서브메뉴
검색
Power Distribution and Efficiency: Theory and Evidence From Unionized Firms
Power Distribution and Efficiency: Theory and Evidence From Unionized Firms
상세정보
- 자료유형
- 학위논문 서양
- 최종처리일시
- 20250211151128
- ISBN
- 9798382776477
- DDC
- 320.1
- 저자명
- Rubio, Estefano.
- 서명/저자
- Power Distribution and Efficiency: Theory and Evidence From Unionized Firms
- 발행사항
- [Sl] : The University of Chicago, 2024
- 발행사항
- Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2024
- 형태사항
- 120 p
- 주기사항
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-12, Section: A.
- 주기사항
- Advisor: Robinson, James A.
- 학위논문주기
- Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 2024.
- 초록/해제
- 요약Power is irrelevant for efficiency in a complete contract world. This paper studies how powerless groups, engaging in noncontractible coercive actions, affect the distribution and size of organizational surplus. I show that, by transferring bargaining power, powerful groups can mitigate coercive actions and enhance their welfare. I investigate this dynamic in union-management disputes, examining how an increase in labor unions' bargaining power affects firms' profits. This offers early causal evidence of power's efficiency effects in incomplete contract settings. Using administrative records from a Chilean labor code reform, I run an event study based on a quasi-random treatment assignment. It reveals that while profits were unaffected, remunerations of nonmanagerial workers increased, the number of hours worked did not fall, and unionization rates declined. Heterogeneous effects based on prepolicy bargaining power indicate that firms' profits are concave, while remunerations and unionization rates are convex, in unions' bargaining power. A Nash-bargaining model explains these findings, characterizing Pareto-efficient bargaining power distributions; demonstrating that management's welfare decreases in its bargaining power when the disputed surplus is sufficiently small; and showing that management generally prefers not to minimize the union's coercive actions. A model calibration indicates an increase in the union's surplus share of the average treated firm from 0.39 (prereform) to 0.48 (postreform)-equivalent to a USD 5.9 million increase-without harming profits.
- 키워드
- Coercion
- 키워드
- Nash bargaining
- 키워드
- Unionization
- 기타저자
- The University of Chicago Economics
- 기본자료저록
- Dissertations Abstracts International. 85-12A.
- 전자적 위치 및 접속
- 로그인 후 원문을 볼 수 있습니다.
MARC
008250123s2024 us c eng d■001000017160866
■00520250211151128
■006m o d
■007cr#unu||||||||
■020 ▼a9798382776477
■035 ▼a(MiAaPQ)AAI31147340
■040 ▼aMiAaPQ▼cMiAaPQ
■0820 ▼a320.1
■1001 ▼aRubio, Estefano.▼0(orcid)0000-0003-1961-4005
■24510▼aPower Distribution and Efficiency: Theory and Evidence From Unionized Firms
■260 ▼a[Sl]▼bThe University of Chicago▼c2024
■260 1▼aAnn Arbor▼bProQuest Dissertations & Theses▼c2024
■300 ▼a120 p
■500 ▼aSource: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-12, Section: A.
■500 ▼aAdvisor: Robinson, James A.
■5021 ▼aThesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 2024.
■520 ▼aPower is irrelevant for efficiency in a complete contract world. This paper studies how powerless groups, engaging in noncontractible coercive actions, affect the distribution and size of organizational surplus. I show that, by transferring bargaining power, powerful groups can mitigate coercive actions and enhance their welfare. I investigate this dynamic in union-management disputes, examining how an increase in labor unions' bargaining power affects firms' profits. This offers early causal evidence of power's efficiency effects in incomplete contract settings. Using administrative records from a Chilean labor code reform, I run an event study based on a quasi-random treatment assignment. It reveals that while profits were unaffected, remunerations of nonmanagerial workers increased, the number of hours worked did not fall, and unionization rates declined. Heterogeneous effects based on prepolicy bargaining power indicate that firms' profits are concave, while remunerations and unionization rates are convex, in unions' bargaining power. A Nash-bargaining model explains these findings, characterizing Pareto-efficient bargaining power distributions; demonstrating that management's welfare decreases in its bargaining power when the disputed surplus is sufficiently small; and showing that management generally prefers not to minimize the union's coercive actions. A model calibration indicates an increase in the union's surplus share of the average treated firm from 0.39 (prereform) to 0.48 (postreform)-equivalent to a USD 5.9 million increase-without harming profits.
■590 ▼aSchool code: 0330.
■653 ▼aCoercion
■653 ▼aIncomplete contracts
■653 ▼aNash bargaining
■653 ▼aPareto efficiency
■653 ▼aPower distribution
■653 ▼aUnionization
■653 ▼aProfit maximization
■690 ▼a0501
■690 ▼a0635
■690 ▼a0629
■690 ▼a0511
■71020▼aThe University of Chicago▼bEconomics.
■7730 ▼tDissertations Abstracts International▼g85-12A.
■790 ▼a0330
■791 ▼aPh.D.
■792 ▼a2024
■793 ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17160866▼nKERIS▼z이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.
