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Essays in Industrial Organization
Essays in Industrial Organization
상세정보
- 자료유형
- 학위논문 서양
- 최종처리일시
- 20250211153104
- ISBN
- 9798384088233
- DDC
- 338.604
- 저자명
- Ni, Zheyu.
- 서명/저자
- Essays in Industrial Organization
- 발행사항
- [Sl] : The Ohio State University, 2024
- 발행사항
- Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2024
- 형태사항
- 167 p
- 주기사항
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-04, Section: A.
- 주기사항
- Advisor: Weinberg, Matthew.
- 학위논문주기
- Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Ohio State University, 2024.
- 초록/해제
- 요약The dissertation contains three chapters on industrial organization and applied economics. Those chapters seek to use economic theory and econometrics models to advance our understanding of market dynamics with a particular focus on mergers, cooperative contracts, vertical relationships, and two-sided markets.Chapter 1 investigates how vertical integration affects consumer welfare in two-sided markets. In two-sided markets, the growth of the consumer base relies on the product variety offered in the market. This indirect network effect motivates the platform to acquire third-party firms to expand product variety and grow consumer bases. Vertical integration can have anti-competitive effects due to foreclosure and pro-competitive effects via eliminating double marginalization. I show theoretically that the impact of vertical integration on consumer welfare in two-sided markets highly depends on the consumer installed base, which affects the indirect network effects. I develop a model of the platform's optimal pricing, third-party firms' entry and pricing, consumer adoption and purchasing, and estimate using data on the single-serve coffee industry. Counterfactual simulations show that accounting for the indirect network effect and firm's entry, vertical integration increases consumer welfare by 0.14% due to increased product variety and increased third-party firm' entry probabilities. In the absence of indirect network effects, the platform's optimal decision would be to set a licensing fee that is ten times higher because foreclosure effects dominate.Chapter 2 studies the welfare impact of codeshare contracts in the Airline industry in early 2000. Firms compete and cooperate in many ways, fostering efficiency gains from pricing and benefiting consumers with the product that results from collaborative efforts. I provide empirical evidence that airfare pricing is efficient and double marginalization doesn't exist in the vertical relationship, but the U.S. domestic codeshare agreement facilitates tacit collusion. Counterfactual simulations show that prices would be about 2% lower under Nash-Bertrand competition, but the withdrawal of codeshare products would decrease the consumer surplus in 46.42% of markets where the benefits of product variety outweigh the price effects.Chapter 3 studies the relationship between competition and price discrimination in the airline industry, exploring the formation and end of the Northeast Alliance (NEA) between American Airlines and JetBlue Airways. We find that NEA significantly increases airfare and price dispersion. The changes in fares vary among consumers and carriers: The mid-range consumers experience price decreases while the top 20% and bottom 15% of consumers experience price increases with American Airlines. American Airlines' mid-range consumers experience price decreases while the top 20% and their bottom 15% consumers experience price increases. On the other hand, Jetblue's top 1% of consumers experience price increases of 4.28%, and the price for the bottom 1% of consumers falls by 7.18%. Our finding suggests that softened competition makes it easier for firms to price discriminate.
- 키워드
- Price dispersion
- 기타저자
- The Ohio State University Economics
- 기본자료저록
- Dissertations Abstracts International. 86-04A.
- 전자적 위치 및 접속
- 로그인 후 원문을 볼 수 있습니다.
MARC
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■00520250211153104
■006m o d
■007cr#unu||||||||
■020 ▼a9798384088233
■035 ▼a(MiAaPQ)AAI31673971
■040 ▼aMiAaPQ▼cMiAaPQ
■0820 ▼a338.604
■1001 ▼aNi, Zheyu.
■24510▼aEssays in Industrial Organization
■260 ▼a[Sl]▼bThe Ohio State University▼c2024
■260 1▼aAnn Arbor▼bProQuest Dissertations & Theses▼c2024
■300 ▼a167 p
■500 ▼aSource: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-04, Section: A.
■500 ▼aAdvisor: Weinberg, Matthew.
■5021 ▼aThesis (Ph.D.)--The Ohio State University, 2024.
■520 ▼aThe dissertation contains three chapters on industrial organization and applied economics. Those chapters seek to use economic theory and econometrics models to advance our understanding of market dynamics with a particular focus on mergers, cooperative contracts, vertical relationships, and two-sided markets.Chapter 1 investigates how vertical integration affects consumer welfare in two-sided markets. In two-sided markets, the growth of the consumer base relies on the product variety offered in the market. This indirect network effect motivates the platform to acquire third-party firms to expand product variety and grow consumer bases. Vertical integration can have anti-competitive effects due to foreclosure and pro-competitive effects via eliminating double marginalization. I show theoretically that the impact of vertical integration on consumer welfare in two-sided markets highly depends on the consumer installed base, which affects the indirect network effects. I develop a model of the platform's optimal pricing, third-party firms' entry and pricing, consumer adoption and purchasing, and estimate using data on the single-serve coffee industry. Counterfactual simulations show that accounting for the indirect network effect and firm's entry, vertical integration increases consumer welfare by 0.14% due to increased product variety and increased third-party firm' entry probabilities. In the absence of indirect network effects, the platform's optimal decision would be to set a licensing fee that is ten times higher because foreclosure effects dominate.Chapter 2 studies the welfare impact of codeshare contracts in the Airline industry in early 2000. Firms compete and cooperate in many ways, fostering efficiency gains from pricing and benefiting consumers with the product that results from collaborative efforts. I provide empirical evidence that airfare pricing is efficient and double marginalization doesn't exist in the vertical relationship, but the U.S. domestic codeshare agreement facilitates tacit collusion. Counterfactual simulations show that prices would be about 2% lower under Nash-Bertrand competition, but the withdrawal of codeshare products would decrease the consumer surplus in 46.42% of markets where the benefits of product variety outweigh the price effects.Chapter 3 studies the relationship between competition and price discrimination in the airline industry, exploring the formation and end of the Northeast Alliance (NEA) between American Airlines and JetBlue Airways. We find that NEA significantly increases airfare and price dispersion. The changes in fares vary among consumers and carriers: The mid-range consumers experience price decreases while the top 20% and bottom 15% of consumers experience price increases with American Airlines. American Airlines' mid-range consumers experience price decreases while the top 20% and their bottom 15% consumers experience price increases. On the other hand, Jetblue's top 1% of consumers experience price increases of 4.28%, and the price for the bottom 1% of consumers falls by 7.18%. Our finding suggests that softened competition makes it easier for firms to price discriminate.
■590 ▼aSchool code: 0168.
■653 ▼aVertical integration
■653 ▼aTwo-sided markets
■653 ▼aCodeshare products
■653 ▼aPrice dispersion
■690 ▼a0501
■690 ▼a0511
■71020▼aThe Ohio State University▼bEconomics.
■7730 ▼tDissertations Abstracts International▼g86-04A.
■790 ▼a0168
■791 ▼aPh.D.
■792 ▼a2024
■793 ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17164929▼nKERIS▼z이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.
