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Essays in Industrial Organization
Essays in Industrial Organization
상세정보
- 자료유형
- 학위논문 서양
- 최종처리일시
- 20250211151515
- ISBN
- 9798382778020
- DDC
- 658
- 서명/저자
- Essays in Industrial Organization
- 발행사항
- [Sl] : University of California, Los Angeles, 2024
- 발행사항
- Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2024
- 형태사항
- 121 p
- 주기사항
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-12, Section: B.
- 주기사항
- Advisor: Asker, John William.
- 학위논문주기
- Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Los Angeles, 2024.
- 초록/해제
- 요약In this dissertation, I analyze how different selling mechanisms affect welfare. This dissertation consists of three chapters. In Chapters 1 and 2, I empirically study upgrades - fees that customers pay to access a premium quality product after the purchase of a regular one - and how they affect consumers. On one hand, upgrades might benefit consumers as they allow the purchase of higher-quality goods at a discounted price. On the other hand, the monopolist will seek to capture surplus from these gains from trade by offering a different price menu for all goods. Whether consumer welfare will rise or fall when a monopolist introduces upgrades will depend on the relative magnitudes of these two effects. I disentangle these two effects in the context of an international airline that gives economy class passengers the option to pay an additional fee to upgrade to business class. In Chapter 1, I describe the data and show how the airline uses upgrades. In Chapter 2, I develop and estimate a model of airline pricing in order to assess the effects of upgrades via counterfactual simulations. I show that the upgrade option improves the allocation of passengers among cabins over time and increases consumer and producer welfare by 1.5% and 2% respectively. In Chapter 3, I theoretically study auctions with budget constraints and I compare first price and second price auctions. I show that endowing bidders with the same and commonly known financial constraints reduces seller's revenues, however, this decrease is larger in second price auctions than in first price auctions.
- 일반주제명
- Finance
- 키워드
- Welfare
- 키워드
- Customers pay
- 키워드
- Airline pricing
- 기타저자
- University of California, Los Angeles Economics 0246
- 기본자료저록
- Dissertations Abstracts International. 85-12B.
- 전자적 위치 및 접속
- 로그인 후 원문을 볼 수 있습니다.
MARC
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■00520250211151515
■006m o d
■007cr#unu||||||||
■020 ▼a9798382778020
■035 ▼a(MiAaPQ)AAI31300468
■040 ▼aMiAaPQ▼cMiAaPQ
■0820 ▼a658
■1001 ▼aFabrizi, Domenico.
■24510▼aEssays in Industrial Organization
■260 ▼a[Sl]▼bUniversity of California, Los Angeles▼c2024
■260 1▼aAnn Arbor▼bProQuest Dissertations & Theses▼c2024
■300 ▼a121 p
■500 ▼aSource: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-12, Section: B.
■500 ▼aAdvisor: Asker, John William.
■5021 ▼aThesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Los Angeles, 2024.
■520 ▼aIn this dissertation, I analyze how different selling mechanisms affect welfare. This dissertation consists of three chapters. In Chapters 1 and 2, I empirically study upgrades - fees that customers pay to access a premium quality product after the purchase of a regular one - and how they affect consumers. On one hand, upgrades might benefit consumers as they allow the purchase of higher-quality goods at a discounted price. On the other hand, the monopolist will seek to capture surplus from these gains from trade by offering a different price menu for all goods. Whether consumer welfare will rise or fall when a monopolist introduces upgrades will depend on the relative magnitudes of these two effects. I disentangle these two effects in the context of an international airline that gives economy class passengers the option to pay an additional fee to upgrade to business class. In Chapter 1, I describe the data and show how the airline uses upgrades. In Chapter 2, I develop and estimate a model of airline pricing in order to assess the effects of upgrades via counterfactual simulations. I show that the upgrade option improves the allocation of passengers among cabins over time and increases consumer and producer welfare by 1.5% and 2% respectively. In Chapter 3, I theoretically study auctions with budget constraints and I compare first price and second price auctions. I show that endowing bidders with the same and commonly known financial constraints reduces seller's revenues, however, this decrease is larger in second price auctions than in first price auctions.
■590 ▼aSchool code: 0031.
■650 4▼aFinance
■653 ▼aIndustrial organizations
■653 ▼aWelfare
■653 ▼aSelling mechanisms
■653 ▼aCustomers pay
■653 ▼aAirline pricing
■690 ▼a0501
■690 ▼a0796
■690 ▼a0454
■690 ▼a0508
■71020▼aUniversity of California, Los Angeles▼bEconomics 0246.
■7730 ▼tDissertations Abstracts International▼g85-12B.
■790 ▼a0031
■791 ▼aPh.D.
■792 ▼a2024
■793 ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17162021▼nKERIS▼z이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.
