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Behavior and Incentives of Political Players in Non-Democratic Systems
Behavior and Incentives of Political Players in Non-Democratic Systems
상세정보
- 자료유형
- 학위논문 서양
- 최종처리일시
- 20250211151128
- ISBN
- 9798382775456
- DDC
- 320
- 저자명
- Yi, Ruochen.
- 서명/저자
- Behavior and Incentives of Political Players in Non-Democratic Systems
- 발행사항
- [Sl] : The University of Chicago, 2024
- 발행사항
- Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2024
- 형태사항
- 184 p
- 주기사항
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-12, Section: A.
- 주기사항
- Advisor: Durlauf, Steven;Myerson, Roger.
- 학위논문주기
- Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 2024.
- 초록/해제
- 요약This dissertation explores the intricate dynamics of political behavior and incentive mechanisms within non-democratic systems, with a focus on China's unique governance structure. It comprises three comprehensive chapters, each addressing distinct yet interrelated aspects of political maneuvering and strategic decision-making by political players.Chapter 1 delves into the manipulation of GDP growth by local Chinese officials, particularly mayors and prefecture Party secretaries, as a strategy for career advancement. Through an extensive analysis of career trajectories for 536 Party secretaries and 583 mayors, this chapter reveals how these officials engage in GDP manipulation at critical junctures in their careers to secure promotions. Employing a game theory model, findings demonstrate that both mayors and secretaries exploit their last opportunity for advancement to positions of real authority by artificially boosting GDP figures. However, this manipulation is met with heightened promotion criteria by higher authorities, particularly for secretaries at pivotal ages who must exceed average GDP growth rates significantly to be considered for promotion. Interestingly, the presence of mayors poised to succeed them acts as a deterrent against secretaries' short-sighted economic policies, suggesting a complex interplay that favors long-term development over immediate gains.Chapter 2 investigates the survival strategies of governments facing threats from various actors with divergent interests. It posits that strategic institution building, which initially disadvantages and later empowers certain challengers, can delay rebellions. This nuanced approach to managing political dissent and conflict highlights the importance of timing in the transition of institutional power, providing insights into the economic and political evolution observed in China. The government's manipulation of perceived benefits to delay potential uprisings underscores the delicate balance between short-term survival and long-term stability.
- 일반주제명
- Public policy
- 일반주제명
- Political science
- 키워드
- Diarchy
- 기타저자
- The University of Chicago Public Policy Studies
- 기본자료저록
- Dissertations Abstracts International. 85-12A.
- 전자적 위치 및 접속
- 로그인 후 원문을 볼 수 있습니다.
MARC
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■020 ▼a9798382775456
■035 ▼a(MiAaPQ)AAI31147262
■040 ▼aMiAaPQ▼cMiAaPQ
■0820 ▼a320
■1001 ▼aYi, Ruochen.
■24510▼aBehavior and Incentives of Political Players in Non-Democratic Systems
■260 ▼a[Sl]▼bThe University of Chicago▼c2024
■260 1▼aAnn Arbor▼bProQuest Dissertations & Theses▼c2024
■300 ▼a184 p
■500 ▼aSource: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-12, Section: A.
■500 ▼aAdvisor: Durlauf, Steven;Myerson, Roger.
■5021 ▼aThesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 2024.
■520 ▼aThis dissertation explores the intricate dynamics of political behavior and incentive mechanisms within non-democratic systems, with a focus on China's unique governance structure. It comprises three comprehensive chapters, each addressing distinct yet interrelated aspects of political maneuvering and strategic decision-making by political players.Chapter 1 delves into the manipulation of GDP growth by local Chinese officials, particularly mayors and prefecture Party secretaries, as a strategy for career advancement. Through an extensive analysis of career trajectories for 536 Party secretaries and 583 mayors, this chapter reveals how these officials engage in GDP manipulation at critical junctures in their careers to secure promotions. Employing a game theory model, findings demonstrate that both mayors and secretaries exploit their last opportunity for advancement to positions of real authority by artificially boosting GDP figures. However, this manipulation is met with heightened promotion criteria by higher authorities, particularly for secretaries at pivotal ages who must exceed average GDP growth rates significantly to be considered for promotion. Interestingly, the presence of mayors poised to succeed them acts as a deterrent against secretaries' short-sighted economic policies, suggesting a complex interplay that favors long-term development over immediate gains.Chapter 2 investigates the survival strategies of governments facing threats from various actors with divergent interests. It posits that strategic institution building, which initially disadvantages and later empowers certain challengers, can delay rebellions. This nuanced approach to managing political dissent and conflict highlights the importance of timing in the transition of institutional power, providing insights into the economic and political evolution observed in China. The government's manipulation of perceived benefits to delay potential uprisings underscores the delicate balance between short-term survival and long-term stability.
■590 ▼aSchool code: 0330.
■650 4▼aPublic policy
■650 4▼aPolitical science
■653 ▼aCareer advancement
■653 ▼aDiarchy
■653 ▼aGovernment survival
■653 ▼aLand market auctions
■653 ▼aNon-revenue-maximizing incentives
■653 ▼aTransition timing
■690 ▼a0630
■690 ▼a0615
■690 ▼a0511
■71020▼aThe University of Chicago▼bPublic Policy Studies.
■7730 ▼tDissertations Abstracts International▼g85-12A.
■790 ▼a0330
■791 ▼aPh.D.
■792 ▼a2024
■793 ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17160863▼nKERIS▼z이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.
