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Explaining Debt Covenant Amendments: A Structural Approach
Explaining Debt Covenant Amendments: A Structural Approach
상세정보
- 자료유형
- 학위논문 서양
- 최종처리일시
- 20250211151039
- ISBN
- 9798382830162
- DDC
- 658
- 저자명
- Luneva, Irina.
- 서명/저자
- Explaining Debt Covenant Amendments: A Structural Approach
- 발행사항
- [Sl] : University of Pennsylvania, 2024
- 발행사항
- Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2024
- 형태사항
- 102 p
- 주기사항
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-12, Section: A.
- 주기사항
- Advisor: Schrand, Catherine M.;Fischer, Paul.
- 학위논문주기
- Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Pennsylvania, 2024.
- 초록/해제
- 요약Financial covenants, which use financial information to determine control rights in corporate loan contracts, are frequently amended (Roberts, 2015). Despite the strong evidence, prior literature has not found an explanation for the high frequency. In this paper, I offer a model of debt covenant amendments and structurally estimate it using novel data on amendments of financial covenants in U.S. companies' loan contracts. The model offers three explanations for why financial covenants get amended: (1) the degree of contractual incompleteness is high, (2) non-contractible information is highly predictive of the future, and (3) the costs of amendments are small, while the costs of misallocating control rights are high. The estimation results mostly support the first and the third explanations. Financial covenants are amended because contracting parties indeed face a high degree of contractual incompleteness, because the costs of amendments are indeed low compared to the costs of misallocating control rights, but not necessarily because non-contractible information is highly predictive of the future.
- 일반주제명
- Finance
- 키워드
- Amendments
- 키워드
- Debt contract
- 키워드
- Dynamic contract
- 기타저자
- University of Pennsylvania Accounting
- 기본자료저록
- Dissertations Abstracts International. 85-12A.
- 전자적 위치 및 접속
- 로그인 후 원문을 볼 수 있습니다.
MARC
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■00520250211151039
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■007cr#unu||||||||
■020 ▼a9798382830162
■035 ▼a(MiAaPQ)AAI31139718
■040 ▼aMiAaPQ▼cMiAaPQ
■0820 ▼a658
■1001 ▼aLuneva, Irina.
■24510▼aExplaining Debt Covenant Amendments: A Structural Approach
■260 ▼a[Sl]▼bUniversity of Pennsylvania▼c2024
■260 1▼aAnn Arbor▼bProQuest Dissertations & Theses▼c2024
■300 ▼a102 p
■500 ▼aSource: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-12, Section: A.
■500 ▼aAdvisor: Schrand, Catherine M.;Fischer, Paul.
■5021 ▼aThesis (Ph.D.)--University of Pennsylvania, 2024.
■520 ▼aFinancial covenants, which use financial information to determine control rights in corporate loan contracts, are frequently amended (Roberts, 2015). Despite the strong evidence, prior literature has not found an explanation for the high frequency. In this paper, I offer a model of debt covenant amendments and structurally estimate it using novel data on amendments of financial covenants in U.S. companies' loan contracts. The model offers three explanations for why financial covenants get amended: (1) the degree of contractual incompleteness is high, (2) non-contractible information is highly predictive of the future, and (3) the costs of amendments are small, while the costs of misallocating control rights are high. The estimation results mostly support the first and the third explanations. Financial covenants are amended because contracting parties indeed face a high degree of contractual incompleteness, because the costs of amendments are indeed low compared to the costs of misallocating control rights, but not necessarily because non-contractible information is highly predictive of the future.
■590 ▼aSchool code: 0175.
■650 4▼aFinance
■653 ▼aAmendments
■653 ▼aDebt contract
■653 ▼aDynamic contract
■653 ▼aFinancial covenants
■690 ▼a0272
■690 ▼a0508
■71020▼aUniversity of Pennsylvania▼bAccounting.
■7730 ▼tDissertations Abstracts International▼g85-12A.
■790 ▼a0175
■791 ▼aPh.D.
■792 ▼a2024
■793 ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17160555▼nKERIS▼z이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.
