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Essays on the Political Economy of Governance
Essays on the Political Economy of Governance
상세정보
- 자료유형
- 학위논문 서양
- 최종처리일시
- 20250211151056
- ISBN
- 9798383160831
- DDC
- 320
- 서명/저자
- Essays on the Political Economy of Governance
- 발행사항
- [Sl] : New York University, 2024
- 발행사항
- Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2024
- 형태사항
- 182 p
- 주기사항
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-12, Section: A.
- 주기사항
- Advisor: Rozenas, Arturas.
- 학위논문주기
- Thesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, 2024.
- 초록/해제
- 요약This dissertation consists of three separate essays that represent the three chapters. The first chapter critically examines the prevailing narrative of the loyalty-competence trade-off in authoritarian regimes, suggesting that such a theory inadequately captures the nuanced realities of autocratic governance and its economic implications. By leveraging a two-level principal-agent model that endogenizes loyalty and competence, it offers a refined lens through which to assess the longevity-performance nexus in authoritarian regimes. The second chapter delves into the nuanced impacts of increasing public sector wages to curb corruption. Using a moral hazard and adverse selection model of job application, this study highlights the two opposing effects of wages on corruption (incentive and selection effects). This chapter offers valuable insights for formulating anti-corruption policies by delineating conditions under which wage increases may either mitigate or exacerbate corruption.In the third chapter, co-authored with Antonella Bandiera, Dongil Lee, and Cyrus Samii, attention shifts to political inequality. Drawing upon survey outcomes from Africa and Latin America, we show the representational disparities by affluence and how government policies disproportionately favor the rich over the poor. We then compile observational and experimental evidence on strategies to promote responsiveness to the poor and synthesize the insights from the literature with a formal model. The model provides a critical understanding of the most effective ways to implement interventions that promote political responsiveness.
- 일반주제명
- Political science
- 일반주제명
- Public policy
- 키워드
- Bureaucracy
- 키워드
- Corruption
- 키워드
- Game theory
- 키워드
- Governance
- 기타저자
- New York University Politics
- 기본자료저록
- Dissertations Abstracts International. 85-12A.
- 전자적 위치 및 접속
- 로그인 후 원문을 볼 수 있습니다.
MARC
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■00520250211151056
■006m o d
■007cr#unu||||||||
■020 ▼a9798383160831
■035 ▼a(MiAaPQ)AAI31142262
■040 ▼aMiAaPQ▼cMiAaPQ
■0820 ▼a320
■1001 ▼aTouola Meda, Francis William.
■24510▼aEssays on the Political Economy of Governance
■260 ▼a[Sl]▼bNew York University▼c2024
■260 1▼aAnn Arbor▼bProQuest Dissertations & Theses▼c2024
■300 ▼a182 p
■500 ▼aSource: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-12, Section: A.
■500 ▼aAdvisor: Rozenas, Arturas.
■5021 ▼aThesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, 2024.
■520 ▼aThis dissertation consists of three separate essays that represent the three chapters. The first chapter critically examines the prevailing narrative of the loyalty-competence trade-off in authoritarian regimes, suggesting that such a theory inadequately captures the nuanced realities of autocratic governance and its economic implications. By leveraging a two-level principal-agent model that endogenizes loyalty and competence, it offers a refined lens through which to assess the longevity-performance nexus in authoritarian regimes. The second chapter delves into the nuanced impacts of increasing public sector wages to curb corruption. Using a moral hazard and adverse selection model of job application, this study highlights the two opposing effects of wages on corruption (incentive and selection effects). This chapter offers valuable insights for formulating anti-corruption policies by delineating conditions under which wage increases may either mitigate or exacerbate corruption.In the third chapter, co-authored with Antonella Bandiera, Dongil Lee, and Cyrus Samii, attention shifts to political inequality. Drawing upon survey outcomes from Africa and Latin America, we show the representational disparities by affluence and how government policies disproportionately favor the rich over the poor. We then compile observational and experimental evidence on strategies to promote responsiveness to the poor and synthesize the insights from the literature with a formal model. The model provides a critical understanding of the most effective ways to implement interventions that promote political responsiveness.
■590 ▼aSchool code: 0146.
■650 4▼aPolitical science
■650 4▼aPublic policy
■653 ▼aAuthoritarian regimes
■653 ▼aBureaucracy
■653 ▼aCorruption
■653 ▼aGame theory
■653 ▼aGovernance
■653 ▼aPolitical inequality
■690 ▼a0615
■690 ▼a0630
■690 ▼a0501
■71020▼aNew York University▼bPolitics.
■7730 ▼tDissertations Abstracts International▼g85-12A.
■790 ▼a0146
■791 ▼aPh.D.
■792 ▼a2024
■793 ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17160655▼nKERIS▼z이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.
