On Fictional Names, Linguistic Pretense, and Imaginative Resistance
On Fictional Names, Linguistic Pretense, and Imaginative Resistance
상세정보
- 자료유형
- 학위논문 서양
- 최종처리일시
- 20250211153148
- ISBN
- 9798384461937
- DDC
- 100
- 서명/저자
- On Fictional Names, Linguistic Pretense, and Imaginative Resistance
- 발행사항
- [Sl] : The Ohio State University, 2024
- 발행사항
- Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2024
- 형태사항
- 131 p
- 주기사항
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-04, Section: A.
- 주기사항
- Advisor: Shapiro, Stewart.
- 학위논문주기
- Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Ohio State University, 2024.
- 초록/해제
- 요약Works of fiction play an expansive role in our cognitive economy. Despite their prominence in both everyday conversation and literary discourse, fictional characters and events pose foundational puzzles to theories of linguistic meaning and communication: Given that fictional entities lack the existence of ordinary targets of reference, how can we explain meaningful tracts of discourse about them? This dissertation is a collection of papers which addresses three core puzzles in the semantics and pragmatics of fiction. First, I address the puzzle posed by the semantics of fictional names. Standard approaches have tended to assume that fictional names are referentially empty singular terms. I argue that fictional names are not best characterized as singular terms, but instead have the basic semantic function of predicates. On the predicativist account I propose, fictional names function similarly to more generic thematic predicates such as protagonist. In motivating this view, I draw on several neglected sources of linguistic evidence. In particular, I draw on evidence from embeddings in complex noun phrases such as the character N to support the view that fictional names are semantically differentiable from nonfictional names. Second, I address the role of linguistic pretense in accounts of the speech acts rendered in the mode of storytelling. I identify two central challenges for pretense-theoretic accounts of the illocutionary force of storytelling. First, such accounts fail to uphold the contrast between fictional representations and factual misrepresentations, insofar as they take storytelling to involve literally expressing felicitous falsehoods under a pretense of truth. Second, such accounts confront a version of the Frege-Geach challenge, insofar as pretense theorists fail to contributions that unembedded fictional sentences make to logically more complex constructions. I propose that these challenges can be avoided by treating fictional truth as a genuine alethic notion distinct from correspondence to reality, and I explore the prospects and challenges of extending alethic pluralism to fictional domains of discourse. Third, I offer a novel solution to the puzzle of imaginative resistance. Cases of imaginative resistance involve failed attempts by authors to render certain incongruent claims as true in a fiction. It seems authors cannot establish the moral rightness of genocide even in an entirely fictional universe. Previous accounts have tended to assume the constraint that fictional worlds must be morally realistic, either by virtue of the nature of moral concepts or the nature of our moral psychology. First, I argue that cases of imaginative resistance are not best explained in terms of moral constraints on fictional truth. Second, I propose that moral cases of imaginative resistance are more fruitfully understood in terms of failures to comprehend the fictions in question. According to the noetic account of imaginative resistance, we confront imaginative barriers when despite our best efforts we find the offending proposition inexplicable. I suggest that the noetic account occupies a helpful middle ground between previous dominant solutions to the puzzle of imaginative resistance.
- 일반주제명
- Philosophy
- 일반주제명
- Art criticism
- 일반주제명
- Epistemology
- 일반주제명
- Aesthetics
- 키워드
- Fictional names
- 키워드
- Empty names
- 키워드
- Reference
- 키워드
- Truth
- 기타저자
- The Ohio State University Philosophy
- 기본자료저록
- Dissertations Abstracts International. 86-04A.
- 전자적 위치 및 접속
- 로그인 후 원문을 볼 수 있습니다.
MARC
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■1001 ▼aAenehzodaee, Ali Kaveh.
■24510▼aOn Fictional Names, Linguistic Pretense, and Imaginative Resistance
■260 ▼a[Sl]▼bThe Ohio State University▼c2024
■260 1▼aAnn Arbor▼bProQuest Dissertations & Theses▼c2024
■300 ▼a131 p
■500 ▼aSource: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-04, Section: A.
■500 ▼aAdvisor: Shapiro, Stewart.
■5021 ▼aThesis (Ph.D.)--The Ohio State University, 2024.
■520 ▼aWorks of fiction play an expansive role in our cognitive economy. Despite their prominence in both everyday conversation and literary discourse, fictional characters and events pose foundational puzzles to theories of linguistic meaning and communication: Given that fictional entities lack the existence of ordinary targets of reference, how can we explain meaningful tracts of discourse about them? This dissertation is a collection of papers which addresses three core puzzles in the semantics and pragmatics of fiction. First, I address the puzzle posed by the semantics of fictional names. Standard approaches have tended to assume that fictional names are referentially empty singular terms. I argue that fictional names are not best characterized as singular terms, but instead have the basic semantic function of predicates. On the predicativist account I propose, fictional names function similarly to more generic thematic predicates such as protagonist. In motivating this view, I draw on several neglected sources of linguistic evidence. In particular, I draw on evidence from embeddings in complex noun phrases such as the character N to support the view that fictional names are semantically differentiable from nonfictional names. Second, I address the role of linguistic pretense in accounts of the speech acts rendered in the mode of storytelling. I identify two central challenges for pretense-theoretic accounts of the illocutionary force of storytelling. First, such accounts fail to uphold the contrast between fictional representations and factual misrepresentations, insofar as they take storytelling to involve literally expressing felicitous falsehoods under a pretense of truth. Second, such accounts confront a version of the Frege-Geach challenge, insofar as pretense theorists fail to contributions that unembedded fictional sentences make to logically more complex constructions. I propose that these challenges can be avoided by treating fictional truth as a genuine alethic notion distinct from correspondence to reality, and I explore the prospects and challenges of extending alethic pluralism to fictional domains of discourse. Third, I offer a novel solution to the puzzle of imaginative resistance. Cases of imaginative resistance involve failed attempts by authors to render certain incongruent claims as true in a fiction. It seems authors cannot establish the moral rightness of genocide even in an entirely fictional universe. Previous accounts have tended to assume the constraint that fictional worlds must be morally realistic, either by virtue of the nature of moral concepts or the nature of our moral psychology. First, I argue that cases of imaginative resistance are not best explained in terms of moral constraints on fictional truth. Second, I propose that moral cases of imaginative resistance are more fruitfully understood in terms of failures to comprehend the fictions in question. According to the noetic account of imaginative resistance, we confront imaginative barriers when despite our best efforts we find the offending proposition inexplicable. I suggest that the noetic account occupies a helpful middle ground between previous dominant solutions to the puzzle of imaginative resistance.
■590 ▼aSchool code: 0168.
■650 4▼aPhilosophy
■650 4▼aArt criticism
■650 4▼aEpistemology
■650 4▼aAesthetics
■653 ▼aFictional names
■653 ▼aEmpty names
■653 ▼aImaginative resistance
■653 ▼aReference
■653 ▼aTruth
■653 ▼aLiterary discourse
■690 ▼a0422
■690 ▼a0365
■690 ▼a0393
■690 ▼a0650
■71020▼aThe Ohio State University▼bPhilosophy.
■7730 ▼tDissertations Abstracts International▼g86-04A.
■790 ▼a0168
■791 ▼aPh.D.
■792 ▼a2024
■793 ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17165203▼nKERIS▼z이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.
