서브메뉴
검색
Innovation and Welfare Impacts of Disclosure Regulation: A General Equilibrium Approach
Innovation and Welfare Impacts of Disclosure Regulation: A General Equilibrium Approach
상세정보
- 자료유형
- 학위논문 서양
- 최종처리일시
- 20250211151101
- ISBN
- 9798382584683
- DDC
- 658
- 저자명
- Yang, Li.
- 서명/저자
- Innovation and Welfare Impacts of Disclosure Regulation: A General Equilibrium Approach
- 발행사항
- [Sl] : Columbia University, 2024
- 발행사항
- Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2024
- 형태사항
- 80 p
- 주기사항
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-11, Section: A.
- 주기사항
- Advisor: Baldenius, Tim;Breuer, Matthias.
- 학위논문주기
- Thesis (Ph.D.)--Columbia University, 2024.
- 초록/해제
- 요약I develop a general equilibrium model to examine the innovation and welfare effects of expanding mandatory financial disclosure to a broader set of firms. In the model, disclosure by relatively small firms reveals proprietary information about their local markets, which helps larger firms enter and compete. Consistent with previous empirical findings, the model predicts that mandatory disclosure encourages (discourages) innovation by larger (smaller) firms. More importantly, I identify conditions for when expanding the scope of disclosure regulation increases aggregate innovation and/or welfare. I structurally estimate the model using innovation data and plausibly exogenous variation in the extent of disclosure regulation in Europe. My estimates suggest that subjecting 15% more firms to full reporting requirements decreases aggregate innovation by around -0.26% but increases welfare by around 1%. This disparity is driven by the fact that production shifts to larger firms that innovate less but are more efficient in exploiting the fruits of innovations.
- 일반주제명
- Finance
- 키워드
- Welfare effects
- 키워드
- Welfare impacts
- 키워드
- Local markets
- 기타저자
- Columbia University Business
- 기본자료저록
- Dissertations Abstracts International. 85-11A.
- 전자적 위치 및 접속
- 로그인 후 원문을 볼 수 있습니다.
MARC
008250123s2024 us c eng d■001000017160690
■00520250211151101
■006m o d
■007cr#unu||||||||
■020 ▼a9798382584683
■035 ▼a(MiAaPQ)AAI31142999
■040 ▼aMiAaPQ▼cMiAaPQ
■0820 ▼a658
■1001 ▼aYang, Li.
■24510▼aInnovation and Welfare Impacts of Disclosure Regulation: A General Equilibrium Approach
■260 ▼a[Sl]▼bColumbia University▼c2024
■260 1▼aAnn Arbor▼bProQuest Dissertations & Theses▼c2024
■300 ▼a80 p
■500 ▼aSource: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-11, Section: A.
■500 ▼aAdvisor: Baldenius, Tim;Breuer, Matthias.
■5021 ▼aThesis (Ph.D.)--Columbia University, 2024.
■520 ▼aI develop a general equilibrium model to examine the innovation and welfare effects of expanding mandatory financial disclosure to a broader set of firms. In the model, disclosure by relatively small firms reveals proprietary information about their local markets, which helps larger firms enter and compete. Consistent with previous empirical findings, the model predicts that mandatory disclosure encourages (discourages) innovation by larger (smaller) firms. More importantly, I identify conditions for when expanding the scope of disclosure regulation increases aggregate innovation and/or welfare. I structurally estimate the model using innovation data and plausibly exogenous variation in the extent of disclosure regulation in Europe. My estimates suggest that subjecting 15% more firms to full reporting requirements decreases aggregate innovation by around -0.26% but increases welfare by around 1%. This disparity is driven by the fact that production shifts to larger firms that innovate less but are more efficient in exploiting the fruits of innovations.
■590 ▼aSchool code: 0054.
■650 4▼aFinance
■653 ▼aWelfare effects
■653 ▼aWelfare impacts
■653 ▼aFinancial disclosure
■653 ▼aLocal markets
■690 ▼a0272
■690 ▼a0501
■690 ▼a0508
■71020▼aColumbia University▼bBusiness.
■7730 ▼tDissertations Abstracts International▼g85-11A.
■790 ▼a0054
■791 ▼aPh.D.
■792 ▼a2024
■793 ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17160690▼nKERIS▼z이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.
