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Essays on Macroeconomics and Financial Markets
Essays on Macroeconomics and Financial Markets
Essays on Macroeconomics and Financial Markets

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자료유형  
 학위논문 서양
최종처리일시  
20250211151055
ISBN  
9798383161012
DDC  
658
저자명  
Varraso, Paolo.
서명/저자  
Essays on Macroeconomics and Financial Markets
발행사항  
[Sl] : New York University, 2024
발행사항  
Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2024
형태사항  
224 p
주기사항  
Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-12, Section: A.
주기사항  
Advisor: Perez, Diego J.
학위논문주기  
Thesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, 2024.
초록/해제  
요약This dissertation consists of three independent chapters on questions related to how financial frictions shapes macroeconomic dynamics and create scope for policy.In the first chapter, I study the role of financial intermediaries in the transmission of interest-rate risk. I develop a quantitative model where banks can invest in assets of different durations and choose optimally their exposure to interest-rate fluctuations. I embed this portfolio problem in a heterogeneous-banks framework with financial frictions and endogenous default. The model predicts that in periods of loose monetary policy banks face weaker financial constraints. As a result, they become more tolerant of interest-rate risk and invest more extensively in long-duration assets. However, when the economy undergoes a sudden monetary tightening, this portfolio shift amplifies contractions in asset prices, credit, and output. I validate the model by showing that it can reproduce aggregate and cross-sectional patterns related to banks' maturity mismatches, the level of the interest rate and leverage. A quantitative application to the 2022 monetary tightening shows that a lengthening of duration in periods of low interest rates gives rise to significant financial amplification.The second chapter studies the design of macroprudential policies based on quantitative collateral-constraint models. I show that the desirability of macroprudential policies critically depends on the specific form of collateral used in debt contracts: While inefficiencies arise when current prices affect collateral-a frequent benchmark used to guide policies-they do not when only future prices affect collateral. Since the microfoundations and quantitative predictions of models with future-price collateral constraints do not appear less plausible than those using current prices, I argue that additional empirical research on whether and how contract design is variant to policy is important for the use of these models in macroprudential policy design.In the third chapter, I study optimal government spending in a canonical, small-open-economy model where a collateral constraint gives rise to overborrowing. I show quantitatively that excess procyclicality-a pervasive feature of emerging markets-makes the economy more vulnerable to sudden stops. In normal times, pro-cyclical spending encourages borrowing and magnifies the inefficiency; during a sudden stop, it depresses collateral values and exacerbates deleveraging pressures on households. I characterize the optimal time-consistent policy and show that it would significantly reduce both the likelihood and severity of a sudden stop. 
일반주제명  
Finance
키워드  
Financial amplification
키워드  
Heterogeneous-banks
키워드  
Policy banks
키워드  
Macroprudential policy
기타저자  
New York University Economics
기본자료저록  
Dissertations Abstracts International. 85-12A.
전자적 위치 및 접속  
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■040    ▼aMiAaPQ▼cMiAaPQ
■0820  ▼a658
■1001  ▼aVarraso,  Paolo.
■24510▼aEssays  on  Macroeconomics  and  Financial  Markets
■260    ▼a[Sl]▼bNew  York  University▼c2024
■260  1▼aAnn  Arbor▼bProQuest  Dissertations  &  Theses▼c2024
■300    ▼a224  p
■500    ▼aSource:  Dissertations  Abstracts  International,  Volume:  85-12,  Section:  A.
■500    ▼aAdvisor:  Perez,  Diego  J.
■5021  ▼aThesis  (Ph.D.)--New  York  University,  2024.
■520    ▼aThis  dissertation  consists  of  three  independent  chapters  on  questions  related  to  how  financial  frictions  shapes  macroeconomic  dynamics  and  create  scope  for  policy.In  the  first  chapter,  I  study  the  role  of  financial  intermediaries  in  the  transmission  of  interest-rate  risk.  I  develop  a  quantitative  model  where  banks  can  invest  in  assets  of  different  durations  and  choose  optimally  their  exposure  to  interest-rate  fluctuations.  I  embed  this  portfolio  problem  in  a  heterogeneous-banks  framework  with  financial  frictions  and  endogenous  default.  The  model  predicts  that  in  periods  of  loose  monetary  policy  banks  face  weaker  financial  constraints.  As  a  result,  they  become  more  tolerant  of  interest-rate  risk  and  invest  more  extensively  in  long-duration  assets.  However,  when  the  economy  undergoes  a  sudden  monetary  tightening,  this  portfolio  shift  amplifies  contractions  in  asset  prices,  credit,  and  output.  I  validate  the  model  by  showing  that  it  can  reproduce  aggregate  and  cross-sectional  patterns  related  to  banks'  maturity  mismatches,  the  level  of  the  interest  rate  and  leverage.  A  quantitative  application  to  the  2022  monetary  tightening  shows  that  a  lengthening  of  duration  in  periods  of  low  interest  rates  gives  rise  to  significant  financial  amplification.The  second  chapter  studies  the  design  of  macroprudential  policies  based  on  quantitative  collateral-constraint  models.  I  show  that  the  desirability  of  macroprudential  policies  critically  depends  on  the  specific  form  of  collateral  used  in  debt  contracts:  While  inefficiencies  arise  when  current  prices  affect  collateral-a  frequent  benchmark  used  to  guide  policies-they  do  not  when  only  future  prices  affect  collateral.  Since  the  microfoundations  and  quantitative  predictions  of  models  with  future-price  collateral  constraints  do  not  appear  less  plausible  than  those  using  current  prices,  I  argue  that  additional  empirical  research  on  whether  and  how  contract  design  is  variant  to  policy  is  important  for  the  use  of  these  models  in  macroprudential  policy  design.In  the  third  chapter,  I  study  optimal  government  spending  in  a  canonical,  small-open-economy  model  where  a  collateral  constraint  gives  rise  to  overborrowing.  I  show  quantitatively  that  excess  procyclicality-a  pervasive  feature  of  emerging  markets-makes  the  economy  more  vulnerable  to  sudden  stops.  In  normal  times,  pro-cyclical  spending  encourages  borrowing  and  magnifies  the  inefficiency;  during  a  sudden  stop,  it  depresses  collateral  values  and  exacerbates  deleveraging  pressures  on  households.  I  characterize  the  optimal  time-consistent  policy  and  show  that  it  would  significantly  reduce  both  the  likelihood  and  severity  of  a  sudden  stop. 
■590    ▼aSchool  code:  0146.
■650  4▼aFinance
■653    ▼aFinancial  amplification
■653    ▼aHeterogeneous-banks
■653    ▼aPolicy  banks
■653    ▼aMacroprudential  policy
■690    ▼a0501
■690    ▼a0338
■690    ▼a0508
■71020▼aNew  York  University▼bEconomics.
■7730  ▼tDissertations  Abstracts  International▼g85-12A.
■790    ▼a0146
■791    ▼aPh.D.
■792    ▼a2024
■793    ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17160651▼nKERIS▼z이  자료의  원문은  한국교육학술정보원에서  제공합니다.

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