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Essays on Macroeconomics and Financial Markets
Essays on Macroeconomics and Financial Markets
상세정보
- 자료유형
- 학위논문 서양
- 최종처리일시
- 20250211151055
- ISBN
- 9798383161012
- DDC
- 658
- 저자명
- Varraso, Paolo.
- 서명/저자
- Essays on Macroeconomics and Financial Markets
- 발행사항
- [Sl] : New York University, 2024
- 발행사항
- Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2024
- 형태사항
- 224 p
- 주기사항
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-12, Section: A.
- 주기사항
- Advisor: Perez, Diego J.
- 학위논문주기
- Thesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, 2024.
- 초록/해제
- 요약This dissertation consists of three independent chapters on questions related to how financial frictions shapes macroeconomic dynamics and create scope for policy.In the first chapter, I study the role of financial intermediaries in the transmission of interest-rate risk. I develop a quantitative model where banks can invest in assets of different durations and choose optimally their exposure to interest-rate fluctuations. I embed this portfolio problem in a heterogeneous-banks framework with financial frictions and endogenous default. The model predicts that in periods of loose monetary policy banks face weaker financial constraints. As a result, they become more tolerant of interest-rate risk and invest more extensively in long-duration assets. However, when the economy undergoes a sudden monetary tightening, this portfolio shift amplifies contractions in asset prices, credit, and output. I validate the model by showing that it can reproduce aggregate and cross-sectional patterns related to banks' maturity mismatches, the level of the interest rate and leverage. A quantitative application to the 2022 monetary tightening shows that a lengthening of duration in periods of low interest rates gives rise to significant financial amplification.The second chapter studies the design of macroprudential policies based on quantitative collateral-constraint models. I show that the desirability of macroprudential policies critically depends on the specific form of collateral used in debt contracts: While inefficiencies arise when current prices affect collateral-a frequent benchmark used to guide policies-they do not when only future prices affect collateral. Since the microfoundations and quantitative predictions of models with future-price collateral constraints do not appear less plausible than those using current prices, I argue that additional empirical research on whether and how contract design is variant to policy is important for the use of these models in macroprudential policy design.In the third chapter, I study optimal government spending in a canonical, small-open-economy model where a collateral constraint gives rise to overborrowing. I show quantitatively that excess procyclicality-a pervasive feature of emerging markets-makes the economy more vulnerable to sudden stops. In normal times, pro-cyclical spending encourages borrowing and magnifies the inefficiency; during a sudden stop, it depresses collateral values and exacerbates deleveraging pressures on households. I characterize the optimal time-consistent policy and show that it would significantly reduce both the likelihood and severity of a sudden stop.
- 일반주제명
- Finance
- 키워드
- Policy banks
- 기타저자
- New York University Economics
- 기본자료저록
- Dissertations Abstracts International. 85-12A.
- 전자적 위치 및 접속
- 로그인 후 원문을 볼 수 있습니다.
MARC
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■020 ▼a9798383161012
■035 ▼a(MiAaPQ)AAI31142192
■040 ▼aMiAaPQ▼cMiAaPQ
■0820 ▼a658
■1001 ▼aVarraso, Paolo.
■24510▼aEssays on Macroeconomics and Financial Markets
■260 ▼a[Sl]▼bNew York University▼c2024
■260 1▼aAnn Arbor▼bProQuest Dissertations & Theses▼c2024
■300 ▼a224 p
■500 ▼aSource: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-12, Section: A.
■500 ▼aAdvisor: Perez, Diego J.
■5021 ▼aThesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, 2024.
■520 ▼aThis dissertation consists of three independent chapters on questions related to how financial frictions shapes macroeconomic dynamics and create scope for policy.In the first chapter, I study the role of financial intermediaries in the transmission of interest-rate risk. I develop a quantitative model where banks can invest in assets of different durations and choose optimally their exposure to interest-rate fluctuations. I embed this portfolio problem in a heterogeneous-banks framework with financial frictions and endogenous default. The model predicts that in periods of loose monetary policy banks face weaker financial constraints. As a result, they become more tolerant of interest-rate risk and invest more extensively in long-duration assets. However, when the economy undergoes a sudden monetary tightening, this portfolio shift amplifies contractions in asset prices, credit, and output. I validate the model by showing that it can reproduce aggregate and cross-sectional patterns related to banks' maturity mismatches, the level of the interest rate and leverage. A quantitative application to the 2022 monetary tightening shows that a lengthening of duration in periods of low interest rates gives rise to significant financial amplification.The second chapter studies the design of macroprudential policies based on quantitative collateral-constraint models. I show that the desirability of macroprudential policies critically depends on the specific form of collateral used in debt contracts: While inefficiencies arise when current prices affect collateral-a frequent benchmark used to guide policies-they do not when only future prices affect collateral. Since the microfoundations and quantitative predictions of models with future-price collateral constraints do not appear less plausible than those using current prices, I argue that additional empirical research on whether and how contract design is variant to policy is important for the use of these models in macroprudential policy design.In the third chapter, I study optimal government spending in a canonical, small-open-economy model where a collateral constraint gives rise to overborrowing. I show quantitatively that excess procyclicality-a pervasive feature of emerging markets-makes the economy more vulnerable to sudden stops. In normal times, pro-cyclical spending encourages borrowing and magnifies the inefficiency; during a sudden stop, it depresses collateral values and exacerbates deleveraging pressures on households. I characterize the optimal time-consistent policy and show that it would significantly reduce both the likelihood and severity of a sudden stop.
■590 ▼aSchool code: 0146.
■650 4▼aFinance
■653 ▼aFinancial amplification
■653 ▼aHeterogeneous-banks
■653 ▼aPolicy banks
■653 ▼aMacroprudential policy
■690 ▼a0501
■690 ▼a0338
■690 ▼a0508
■71020▼aNew York University▼bEconomics.
■7730 ▼tDissertations Abstracts International▼g85-12A.
■790 ▼a0146
■791 ▼aPh.D.
■792 ▼a2024
■793 ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17160651▼nKERIS▼z이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.


