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The Cyber Spiral? Operational and Political Implications of Emerging Domains of Warfare
The Cyber Spiral? Operational and Political Implications of Emerging Domains of Warfare
상세정보
- 자료유형
- 학위논문 서양
- 최종처리일시
- 20250211151402
- ISBN
- 9798382231129
- DDC
- 320
- 서명/저자
- The Cyber Spiral? Operational and Political Implications of Emerging Domains of Warfare
- 발행사항
- [Sl] : Stanford University, 2024
- 발행사항
- Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2024
- 형태사항
- 232 p
- 주기사항
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-11, Section: A.
- 주기사항
- Advisor: Schultz, Kenneth A.
- 학위논문주기
- Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2024.
- 초록/해제
- 요약This project examines how international actors send, receive, interpret, attribute, predict, and act on information about their opponents during security crises, with special consideration to conflict involving emerging domains such as cyberspace. The first paper baselines how states perceive each other's images to determine if there are patterns of perception and misperception in these interpretations. This paper uses content analysis of historical wargames from the Cold War to evaluate how states convey and interpret images of resolve. It finds that strategic misperception is very common, and that actors are more likely to underestimate opponents' images of resolve than overestimate them. It also finds little evidence that significant game moves, often described as signals, effectively shift prior assumptions or beliefs; this suggests that assumptions, biases, and other priors are likely drivers of misperception. The second and third papers use scenario-based survey experiments of elite practitioners to establish how decision-makers consider traditional versus emerging technological domains to (1) interpret the intent of adversary actions and (2) assess and assume risk under conditions of uncertainty. These two papers find that practitioners view military actions in cyberspace with many of the characteristics the literature typically ascribes to signals, and that these practitioners view cyber activity as decidedly less escalatory than kinetic activity. We also find that technological uncertainty has almost no effect on the calculus of decision-makers, but assessments of escalatory risk are highly important. Further, almost all US military respondents coalesce in roughly equal numbers around three distinct decision constructs with distinct logics. The surveys reveal a great chasm between US military and US public decision-making involving emerging technologies. The dissertation contributes substantively to the literature on escalation, risk and uncertainty, misperception, signaling, and conflict in cyberspace.
- 일반주제명
- Political science
- 일반주제명
- Public policy
- 키워드
- Warfare
- 키워드
- Cyber activity
- 기타저자
- Stanford University.
- 기본자료저록
- Dissertations Abstracts International. 85-11A.
- 전자적 위치 및 접속
- 로그인 후 원문을 볼 수 있습니다.
MARC
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■020 ▼a9798382231129
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■035 ▼a(MiAaPQ)jr359jz3277
■040 ▼aMiAaPQ▼cMiAaPQ
■0820 ▼a320
■1001 ▼aShawna Lee Sinnott.
■24510▼aThe Cyber Spiral? Operational and Political Implications of Emerging Domains of Warfare
■260 ▼a[Sl]▼bStanford University▼c2024
■260 1▼aAnn Arbor▼bProQuest Dissertations & Theses▼c2024
■300 ▼a232 p
■500 ▼aSource: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-11, Section: A.
■500 ▼aAdvisor: Schultz, Kenneth A.
■5021 ▼aThesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2024.
■520 ▼aThis project examines how international actors send, receive, interpret, attribute, predict, and act on information about their opponents during security crises, with special consideration to conflict involving emerging domains such as cyberspace. The first paper baselines how states perceive each other's images to determine if there are patterns of perception and misperception in these interpretations. This paper uses content analysis of historical wargames from the Cold War to evaluate how states convey and interpret images of resolve. It finds that strategic misperception is very common, and that actors are more likely to underestimate opponents' images of resolve than overestimate them. It also finds little evidence that significant game moves, often described as signals, effectively shift prior assumptions or beliefs; this suggests that assumptions, biases, and other priors are likely drivers of misperception. The second and third papers use scenario-based survey experiments of elite practitioners to establish how decision-makers consider traditional versus emerging technological domains to (1) interpret the intent of adversary actions and (2) assess and assume risk under conditions of uncertainty. These two papers find that practitioners view military actions in cyberspace with many of the characteristics the literature typically ascribes to signals, and that these practitioners view cyber activity as decidedly less escalatory than kinetic activity. We also find that technological uncertainty has almost no effect on the calculus of decision-makers, but assessments of escalatory risk are highly important. Further, almost all US military respondents coalesce in roughly equal numbers around three distinct decision constructs with distinct logics. The surveys reveal a great chasm between US military and US public decision-making involving emerging technologies. The dissertation contributes substantively to the literature on escalation, risk and uncertainty, misperception, signaling, and conflict in cyberspace.
■590 ▼aSchool code: 0212.
■650 4▼aPolitical science
■650 4▼aPublic policy
■653 ▼aHistorical wargames
■653 ▼aWarfare
■653 ▼aCyber activity
■690 ▼a0615
■690 ▼a0630
■71020▼aStanford University.
■7730 ▼tDissertations Abstracts International▼g85-11A.
■790 ▼a0212
■791 ▼aPh.D.
■792 ▼a2024
■793 ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17161484▼nKERIS▼z이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.
