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Theorizing the Dynamics of Civilian Control Over Law Enforcement Militarization: A Case Study of the 2018 Federal Intervention of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
Theorizing the Dynamics of Civilian Control Over Law Enforcement Militarization: A Case St...
Theorizing the Dynamics of Civilian Control Over Law Enforcement Militarization: A Case Study of the 2018 Federal Intervention of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

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자료유형  
 학위논문 서양
최종처리일시  
20250211151359
ISBN  
9798382332543
DDC  
320
저자명  
Littlefield, Ned.
서명/저자  
Theorizing the Dynamics of Civilian Control Over Law Enforcement Militarization: A Case Study of the 2018 Federal Intervention of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
발행사항  
[Sl] : The University of Wisconsin - Madison, 2024
발행사항  
Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2024
형태사항  
417 p
주기사항  
Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-11, Section: A.
주기사항  
Includes supplementary digital materials.
주기사항  
Advisor: Simmons, Erica.
학위논문주기  
Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Wisconsin - Madison, 2024.
초록/해제  
요약Why and to what effect do civilian institutions form to control law enforcement militarization? Facing extreme insecurity, Latin American democracies increasingly deploy soldiers for policing and operate police like soldiers. This trend risks undermining democratic governance in multiple respects (e.g., fueling human rights violations). However, civilians reportedly have few incentives and capabilities to control militarization by concluding troop deployments and reducing police violence.It therefore is puzzling that a coalition emerged to monitor the 2018 Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro, wherein the Brazilian Army controlled local policing. Moreover, the Intervention and preceding military operations in Rio de Janeiro were discontinued from 2019 to 2022. The Intervention saw considerably more police violence than prior military operations, which surprisingly had corresponded with fewer extrajudicial killings than non-deployment periods.To illuminate these puzzles, I argue that the autonomy paradox explains institutions' formation and impacts. Independence from militarization's principal and agents gives civilians the opportunity to establish institutions to contest militarization. Because autonomy limits their access to information, institutions must collect original information to monitor militarization. Such information could enable them to shape political discourse (by influencing critical media coverage) and, thus, military officials' concerns with deployments' legitimacy (by raising societal costs), potentially contributing to military lobbying against deployments.The paradox is that autonomy and its effects could limit institutions' access to military officials. Civilians thus have few opportunities to socialize officials against substituting military presence with police violence. Institutions could raise militarization's cost, potentially cannot facilitate demilitarization necessarily, and could have the unintended consequence of intensifying violence. Overcoming the paradox could require balancing independence and collaboration to increase socialization opportunities.I develop this argument by synthesizing theory on controlling the military and controlling militarization. The former entails monitoring the military to raise societal costs of disobeying civilian authority and socializing officials into considering this authority legitimate. The latter involves using political discourse to delegitimize military force. A theory-building case study advances the argument. Through process-tracing based on 119 interviews and several original datasets, I analyze whether autonomy was necessary and/or sufficient for institutions to form, monitor, and influence the Federal Intervention.
일반주제명  
Political science
일반주제명  
Latin American studies
일반주제명  
Law enforcement
일반주제명  
Military studies
키워드  
Brazil
키워드  
Civilian control
키워드  
Civilian institutions
키워드  
Militarization
키워드  
Rio de Janeiro
키워드  
Federal Intervention
기타저자  
The University of Wisconsin - Madison Political Science
기본자료저록  
Dissertations Abstracts International. 85-11A.
전자적 위치 및 접속  
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MARC

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■040    ▼aMiAaPQ▼cMiAaPQ
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■1001  ▼aLittlefield,  Ned.
■24510▼aTheorizing  the  Dynamics  of  Civilian  Control  Over  Law  Enforcement  Militarization:  A  Case  Study  of  the  2018  Federal  Intervention  of  Rio  de  Janeiro,  Brazil
■260    ▼a[Sl]▼bThe  University  of  Wisconsin  -  Madison▼c2024
■260  1▼aAnn  Arbor▼bProQuest  Dissertations  &  Theses▼c2024
■300    ▼a417  p
■500    ▼aSource:  Dissertations  Abstracts  International,  Volume:  85-11,  Section:  A.
■500    ▼aIncludes  supplementary  digital  materials.
■500    ▼aAdvisor:  Simmons,  Erica.
■5021  ▼aThesis  (Ph.D.)--The  University  of  Wisconsin  -  Madison,  2024.
■520    ▼aWhy  and  to  what  effect  do  civilian  institutions  form  to  control  law  enforcement  militarization?  Facing  extreme  insecurity,  Latin  American  democracies  increasingly  deploy  soldiers  for  policing  and  operate  police  like  soldiers.  This  trend  risks  undermining  democratic  governance  in  multiple  respects  (e.g.,  fueling  human  rights  violations).  However,  civilians  reportedly  have  few  incentives  and  capabilities  to  control  militarization  by  concluding  troop  deployments  and  reducing  police  violence.It  therefore  is  puzzling  that  a  coalition  emerged  to  monitor  the  2018  Federal  Intervention  in  Rio  de  Janeiro,  wherein  the  Brazilian  Army  controlled  local  policing.  Moreover,  the  Intervention  and  preceding  military  operations  in  Rio  de  Janeiro  were  discontinued  from  2019  to  2022.  The  Intervention  saw  considerably  more  police  violence  than  prior  military  operations,  which  surprisingly  had  corresponded  with  fewer  extrajudicial  killings  than  non-deployment  periods.To  illuminate  these  puzzles,  I  argue  that  the  autonomy  paradox  explains  institutions'  formation  and  impacts.  Independence  from  militarization's  principal  and  agents  gives  civilians  the  opportunity  to  establish  institutions  to  contest  militarization.  Because  autonomy  limits  their  access  to  information,  institutions  must  collect  original  information  to  monitor  militarization.  Such  information  could  enable  them  to  shape  political  discourse  (by  influencing  critical  media  coverage)  and,  thus,  military  officials'  concerns  with  deployments'  legitimacy  (by  raising  societal  costs),  potentially  contributing  to  military  lobbying  against  deployments.The  paradox  is  that  autonomy  and  its  effects  could  limit  institutions'  access  to  military  officials.  Civilians  thus  have  few  opportunities  to  socialize  officials  against  substituting  military  presence  with  police  violence.  Institutions  could  raise  militarization's  cost,  potentially  cannot  facilitate  demilitarization  necessarily,  and  could  have  the  unintended  consequence  of  intensifying  violence.  Overcoming  the  paradox  could  require  balancing  independence  and  collaboration  to  increase  socialization  opportunities.I  develop  this  argument  by  synthesizing  theory  on  controlling  the  military  and  controlling  militarization.  The  former  entails  monitoring  the  military  to  raise  societal  costs  of  disobeying  civilian  authority  and  socializing  officials  into  considering  this  authority  legitimate.  The  latter  involves  using  political  discourse  to  delegitimize  military  force.  A  theory-building  case  study  advances  the  argument.  Through  process-tracing  based  on  119  interviews  and  several  original  datasets,  I  analyze  whether  autonomy  was  necessary  and/or  sufficient  for  institutions  to  form,  monitor,  and  influence  the  Federal  Intervention.
■590    ▼aSchool  code:  0262.
■650  4▼aPolitical  science
■650  4▼aLatin  American  studies
■650  4▼aLaw  enforcement
■650  4▼aMilitary  studies
■653    ▼aBrazil
■653    ▼aCivilian  control
■653    ▼aCivilian  institutions
■653    ▼aMilitarization
■653    ▼aRio  de  Janeiro
■653    ▼aFederal  Intervention
■690    ▼a0615
■690    ▼a0550
■690    ▼a0750
■690    ▼a0206
■690    ▼a0601
■71020▼aThe  University  of  Wisconsin  -  Madison▼bPolitical  Science.
■7730  ▼tDissertations  Abstracts  International▼g85-11A.
■790    ▼a0262
■791    ▼aPh.D.
■792    ▼a2024
■793    ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17161460▼nKERIS▼z이  자료의  원문은  한국교육학술정보원에서  제공합니다.

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