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Philosophical Foundations of Resource Rational Analysis
Philosophical Foundations of Resource Rational Analysis
상세정보
- 자료유형
- 학위논문 서양
- 최종처리일시
- 20250211152949
- ISBN
- 9798346390244
- DDC
- 320
- 서명/저자
- Philosophical Foundations of Resource Rational Analysis
- 발행사항
- [Sl] : University of Pittsburgh, 2024
- 발행사항
- Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2024
- 형태사항
- 194 p
- 주기사항
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-05, Section: B.
- 주기사항
- Advisor: Icard, Thomas;Norton, John;Machery, Edouard;Allen, Colin.
- 학위논문주기
- Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Pittsburgh, 2024.
- 초록/해제
- 요약Tacit appeals to systems being rational or apparently irrational are common in cognitive science, and for good reason: irrationality provides valuable evidence for cognitive models. A methodological approach in cognitive science called resource rational analysis attempts to systematize the use of irrationality to develop and test models of cognition. It does so by initially assuming that a system is rational, and then iteratively de-idealizing this assumption by identifying psychological facts that prevent a system from being more rational. This dissertation seeks to analyze how this strategy has worked, how it should work, why it will work, and why it can work better with the conceptual foundations proposed here. In Chapter 1, I develop a specific account of resource rationality. I argue that all epistemic norms are relative to cognitive constraints, and that there is no principled way to distinguish between agents doing their best relative to their limitations and agents being irrational. I advocate for a maximally broad view of cognitive constraints, which renders all agents trivially resource rational, but still allows for meaningful evaluation and prescription. Chapter 2 reviews arguments that intentionality presupposes rationality, and argues that this position is strengthened if the appropriate notion of rationality is understood as my notion of resource rationality. This conclusion shows why rationality considerations are important and even necessary for any intentional psychological science. In Chapter 3, I extend my account of resource rationality to normative commitments, proposing that what I call a meta-reflective capacity-maintaining resource rationality under varying conditions-is necessary and sufficient for possessing normative commitments. This perspective offers a framework for endowing AI systems with normative commitments and empirically investigating these commitments in humans and non-human animals. Chapter 4 presents resource rational analysis as a methodological strategy in cognitive science and argues for its effectiveness. This strategy, I show, implements a dynamic theory-testing method known as ``Closing-the-Loop," as described by Smith (2014). I use the Material Theory of Induction and Topological Learning Theory to provide an epistemic justification for this dynamic testing strategy. These considerations support the iterative de-idealization process and demonstrate the utility of rationality considerations in cognitive science.
- 일반주제명
- Rationality
- 일반주제명
- Epistemology
- 일반주제명
- Philosophy
- 일반주제명
- Cognition & reasoning
- 일반주제명
- Cognitive psychology
- 기본자료저록
- Dissertations Abstracts International. 86-05B.
- 전자적 위치 및 접속
- 로그인 후 원문을 볼 수 있습니다.
MARC
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■020 ▼a9798346390244
■035 ▼a(MiAaPQ)AAI31628774
■035 ▼a(MiAaPQ)Pittsburgh46632
■040 ▼aMiAaPQ▼cMiAaPQ
■0820 ▼a320
■1001 ▼aFleig-Goldstein, Brendan.
■24510▼aPhilosophical Foundations of Resource Rational Analysis
■260 ▼a[Sl]▼bUniversity of Pittsburgh▼c2024
■260 1▼aAnn Arbor▼bProQuest Dissertations & Theses▼c2024
■300 ▼a194 p
■500 ▼aSource: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-05, Section: B.
■500 ▼aAdvisor: Icard, Thomas;Norton, John;Machery, Edouard;Allen, Colin.
■5021 ▼aThesis (Ph.D.)--University of Pittsburgh, 2024.
■520 ▼aTacit appeals to systems being rational or apparently irrational are common in cognitive science, and for good reason: irrationality provides valuable evidence for cognitive models. A methodological approach in cognitive science called resource rational analysis attempts to systematize the use of irrationality to develop and test models of cognition. It does so by initially assuming that a system is rational, and then iteratively de-idealizing this assumption by identifying psychological facts that prevent a system from being more rational. This dissertation seeks to analyze how this strategy has worked, how it should work, why it will work, and why it can work better with the conceptual foundations proposed here. In Chapter 1, I develop a specific account of resource rationality. I argue that all epistemic norms are relative to cognitive constraints, and that there is no principled way to distinguish between agents doing their best relative to their limitations and agents being irrational. I advocate for a maximally broad view of cognitive constraints, which renders all agents trivially resource rational, but still allows for meaningful evaluation and prescription. Chapter 2 reviews arguments that intentionality presupposes rationality, and argues that this position is strengthened if the appropriate notion of rationality is understood as my notion of resource rationality. This conclusion shows why rationality considerations are important and even necessary for any intentional psychological science. In Chapter 3, I extend my account of resource rationality to normative commitments, proposing that what I call a meta-reflective capacity-maintaining resource rationality under varying conditions-is necessary and sufficient for possessing normative commitments. This perspective offers a framework for endowing AI systems with normative commitments and empirically investigating these commitments in humans and non-human animals. Chapter 4 presents resource rational analysis as a methodological strategy in cognitive science and argues for its effectiveness. This strategy, I show, implements a dynamic theory-testing method known as ``Closing-the-Loop," as described by Smith (2014). I use the Material Theory of Induction and Topological Learning Theory to provide an epistemic justification for this dynamic testing strategy. These considerations support the iterative de-idealization process and demonstrate the utility of rationality considerations in cognitive science.
■590 ▼aSchool code: 0178.
■650 4▼aRationality
■650 4▼aEpistemology
■650 4▼aPhilosophy
■650 4▼aCognition & reasoning
■650 4▼aCognitive psychology
■690 ▼a0422
■690 ▼a0393
■690 ▼a0633
■71020▼aUniversity of Pittsburgh.
■7730 ▼tDissertations Abstracts International▼g86-05B.
■790 ▼a0178
■791 ▼aPh.D.
■792 ▼a2024
■793 ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17164329▼nKERIS▼z이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.


