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Philosophical Foundations of Resource Rational Analysis
Philosophical Foundations of Resource Rational Analysis
Philosophical Foundations of Resource Rational Analysis

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자료유형  
 학위논문 서양
최종처리일시  
20250211152949
ISBN  
9798346390244
DDC  
320
저자명  
Fleig-Goldstein, Brendan.
서명/저자  
Philosophical Foundations of Resource Rational Analysis
발행사항  
[Sl] : University of Pittsburgh, 2024
발행사항  
Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2024
형태사항  
194 p
주기사항  
Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-05, Section: B.
주기사항  
Advisor: Icard, Thomas;Norton, John;Machery, Edouard;Allen, Colin.
학위논문주기  
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Pittsburgh, 2024.
초록/해제  
요약Tacit appeals to systems being rational or apparently irrational are common in cognitive science, and for good reason: irrationality provides valuable evidence for cognitive models. A methodological approach in cognitive science called resource rational analysis attempts to systematize the use of irrationality to develop and test models of cognition. It does so by initially assuming that a system is rational, and then iteratively de-idealizing this assumption by identifying psychological facts that prevent a system from being more rational. This dissertation seeks to analyze how this strategy has worked, how it should work, why it will work, and why it can work better with the conceptual foundations proposed here. In Chapter 1, I develop a specific account of resource rationality. I argue that all epistemic norms are relative to cognitive constraints, and that there is no principled way to distinguish between agents doing their best relative to their limitations and agents being irrational. I advocate for a maximally broad view of cognitive constraints, which renders all agents trivially resource rational, but still allows for meaningful evaluation and prescription. Chapter 2 reviews arguments that intentionality presupposes rationality, and argues that this position is strengthened if the appropriate notion of rationality is understood as my notion of resource rationality. This conclusion shows why rationality considerations are important and even necessary for any intentional psychological science. In Chapter 3, I extend my account of resource rationality to normative commitments, proposing that what I call a meta-reflective capacity-maintaining resource rationality under varying conditions-is necessary and sufficient for possessing normative commitments. This perspective offers a framework for endowing AI systems with normative commitments and empirically investigating these commitments in humans and non-human animals. Chapter 4 presents resource rational analysis as a methodological strategy in cognitive science and argues for its effectiveness. This strategy, I show, implements a dynamic theory-testing method known as ``Closing-the-Loop," as described by Smith (2014). I use the Material Theory of Induction and Topological Learning Theory to provide an epistemic justification for this dynamic testing strategy. These considerations support the iterative de-idealization process and demonstrate the utility of rationality considerations in cognitive science.
일반주제명  
Rationality
일반주제명  
Epistemology
일반주제명  
Philosophy
일반주제명  
Cognition & reasoning
일반주제명  
Cognitive psychology
기타저자  
University of Pittsburgh.
기본자료저록  
Dissertations Abstracts International. 86-05B.
전자적 위치 및 접속  
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MARC

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■035    ▼a(MiAaPQ)Pittsburgh46632
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■0820  ▼a320
■1001  ▼aFleig-Goldstein,  Brendan.
■24510▼aPhilosophical  Foundations  of  Resource  Rational  Analysis
■260    ▼a[Sl]▼bUniversity  of  Pittsburgh▼c2024
■260  1▼aAnn  Arbor▼bProQuest  Dissertations  &  Theses▼c2024
■300    ▼a194  p
■500    ▼aSource:  Dissertations  Abstracts  International,  Volume:  86-05,  Section:  B.
■500    ▼aAdvisor:  Icard,  Thomas;Norton,  John;Machery,  Edouard;Allen,  Colin.
■5021  ▼aThesis  (Ph.D.)--University  of  Pittsburgh,  2024.
■520    ▼aTacit  appeals  to  systems  being  rational  or  apparently  irrational  are  common  in  cognitive  science,  and  for  good  reason:  irrationality  provides  valuable  evidence  for  cognitive  models.  A  methodological  approach  in  cognitive  science  called  resource  rational  analysis  attempts  to  systematize  the  use  of  irrationality  to  develop  and  test  models  of  cognition.  It  does  so  by  initially  assuming  that  a  system  is  rational,  and  then  iteratively  de-idealizing  this  assumption  by  identifying  psychological  facts  that  prevent  a  system  from  being  more  rational.  This  dissertation  seeks  to  analyze  how  this  strategy  has  worked,  how  it  should  work,  why  it  will  work,  and  why  it  can  work  better  with  the  conceptual  foundations  proposed  here.  In  Chapter  1,  I  develop  a  specific  account  of  resource  rationality.  I  argue  that  all  epistemic  norms  are  relative  to  cognitive  constraints,  and  that  there  is  no  principled  way  to  distinguish  between  agents  doing  their  best  relative  to  their  limitations  and  agents  being  irrational.  I  advocate  for  a  maximally  broad  view  of  cognitive  constraints,  which  renders  all  agents  trivially  resource  rational,  but  still  allows  for  meaningful  evaluation  and  prescription.  Chapter  2  reviews  arguments  that  intentionality  presupposes  rationality,  and  argues  that  this  position  is  strengthened  if  the  appropriate  notion  of  rationality  is  understood  as  my  notion  of  resource  rationality.  This  conclusion  shows  why  rationality  considerations  are  important  and  even  necessary  for  any  intentional  psychological  science.  In  Chapter  3,  I  extend  my  account  of  resource  rationality  to  normative  commitments,  proposing  that  what  I  call  a  meta-reflective  capacity-maintaining  resource  rationality  under  varying  conditions-is  necessary  and  sufficient  for  possessing  normative  commitments.  This  perspective  offers  a  framework  for  endowing  AI  systems  with  normative  commitments  and  empirically  investigating  these  commitments  in  humans  and  non-human  animals.  Chapter  4  presents  resource  rational  analysis  as  a  methodological  strategy  in  cognitive  science  and  argues  for  its  effectiveness.  This  strategy,  I  show,  implements  a  dynamic  theory-testing  method  known  as  ``Closing-the-Loop,"  as  described  by  Smith  (2014).  I  use  the  Material  Theory  of  Induction  and  Topological  Learning  Theory  to  provide  an  epistemic  justification  for  this  dynamic  testing  strategy.  These  considerations  support  the  iterative  de-idealization  process  and  demonstrate  the  utility  of  rationality  considerations  in  cognitive  science.
■590    ▼aSchool  code:  0178.
■650  4▼aRationality
■650  4▼aEpistemology
■650  4▼aPhilosophy
■650  4▼aCognition  &  reasoning
■650  4▼aCognitive  psychology
■690    ▼a0422
■690    ▼a0393
■690    ▼a0633
■71020▼aUniversity  of  Pittsburgh.
■7730  ▼tDissertations  Abstracts  International▼g86-05B.
■790    ▼a0178
■791    ▼aPh.D.
■792    ▼a2024
■793    ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17164329▼nKERIS▼z이  자료의  원문은  한국교육학술정보원에서  제공합니다.

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