Input Institutions in a Changing China
Input Institutions in a Changing China
상세정보
- 자료유형
- 학위논문 서양
- 최종처리일시
- 20250211151336
- ISBN
- 9798384452690
- DDC
- 320
- 저자명
- Brown, Junius.
- 서명/저자
- Input Institutions in a Changing China
- 발행사항
- [Sl] : University of California, Berkeley, 2024
- 발행사항
- Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2024
- 형태사항
- 96 p
- 주기사항
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-03, Section: A.
- 주기사항
- Advisor: O'Brien, Kevin J.
- 학위논문주기
- Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 2024.
- 초록/해제
- 요약Over the last ten years, scholars studying China have written extensively about the concept of "responsive authoritarianism." This framework proposes that the Chinese government uses constituency service, online complaint portals, small-group petitions, and even localized protests to solicit information on public opinion, and incorporates this information into policymaking and service provision. Debate persists over how well this framework captures the reality of political participation in China, particularly under Xi Jinping, who has overseen an authoritarian pivot toward greater top-down control within the government and greater repression outside it. Are Chinese citizens satisfied with their experiences contacting government officials for help? What kinds of replies do they encounter, given the complexity of real issues? And what do those replies tell us about the incentives that shape Chinese civil servants' actions? This dissertation, structured as three standalone papers under a shared research program, provides answers to these questions.Paper 1 uses data from Wave 5 of the Asian Barometer Survey to compare beliefs about government responsiveness among people who have and have not engaged with institutional input channels in China. In this paper, I find evidence that people who contact both elected and unelected officials see no significant change in satisfaction, while petitioning is associated with a significant and negative shift in beliefs about government responsiveness.Paper 2 analyzes an original dataset of 2,003 incoming letters and government replies on the Message Board for Leaders, a public-service help website in China. Drawing on these letters, I lay out the concept of "explanatory responsiveness," in which the replier explains why they were unable to satisfy some or all parts of a request. These explanatory responses, along with other complexities of partially resolved letters, challenge an implicit tendency in the literature to treat responsiveness as a binary yes-no variable.Paper 3 zeroes in on one type of explanatory responsiveness: what I term "law as a shield." This is the practice of invoking a specific law, rule, or regulation to justify an unfortunate situation- for example, to show that the conduct in question is not unlawful, or to explain why the local government is unable to act. The frequency of these replies in the data illustrates how "rule by law" operates in China, even when rule of law is weak.
- 일반주제명
- Political science
- 일반주제명
- Public administration
- 일반주제명
- Asian studies
- 키워드
- China
- 키워드
- Legality
- 키워드
- Responsiveness
- 기타저자
- University of California, Berkeley Political Science
- 기본자료저록
- Dissertations Abstracts International. 86-03A.
- 전자적 위치 및 접속
- 로그인 후 원문을 볼 수 있습니다.
MARC
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■020 ▼a9798384452690
■035 ▼a(MiAaPQ)AAI31241863
■040 ▼aMiAaPQ▼cMiAaPQ
■0820 ▼a320
■1001 ▼aBrown, Junius.
■24510▼aInput Institutions in a Changing China
■260 ▼a[Sl]▼bUniversity of California, Berkeley▼c2024
■260 1▼aAnn Arbor▼bProQuest Dissertations & Theses▼c2024
■300 ▼a96 p
■500 ▼aSource: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-03, Section: A.
■500 ▼aAdvisor: O'Brien, Kevin J.
■5021 ▼aThesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 2024.
■520 ▼aOver the last ten years, scholars studying China have written extensively about the concept of "responsive authoritarianism." This framework proposes that the Chinese government uses constituency service, online complaint portals, small-group petitions, and even localized protests to solicit information on public opinion, and incorporates this information into policymaking and service provision. Debate persists over how well this framework captures the reality of political participation in China, particularly under Xi Jinping, who has overseen an authoritarian pivot toward greater top-down control within the government and greater repression outside it. Are Chinese citizens satisfied with their experiences contacting government officials for help? What kinds of replies do they encounter, given the complexity of real issues? And what do those replies tell us about the incentives that shape Chinese civil servants' actions? This dissertation, structured as three standalone papers under a shared research program, provides answers to these questions.Paper 1 uses data from Wave 5 of the Asian Barometer Survey to compare beliefs about government responsiveness among people who have and have not engaged with institutional input channels in China. In this paper, I find evidence that people who contact both elected and unelected officials see no significant change in satisfaction, while petitioning is associated with a significant and negative shift in beliefs about government responsiveness.Paper 2 analyzes an original dataset of 2,003 incoming letters and government replies on the Message Board for Leaders, a public-service help website in China. Drawing on these letters, I lay out the concept of "explanatory responsiveness," in which the replier explains why they were unable to satisfy some or all parts of a request. These explanatory responses, along with other complexities of partially resolved letters, challenge an implicit tendency in the literature to treat responsiveness as a binary yes-no variable.Paper 3 zeroes in on one type of explanatory responsiveness: what I term "law as a shield." This is the practice of invoking a specific law, rule, or regulation to justify an unfortunate situation- for example, to show that the conduct in question is not unlawful, or to explain why the local government is unable to act. The frequency of these replies in the data illustrates how "rule by law" operates in China, even when rule of law is weak.
■590 ▼aSchool code: 0028.
■650 4▼aPolitical science
■650 4▼aPublic administration
■650 4▼aAsian studies
■653 ▼aChina
■653 ▼aLegality
■653 ▼aPolitical communication
■653 ▼aPolitical participation
■653 ▼aResponsiveness
■690 ▼a0615
■690 ▼a0617
■690 ▼a0342
■71020▼aUniversity of California, Berkeley▼bPolitical Science.
■7730 ▼tDissertations Abstracts International▼g86-03A.
■790 ▼a0028
■791 ▼aPh.D.
■792 ▼a2024
■793 ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17161297▼nKERIS▼z이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.
