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A Powers Framework for Mental Action
A Powers Framework for Mental Action
상세정보
- 자료유형
- 학위논문 서양
- 최종처리일시
- 20250211152949
- ISBN
- 9798346385325
- DDC
- 153.68
- 서명/저자
- A Powers Framework for Mental Action
- 발행사항
- [Sl] : University of Pittsburgh, 2024
- 발행사항
- Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2024
- 형태사항
- 341 p
- 주기사항
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-05, Section: B.
- 주기사항
- Advisor: Stanton, Kate;Wu, Wayne;Allen, Colin;Brandom, Robert.
- 학위논문주기
- Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Pittsburgh, 2024.
- 초록/해제
- 요약Mental actions are things we do with our minds. Consider inferring, deliberating, imagining, remembering, calculating, and so on. I introduce a non-reductive alternative to standard causalist accounts of mental action that understands such action in terms of dispositions for performing mental actions. I call this alternative the powers framework. On the powers framework, habitual and skillful mental actions are themselves infused with practical intelligence by being expressions of the agent's rational tendencies and capacities, respectively. The intelligence exemplified in the performance of habitual and skillful mental actions stems from the agent's having shaped the corresponding tendencies and capacities through training and practice. In this way, mental habits and skills are 'second nature' to us. I substantiate the powers framework by giving an account of imagining as a type of skillful mental action. In particular, I argue that imagination is a power to construct representations and select their contents as a means to performing learned behaviors like pretending, engaging with fiction, predicting others' behavior, reasoning about possibility and necessity, reasoning hypothetically or counterfactually about contingent matters of fact, and even imagining for its own sake. I extend the account of imagining to episodic remembering. I argue that such remembering, considered as a mental action, is a kind of imagining by virtue of the agent's constructing a representation and selecting its content as a means of performing the learned behavior of navigating her personal past.
- 일반주제명
- Listening
- 일반주제명
- Rationality
- 일반주제명
- Memory
- 일반주제명
- Verbal communication
- 일반주제명
- Cognitive science
- 일반주제명
- Philosophy
- 일반주제명
- Cognition & reasoning
- 일반주제명
- Philosophers
- 일반주제명
- Cognitive psychology
- 일반주제명
- Communication
- 기본자료저록
- Dissertations Abstracts International. 86-05B.
- 전자적 위치 및 접속
- 로그인 후 원문을 볼 수 있습니다.
MARC
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■00520250211152949
■006m o d
■007cr#unu||||||||
■020 ▼a9798346385325
■035 ▼a(MiAaPQ)AAI31628770
■035 ▼a(MiAaPQ)Pittsburgh46748
■040 ▼aMiAaPQ▼cMiAaPQ
■0820 ▼a153.68
■1001 ▼aGoldwasser, Seth Jeremy.
■24512▼aA Powers Framework for Mental Action
■260 ▼a[Sl]▼bUniversity of Pittsburgh▼c2024
■260 1▼aAnn Arbor▼bProQuest Dissertations & Theses▼c2024
■300 ▼a341 p
■500 ▼aSource: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-05, Section: B.
■500 ▼aAdvisor: Stanton, Kate;Wu, Wayne;Allen, Colin;Brandom, Robert.
■5021 ▼aThesis (Ph.D.)--University of Pittsburgh, 2024.
■520 ▼aMental actions are things we do with our minds. Consider inferring, deliberating, imagining, remembering, calculating, and so on. I introduce a non-reductive alternative to standard causalist accounts of mental action that understands such action in terms of dispositions for performing mental actions. I call this alternative the powers framework. On the powers framework, habitual and skillful mental actions are themselves infused with practical intelligence by being expressions of the agent's rational tendencies and capacities, respectively. The intelligence exemplified in the performance of habitual and skillful mental actions stems from the agent's having shaped the corresponding tendencies and capacities through training and practice. In this way, mental habits and skills are 'second nature' to us. I substantiate the powers framework by giving an account of imagining as a type of skillful mental action. In particular, I argue that imagination is a power to construct representations and select their contents as a means to performing learned behaviors like pretending, engaging with fiction, predicting others' behavior, reasoning about possibility and necessity, reasoning hypothetically or counterfactually about contingent matters of fact, and even imagining for its own sake. I extend the account of imagining to episodic remembering. I argue that such remembering, considered as a mental action, is a kind of imagining by virtue of the agent's constructing a representation and selecting its content as a means of performing the learned behavior of navigating her personal past.
■590 ▼aSchool code: 0178.
■650 4▼aListening
■650 4▼aRationality
■650 4▼aMemory
■650 4▼aVerbal communication
■650 4▼aCognitive science
■650 4▼aPhilosophy
■650 4▼aCognition & reasoning
■650 4▼aPhilosophers
■650 4▼aCognitive psychology
■650 4▼aCommunication
■690 ▼a0422
■690 ▼a0633
■690 ▼a0459
■71020▼aUniversity of Pittsburgh.
■7730 ▼tDissertations Abstracts International▼g86-05B.
■790 ▼a0178
■791 ▼aPh.D.
■792 ▼a2024
■793 ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17164328▼nKERIS▼z이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.
