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Ontological Methodology and the Philosophy of Arithmetic: A Critique of Abstractionism
Ontological Methodology and the Philosophy of Arithmetic: A Critique of Abstractionism
Detailed Information
- 자료유형
- 학위논문 서양
- 최종처리일시
- 20250211152822
- ISBN
- 9798384095507
- DDC
- 100
- 서명/저자
- Ontological Methodology and the Philosophy of Arithmetic: A Critique of Abstractionism
- 발행사항
- [Sl] : University of Minnesota, 2024
- 발행사항
- Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2024
- 형태사항
- 110 p
- 주기사항
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-03, Section: B.
- 주기사항
- Advisor: Cook, Roy T.
- 학위논문주기
- Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Minnesota, 2024.
- 초록/해제
- 요약My dissertation is a study of Bob Hale and Crispin Wright's abstractionism, a realist philosophy of mathematics that originates from the philosophical and technical work of Gottlob Frege (1884-1925). More specifically, I am concerned with the structure and viability of their metaontology: the method by which Hale and Wright establish the existence of numbers as mind-independent objects. At the heart of their view is the claim that the truth of abstraction principles (a special type of implicit definition) and the Syntactic Priority Thesis (a special semantic principle) is enough to guarantee mathematical realism. Hence, they adopt the language-first approach, according to which facts about language can decide metaphysical questions about mathematicalia. The first chapter is introductory; it serves to situate the subject matter of this thesis and provide the necessary background information. The second chapter is historical. Therein I offer a novel interpretation of the language-first arguments for mathematical realism put forth by Frege. On this reading, his metaontology relies on the aboutness properties of arithmetical terms and sentences. This chapter serves to make explicit the mechanics of Frege's metaphysical arguments, which have hitherto remained somewhat mysterious; and to place the metaontology of abstractionism in relief. The third chapter is critical. There I present Hale and Wright's methodology and level several criticisms against it: First, I demonstrate that their argument for the truth of a given abstraction principle is unsuccessful. Second, I show that the Syntactic Priority Thesis has plausible counterexamples. Thus, a different approach must be taken if abstractionism is to count as a promising species of mathematical realism. The fourth and final chapter is constructive. I lay the foundations of a new language-first metaontology for abstractionism that is inspired by the work of Stewart Shapiro, Oystein Linnebo, and Roy T. Cook. As a species of coherentist minimalism, this approach is committed to the following claim: if a formal theory of abstraction meets stringent coherence conditions (or is coherent-plus), then the entities it purports to be about exist as mind-independent abstract objects. Lastly, I show that a particularly important theory of abstraction that grounds arithmetic does, in fact, meet said coherence conditions.
- 일반주제명
- Philosophy
- 일반주제명
- Theoretical mathematics
- 일반주제명
- Mathematics
- 일반주제명
- Epistemology
- 키워드
- Abstractionism
- 키워드
- Existence
- 키워드
- Metaontology
- 키워드
- Objecthood
- 기타저자
- University of Minnesota Philosophy
- 기본자료저록
- Dissertations Abstracts International. 86-03B.
- 전자적 위치 및 접속
- 로그인 후 원문을 볼 수 있습니다.
MARC
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■00520250211152822
■006m o d
■007cr#unu||||||||
■020 ▼a9798384095507
■035 ▼a(MiAaPQ)AAI31559590
■040 ▼aMiAaPQ▼cMiAaPQ
■0820 ▼a100
■1001 ▼aCalasso, Michael.
■24510▼aOntological Methodology and the Philosophy of Arithmetic: A Critique of Abstractionism
■260 ▼a[Sl]▼bUniversity of Minnesota▼c2024
■260 1▼aAnn Arbor▼bProQuest Dissertations & Theses▼c2024
■300 ▼a110 p
■500 ▼aSource: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-03, Section: B.
■500 ▼aAdvisor: Cook, Roy T.
■5021 ▼aThesis (Ph.D.)--University of Minnesota, 2024.
■520 ▼aMy dissertation is a study of Bob Hale and Crispin Wright's abstractionism, a realist philosophy of mathematics that originates from the philosophical and technical work of Gottlob Frege (1884-1925). More specifically, I am concerned with the structure and viability of their metaontology: the method by which Hale and Wright establish the existence of numbers as mind-independent objects. At the heart of their view is the claim that the truth of abstraction principles (a special type of implicit definition) and the Syntactic Priority Thesis (a special semantic principle) is enough to guarantee mathematical realism. Hence, they adopt the language-first approach, according to which facts about language can decide metaphysical questions about mathematicalia. The first chapter is introductory; it serves to situate the subject matter of this thesis and provide the necessary background information. The second chapter is historical. Therein I offer a novel interpretation of the language-first arguments for mathematical realism put forth by Frege. On this reading, his metaontology relies on the aboutness properties of arithmetical terms and sentences. This chapter serves to make explicit the mechanics of Frege's metaphysical arguments, which have hitherto remained somewhat mysterious; and to place the metaontology of abstractionism in relief. The third chapter is critical. There I present Hale and Wright's methodology and level several criticisms against it: First, I demonstrate that their argument for the truth of a given abstraction principle is unsuccessful. Second, I show that the Syntactic Priority Thesis has plausible counterexamples. Thus, a different approach must be taken if abstractionism is to count as a promising species of mathematical realism. The fourth and final chapter is constructive. I lay the foundations of a new language-first metaontology for abstractionism that is inspired by the work of Stewart Shapiro, Oystein Linnebo, and Roy T. Cook. As a species of coherentist minimalism, this approach is committed to the following claim: if a formal theory of abstraction meets stringent coherence conditions (or is coherent-plus), then the entities it purports to be about exist as mind-independent abstract objects. Lastly, I show that a particularly important theory of abstraction that grounds arithmetic does, in fact, meet said coherence conditions.
■590 ▼aSchool code: 0130.
■650 4▼aPhilosophy
■650 4▼aTheoretical mathematics
■650 4▼aMathematics
■650 4▼aEpistemology
■653 ▼aAbstractionism
■653 ▼aExistence
■653 ▼aMetaontology
■653 ▼aObjecthood
■653 ▼aPhilosophy of mathematics
■690 ▼a0422
■690 ▼a0642
■690 ▼a0405
■690 ▼a0393
■71020▼aUniversity of Minnesota▼bPhilosophy.
■7730 ▼tDissertations Abstracts International▼g86-03B.
■790 ▼a0130
■791 ▼aPh.D.
■792 ▼a2024
■793 ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17164025▼nKERIS▼z이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.
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