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Modeling and Mitigating Side Channels in Optical and Embedded Sensing Systems
Modeling and Mitigating Side Channels in Optical and Embedded Sensing Systems
Detailed Information
- 자료유형
- 학위논문 서양
- 최종처리일시
- 20250211153012
- ISBN
- 9798384045007
- DDC
- 620
- 저자명
- Long, Yan.
- 서명/저자
- Modeling and Mitigating Side Channels in Optical and Embedded Sensing Systems
- 발행사항
- [Sl] : University of Michigan, 2024
- 발행사항
- Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2024
- 형태사항
- 191 p
- 주기사항
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-03, Section: B.
- 주기사항
- Advisor: Fu, Kevin;Liu, Mingyan.
- 학위논문주기
- Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Michigan, 2024.
- 초록/해제
- 요약This thesis investigates how to model and mitigate the security and privacy impact of undefined information channels in the analog-digital interfaces of sensing systems. Sensors bridge the physical and digital worlds and have become a fundamental building block of modern computer systems. The physical and analog nature of sensor hardware, however, creates an inherent gap in the abstraction of sensors when sensor hardware is interfaced with computer software. The lack of comprehensive and proper abstraction causes side channels in physical-digital information transformation, resulting in information leakage and manipulation problems that could compromise the data security and user privacy of emerging cyber-physical technologies. By analyzing the sensing model and several representative examples of camera sensing and other embedded sensors, my thesis first investigates how three key factors of modern sensor design contribute to sensor data leakage problems. These factors include (1) the increasing resolution and sensitivity of sensors, (2) the increasing structural complexity of sensors, and (3) the more standardized but unprotected sensor data distributions. The first factor is demonstrated by a case study of webcams leaking user screen contents during video conferencing when the screen contents are reflected by users' eyeglasses, and generalized to another threat model of smartphone zero-permission accelerometers and gyroscopes leaking touchtone audio. The second factor is demonstrated by exploiting the rolling shutter and movable lens structures of smartphone cameras to extract ambient audio from a stream of photos. The third factor is demonstrated by eavesdropping on the electromagnetic leakage of camera data transmission interfaces to reconstruct confidential camera videos in real time. Besides information leakage, this thesis explains how such side channels in sensors also allow the injection of false information into sensing systems. Specifically, it shows how intentional electromagnetic interference can interact with analog sensing circuits to manipulate the temperature readings of vaccine temperature monitors and induce phantom keystroke inputs on various types of keyboards. Finally, the thesis generalizes the concept of sensor side channels and proposes that when properly controlled, such side channels could be utilized by system defenders to strengthen existing systems, such as synthesizing virtual sensors from existing sensor hardware to perform multimodal sensing and authentication.
- 일반주제명
- Engineering
- 일반주제명
- Computer science
- 일반주제명
- Electrical engineering
- 키워드
- Sensor security
- 키워드
- Side channels
- 키워드
- Eavesdropping
- 키워드
- Authentication
- 기타저자
- University of Michigan Electrical and Computer Engineering
- 기본자료저록
- Dissertations Abstracts International. 86-03B.
- 전자적 위치 및 접속
- 로그인 후 원문을 볼 수 있습니다.
MARC
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■00520250211153012
■006m o d
■007cr#unu||||||||
■020 ▼a9798384045007
■035 ▼a(MiAaPQ)AAI31631467
■035 ▼a(MiAaPQ)umichrackham005854
■040 ▼aMiAaPQ▼cMiAaPQ
■0820 ▼a620
■1001 ▼aLong, Yan.
■24510▼aModeling and Mitigating Side Channels in Optical and Embedded Sensing Systems
■260 ▼a[Sl]▼bUniversity of Michigan▼c2024
■260 1▼aAnn Arbor▼bProQuest Dissertations & Theses▼c2024
■300 ▼a191 p
■500 ▼aSource: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-03, Section: B.
■500 ▼aAdvisor: Fu, Kevin;Liu, Mingyan.
■5021 ▼aThesis (Ph.D.)--University of Michigan, 2024.
■520 ▼aThis thesis investigates how to model and mitigate the security and privacy impact of undefined information channels in the analog-digital interfaces of sensing systems. Sensors bridge the physical and digital worlds and have become a fundamental building block of modern computer systems. The physical and analog nature of sensor hardware, however, creates an inherent gap in the abstraction of sensors when sensor hardware is interfaced with computer software. The lack of comprehensive and proper abstraction causes side channels in physical-digital information transformation, resulting in information leakage and manipulation problems that could compromise the data security and user privacy of emerging cyber-physical technologies. By analyzing the sensing model and several representative examples of camera sensing and other embedded sensors, my thesis first investigates how three key factors of modern sensor design contribute to sensor data leakage problems. These factors include (1) the increasing resolution and sensitivity of sensors, (2) the increasing structural complexity of sensors, and (3) the more standardized but unprotected sensor data distributions. The first factor is demonstrated by a case study of webcams leaking user screen contents during video conferencing when the screen contents are reflected by users' eyeglasses, and generalized to another threat model of smartphone zero-permission accelerometers and gyroscopes leaking touchtone audio. The second factor is demonstrated by exploiting the rolling shutter and movable lens structures of smartphone cameras to extract ambient audio from a stream of photos. The third factor is demonstrated by eavesdropping on the electromagnetic leakage of camera data transmission interfaces to reconstruct confidential camera videos in real time. Besides information leakage, this thesis explains how such side channels in sensors also allow the injection of false information into sensing systems. Specifically, it shows how intentional electromagnetic interference can interact with analog sensing circuits to manipulate the temperature readings of vaccine temperature monitors and induce phantom keystroke inputs on various types of keyboards. Finally, the thesis generalizes the concept of sensor side channels and proposes that when properly controlled, such side channels could be utilized by system defenders to strengthen existing systems, such as synthesizing virtual sensors from existing sensor hardware to perform multimodal sensing and authentication.
■590 ▼aSchool code: 0127.
■650 4▼aEngineering
■650 4▼aComputer science
■650 4▼aElectrical engineering
■653 ▼aSensor security
■653 ▼aSide channels
■653 ▼aInformation leakage
■653 ▼aEavesdropping
■653 ▼aAuthentication
■690 ▼a0537
■690 ▼a0984
■690 ▼a0544
■71020▼aUniversity of Michigan▼bElectrical and Computer Engineering.
■7730 ▼tDissertations Abstracts International▼g86-03B.
■790 ▼a0127
■791 ▼aPh.D.
■792 ▼a2024
■793 ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17164517▼nKERIS▼z이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.
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