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High-Performance Process-in-Memory Architectures Design and Security Analysis
High-Performance Process-in-Memory Architectures Design and Security Analysis
상세정보
- 자료유형
- 학위논문 서양
- 최종처리일시
- 20250211152100
- ISBN
- 9798382739557
- DDC
- 621.3
- 저자명
- Wang, Ziyu.
- 서명/저자
- High-Performance Process-in-Memory Architectures Design and Security Analysis
- 발행사항
- [Sl] : University of Michigan, 2024
- 발행사항
- Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2024
- 형태사항
- 158 p
- 주기사항
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-12, Section: B.
- 주기사항
- Advisor: Lu, Wei.
- 학위논문주기
- Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Michigan, 2024.
- 초록/해제
- 요약The performance of processor-centric von Neumann architectures is greatly hindered by data movement between memory and processor, especially when encountering data-intensive tasks. Memory-centric process-in-memory (PIM) architectures perform computations directly within the memory modules. Hence, the performance and energy penalty associated with data access can be mitigated by minimizing data movement and leveraging high internal bandwidth. In addition to the benefits in performance and energy efficiency, PIM architectures facilitate extensive computing parallelism and scalability, while also provide enhanced security resilience against bus-snoop attacks. PIM architectures have shown their capability in many machine learning applications. Nonetheless, effectively accommodating ultra-large deep neural network (DNN) models, like Transformer, remains an ongoing challenge, and with the continued adoption of PIM architectures, security and vulnerability issues are poised to become looming threats. This dissertation focuses on high-performance PIM architecture design for data-intensive applications. To facilitate PIM architecture design and security studies, the dissertation first proposes event-driven, cycle-accurate simulators and their implementations for PIM architectures based on dynamic random-access memory (DRAM) and resistive random-access memory (RRAM), along with how these simulators can be used for architecture design. The PIM-GPT architecture is then introduced, which offers high performance, high energy efficiency and end-to-end acceleration of GPT inference. PIM-GPT leverages DRAM-based PIM solutions to perform multiply-accumulate (MAC) operations on the DRAM chips, working together with an application-specific integrated chip (ASIC) which supports data communication and other necessary arithmetic computations. At the software level, the mapping scheme is designed to maximize data locality and computation parallelism by partitioning a matrix among DRAM channels and banks to utilize all in-bank computation resources concurrently. Overall, PIM-GPT achieves 41-137x, 631-1074x speedup and 123-383x and 320-602x energy efficiency over GPU and CPU baseline, respectively, on 8 GPT models. Two security and vulnerability investigations are then conducted on RRAM-based analog PIM architectures. These studies employ a dynamic power trace modeling approach at runtime, enabling efficient power and timing side-channel analysis. The susceptibility of PIM architectures to side-channel attacks is analysed. And the study reveals the possibility of extracting complete DNN model architectural information solely from power trace measurements, without prior DNN knowledge. Furthermore, another potential security vulnerability is identified, wherein an adversary can reconstruct a user's private input data through a power side-channel attack, given proper data acquisition and pre-processing. The study employs a machine learning-based attack approach utilizing a generative adversarial network (GAN) to enhance data reconstruction. Notably, these findings illustrate the effectiveness of specific attack methodologies in extracting DNN model structures and user inputs from analog PIM accelerator power leakage, even in the presence of substantial noise levels. Countermeasures against these side-channel attacks are also discussed. In light of these security challenges, there is a growing demand for hardware secure systems capable of providing robust solutions for identification, authentication, and protection against counterfeiting and unauthorized modifications. Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) emerge as a valuable technique for hardware root-of-trust. A PUF system built upon fingerprint-like random planar structures is developed, demonstrating compatibility with the back-end-of-line (BEOL) process and presenting promising potential as a hardware security primitive in the IoT industry. In the end, guiding principles and proposals for future work are deliberated, focusing on three key aspects: 1) hardware modeling and simulation of emerging PIM architectures; 2) hardware/software co-optimization for Transformer models; and 3) security and vulnerabilities in neuromorphic computing systems.
- 일반주제명
- Computer engineering
- 일반주제명
- Electrical engineering
- 기타저자
- University of Michigan Electrical and Computer Engineering
- 기본자료저록
- Dissertations Abstracts International. 85-12B.
- 전자적 위치 및 접속
- 로그인 후 원문을 볼 수 있습니다.
MARC
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■040 ▼aMiAaPQ▼cMiAaPQ
■0820 ▼a621.3
■1001 ▼aWang, Ziyu.
■24510▼aHigh-Performance Process-in-Memory Architectures Design and Security Analysis
■260 ▼a[Sl]▼bUniversity of Michigan▼c2024
■260 1▼aAnn Arbor▼bProQuest Dissertations & Theses▼c2024
■300 ▼a158 p
■500 ▼aSource: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-12, Section: B.
■500 ▼aAdvisor: Lu, Wei.
■5021 ▼aThesis (Ph.D.)--University of Michigan, 2024.
■520 ▼aThe performance of processor-centric von Neumann architectures is greatly hindered by data movement between memory and processor, especially when encountering data-intensive tasks. Memory-centric process-in-memory (PIM) architectures perform computations directly within the memory modules. Hence, the performance and energy penalty associated with data access can be mitigated by minimizing data movement and leveraging high internal bandwidth. In addition to the benefits in performance and energy efficiency, PIM architectures facilitate extensive computing parallelism and scalability, while also provide enhanced security resilience against bus-snoop attacks. PIM architectures have shown their capability in many machine learning applications. Nonetheless, effectively accommodating ultra-large deep neural network (DNN) models, like Transformer, remains an ongoing challenge, and with the continued adoption of PIM architectures, security and vulnerability issues are poised to become looming threats. This dissertation focuses on high-performance PIM architecture design for data-intensive applications. To facilitate PIM architecture design and security studies, the dissertation first proposes event-driven, cycle-accurate simulators and their implementations for PIM architectures based on dynamic random-access memory (DRAM) and resistive random-access memory (RRAM), along with how these simulators can be used for architecture design. The PIM-GPT architecture is then introduced, which offers high performance, high energy efficiency and end-to-end acceleration of GPT inference. PIM-GPT leverages DRAM-based PIM solutions to perform multiply-accumulate (MAC) operations on the DRAM chips, working together with an application-specific integrated chip (ASIC) which supports data communication and other necessary arithmetic computations. At the software level, the mapping scheme is designed to maximize data locality and computation parallelism by partitioning a matrix among DRAM channels and banks to utilize all in-bank computation resources concurrently. Overall, PIM-GPT achieves 41-137x, 631-1074x speedup and 123-383x and 320-602x energy efficiency over GPU and CPU baseline, respectively, on 8 GPT models. Two security and vulnerability investigations are then conducted on RRAM-based analog PIM architectures. These studies employ a dynamic power trace modeling approach at runtime, enabling efficient power and timing side-channel analysis. The susceptibility of PIM architectures to side-channel attacks is analysed. And the study reveals the possibility of extracting complete DNN model architectural information solely from power trace measurements, without prior DNN knowledge. Furthermore, another potential security vulnerability is identified, wherein an adversary can reconstruct a user's private input data through a power side-channel attack, given proper data acquisition and pre-processing. The study employs a machine learning-based attack approach utilizing a generative adversarial network (GAN) to enhance data reconstruction. Notably, these findings illustrate the effectiveness of specific attack methodologies in extracting DNN model structures and user inputs from analog PIM accelerator power leakage, even in the presence of substantial noise levels. Countermeasures against these side-channel attacks are also discussed. In light of these security challenges, there is a growing demand for hardware secure systems capable of providing robust solutions for identification, authentication, and protection against counterfeiting and unauthorized modifications. Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) emerge as a valuable technique for hardware root-of-trust. A PUF system built upon fingerprint-like random planar structures is developed, demonstrating compatibility with the back-end-of-line (BEOL) process and presenting promising potential as a hardware security primitive in the IoT industry. In the end, guiding principles and proposals for future work are deliberated, focusing on three key aspects: 1) hardware modeling and simulation of emerging PIM architectures; 2) hardware/software co-optimization for Transformer models; and 3) security and vulnerabilities in neuromorphic computing systems.
■590 ▼aSchool code: 0127.
■650 4▼aComputer engineering
■650 4▼aElectrical engineering
■653 ▼aProcess-in-memory
■653 ▼aMachine learning accelerator
■653 ▼aSide-channel attack
■653 ▼aHardware security
■653 ▼aDynamic random-access memory
■653 ▼aResistive random-access memory
■690 ▼a0544
■690 ▼a0464
■71020▼aUniversity of Michigan▼bElectrical and Computer Engineering.
■7730 ▼tDissertations Abstracts International▼g85-12B.
■790 ▼a0127
■791 ▼aPh.D.
■792 ▼a2024
■793 ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17162830▼nKERIS▼z이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.


