQ
■0820 ▼a310
■1001 ▼aLu, Sen.
■24510▼aEssays in Industrial Organization
■260 ▼a[Sl]▼bRice University▼c2024
■260 1▼aAnn Arbor▼bProQuest Dissertations & Theses▼c2024
■300 ▼a128 p
■500 ▼aSource: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-02, Section: B.
■500 ▼aAdvisor: Fox, Jeremy.
■5021 ▼aThesis (Ph.D.)--Rice University, 2024.
■520 ▼aThis dissertation consists of two chapters on the partial identification in empirical industrial organization. Chapter 1: Game-theoretic entry models usually impose strong restrictions on the predetermined information structure of the game. This paper introduces a new method for the identification and inference of payoff parameters in static entry games, while being agnostic about the latent information structure. I examine a static entry game, assuming that all potential entrants are symmetric. I introduce a modification of Bergemann and Morris's (2016) solution concept, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium (BCE), which I refer to as Symmetric BCE, and provide a tractable and sharp characterization of the identified set of payoff parameters. I apply the method to driving schools, investigating the impact of the number of operating firms on the profitability of potential entrants. I conduct two counterfactual experiments to evaluate the effects on the number of operating firms: firstly, a simulation of market size reduction, and secondly, amplifying the market size effect by 30%. The empirical results indicate that the new, robust method still provides informative insights. Moreover, using the notion of Symmetric BCE, as opposed to BCE, reduces the computational burden, making identification and inference feasible even with a moderate number of players.Chapter 2: This paper proposes a new approach to partial identification of the semi-parametric multinomial choices model in a panel data setting, where the analyst uses covariate data on a subset of choices. This multinomial choice model allows for an arbitrary joint distribution of choice specific unobservables, so IIA-like property is not assumed. I show that the within-group comparison proposed by Pakes and Porter(2024) can be modified to account for the observation structure. I show that the new within-group comparison leads to a set of conditional moment inequalities. My main finding shows that the set of conditional moment inequalities characterizes the sharp identified set of the index parameters. In Monte Carlo simulations, the finite sample performance is presented.
■590 ▼aSchool code: 0187.
■650 4▼aStatistics
■653 ▼aSet identification
■653 ▼aEntry games
■653 ▼aRobust information
■653 ▼aMultinomial choice
■690 ▼a0501
■690 ▼a0511
■690 ▼a0463
■71020▼aRice University▼bEconomics.
■7730 ▼tDissertations Abstracts International▼g86-02B.
■790 ▼a0187
■791 ▼aPh.D.
■792 ▼a2024
■793 ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17163781▼nKERIS▼z이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.
