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Kant's Doctrine of Transcendental Idealism
Kant's Doctrine of Transcendental Idealism
상세정보
- 자료유형
- 학위논문 서양
- 최종처리일시
- 20250211151130
- ISBN
- 9798382319940
- DDC
- 100
- 서명/저자
- Kants Doctrine of Transcendental Idealism
- 발행사항
- [Sl] : Indiana University, 2024
- 발행사항
- Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2024
- 형태사항
- 266 p
- 주기사항
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-10, Section: A.
- 주기사항
- Advisor: Wood, Allen.
- 학위논문주기
- Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, 2024.
- 초록/해제
- 요약My dissertation proposes a novel interpretation of Kant's doctrine of transcendental idealism as presented in the Critique of Pure Reason. I aim to give a consensus interpretation by overcoming past errors in interpreting this doctrine. I support my interpretation through a textual exegesis of the Critique of Pure Reason with a special focus on the direct and indirect proofs of transcendental idealism.Transcendental idealism is the doctrine that objects of our experience, space, and time, when taken as they would be outside our possible experience, are nothing but mere representations. However, this does not make them into illusions. This is because Kant takes objects of our experience, space, and time to be empirically real. Empirical realism is the doctrine that objects of our experience, space, and time, when taken within our possible experience, exist independently of us. Yet, their empirical reality is not grounded in things in themselves, about whose existence Kant is agnostic. Instead, the reality of objects of our experience, space, and time depend on a standard of empirical reality that differs from the standard of transcendental reality. This separate standard of empirical reality allows Kant to hold transcendental idealism and empirical realism at the same time. Finally, while not strictly part of the doctrine of transcendental idealism, I answer the question of the relation of appearances and things in themselves. The distinction between appearances and things in themselves is a metaphysical distinction between two different ways of being, i.e., objectivity, properties, existence, reality. Yet, this is a metaphysical distinction within the same concept of an object. Thus, appearances and things in themselves are the same object conceptually that is determined metaphysically in two different ways.
- 일반주제명
- Philosophy
- 일반주제명
- Metaphysics
- 일반주제명
- Epistemology
- 키워드
- Kant
- 기타저자
- Indiana University Philosophy
- 기본자료저록
- Dissertations Abstracts International. 85-10A.
- 전자적 위치 및 접속
- 로그인 후 원문을 볼 수 있습니다.
MARC
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■020 ▼a9798382319940
■035 ▼a(MiAaPQ)AAI31147494
■040 ▼aMiAaPQ▼cMiAaPQ
■0820 ▼a100
■1001 ▼aBuchinski, Alexander.
■24510▼aKant's Doctrine of Transcendental Idealism
■260 ▼a[Sl]▼bIndiana University▼c2024
■260 1▼aAnn Arbor▼bProQuest Dissertations & Theses▼c2024
■300 ▼a266 p
■500 ▼aSource: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-10, Section: A.
■500 ▼aAdvisor: Wood, Allen.
■5021 ▼aThesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, 2024.
■520 ▼aMy dissertation proposes a novel interpretation of Kant's doctrine of transcendental idealism as presented in the Critique of Pure Reason. I aim to give a consensus interpretation by overcoming past errors in interpreting this doctrine. I support my interpretation through a textual exegesis of the Critique of Pure Reason with a special focus on the direct and indirect proofs of transcendental idealism.Transcendental idealism is the doctrine that objects of our experience, space, and time, when taken as they would be outside our possible experience, are nothing but mere representations. However, this does not make them into illusions. This is because Kant takes objects of our experience, space, and time to be empirically real. Empirical realism is the doctrine that objects of our experience, space, and time, when taken within our possible experience, exist independently of us. Yet, their empirical reality is not grounded in things in themselves, about whose existence Kant is agnostic. Instead, the reality of objects of our experience, space, and time depend on a standard of empirical reality that differs from the standard of transcendental reality. This separate standard of empirical reality allows Kant to hold transcendental idealism and empirical realism at the same time. Finally, while not strictly part of the doctrine of transcendental idealism, I answer the question of the relation of appearances and things in themselves. The distinction between appearances and things in themselves is a metaphysical distinction between two different ways of being, i.e., objectivity, properties, existence, reality. Yet, this is a metaphysical distinction within the same concept of an object. Thus, appearances and things in themselves are the same object conceptually that is determined metaphysically in two different ways.
■590 ▼aSchool code: 0093.
■650 4▼aPhilosophy
■650 4▼aMetaphysics
■650 4▼aEpistemology
■653 ▼aEmpirical realism
■653 ▼aTranscendental idealism
■653 ▼aKant
■653 ▼aMetaphysical distinction
■690 ▼a0422
■690 ▼a0396
■690 ▼a0393
■71020▼aIndiana University▼bPhilosophy.
■7730 ▼tDissertations Abstracts International▼g85-10A.
■790 ▼a0093
■791 ▼aPh.D.
■792 ▼a2024
■793 ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17160877▼nKERIS▼z이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.
