본문

서브메뉴

Pragmatism as a Theory of Normativity: Three Revisionary Projects
Pragmatism as a Theory of Normativity: Three Revisionary Projects
Pragmatism as a Theory of Normativity: Three Revisionary Projects

상세정보

자료유형  
 학위논문 서양
최종처리일시  
20250211153113
ISBN  
9798384462040
DDC  
100
저자명  
Wang, Yonghao.
서명/저자  
Pragmatism as a Theory of Normativity: Three Revisionary Projects
발행사항  
[Sl] : The Ohio State University, 2024
발행사항  
Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2024
형태사항  
103 p
주기사항  
Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-04, Section: A.
주기사항  
Advisor: Kraut, Robert.
학위논문주기  
Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Ohio State University, 2024.
초록/해제  
요약Philosophical inquiries are inherently normative, as they are evaluated various normative standards. As a result, a theory of normativity bears on how we ought to do philosophy. Pragmatism, as I understand it, is a theory of normativity. It claims that normativity is our normative practices, and that we should seek normative guidance in ourselves and in each other, rather than in objective reality. This dissertation consists of three first-order applications of this pragmatist methodology, each explicating and defending a revisionary proposal on how we view normativity within a specific philosophical domain. Following the introductory chapter, the second chapter concerns truth and defends Rorty's proposal that we should stop attributing normative significance to the truth norm. The third chapter turns to the idea of semantic content and gives a naturalistic treatment of Brandom's normative inferentialism, according to which our uses of language confer content on linguistic items, contrasting with the prevalent idea that content determines how we ought to use concepts. The fourth chapter examines morality. Using ideas from Simon Blackburn, Sharon Street, and Nietzsche, I argue that there are no moral facts. 
일반주제명  
Philosophy
일반주제명  
Epistemology
일반주제명  
Literature
키워드  
Philosophical inquiries
키워드  
Pragmatism
키워드  
Normative significance
키워드  
Rorty's proposal
기타저자  
The Ohio State University Philosophy
기본자료저록  
Dissertations Abstracts International. 86-04A.
전자적 위치 및 접속  
로그인 후 원문을 볼 수 있습니다.

MARC

 008250123s2024        us                              c    eng  d
■001000017165013
■00520250211153113
■006m          o    d                
■007cr#unu||||||||
■020    ▼a9798384462040
■035    ▼a(MiAaPQ)AAI31693861
■040    ▼aMiAaPQ▼cMiAaPQ
■0820  ▼a100
■1001  ▼aWang,  Yonghao.
■24510▼aPragmatism  as  a  Theory  of  Normativity:  Three  Revisionary  Projects
■260    ▼a[Sl]▼bThe  Ohio  State  University▼c2024
■260  1▼aAnn  Arbor▼bProQuest  Dissertations  &  Theses▼c2024
■300    ▼a103  p
■500    ▼aSource:  Dissertations  Abstracts  International,  Volume:  86-04,  Section:  A.
■500    ▼aAdvisor:  Kraut,  Robert.
■5021  ▼aThesis  (Ph.D.)--The  Ohio  State  University,  2024.
■520    ▼aPhilosophical  inquiries  are  inherently  normative,  as  they  are  evaluated  various  normative  standards.  As  a  result,  a  theory  of  normativity  bears  on  how  we  ought  to  do  philosophy.  Pragmatism,  as  I  understand  it,  is  a  theory  of  normativity.  It  claims  that  normativity  is  our  normative  practices,  and  that  we  should  seek  normative  guidance  in  ourselves  and  in  each  other,  rather  than  in  objective  reality.  This  dissertation  consists  of  three  first-order  applications  of  this  pragmatist  methodology,  each  explicating  and  defending  a  revisionary  proposal  on  how  we  view  normativity  within  a  specific  philosophical  domain.  Following  the  introductory  chapter,  the  second  chapter  concerns  truth  and  defends  Rorty's  proposal  that  we  should  stop  attributing  normative  significance  to  the  truth  norm.  The  third  chapter  turns  to  the  idea  of  semantic  content  and  gives  a  naturalistic  treatment  of  Brandom's  normative  inferentialism,  according  to  which  our  uses  of  language  confer  content  on  linguistic  items,  contrasting  with  the  prevalent  idea  that  content  determines  how  we  ought  to  use  concepts.  The  fourth  chapter  examines  morality.  Using  ideas  from  Simon  Blackburn,  Sharon  Street,  and  Nietzsche,  I  argue  that  there  are  no  moral  facts. 
■590    ▼aSchool  code:  0168.
■650  4▼aPhilosophy
■650  4▼aEpistemology
■650  4▼aLiterature
■653    ▼aPhilosophical  inquiries
■653    ▼aPragmatism
■653    ▼aNormative  significance
■653    ▼aRorty's  proposal
■690    ▼a0422
■690    ▼a0401
■690    ▼a0393
■71020▼aThe  Ohio  State  University▼bPhilosophy.
■7730  ▼tDissertations  Abstracts  International▼g86-04A.
■790    ▼a0168
■791    ▼aPh.D.
■792    ▼a2024
■793    ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17165013▼nKERIS▼z이  자료의  원문은  한국교육학술정보원에서  제공합니다.

미리보기

내보내기

chatGPT토론

Ai 추천 관련 도서


    신착도서 더보기
    최근 3년간 통계입니다.

    소장정보

    • 예약
    • 소재불명신고
    • 나의폴더
    • 우선정리요청
    • 비도서대출신청
    • 야간 도서대출신청
    소장자료
    등록번호 청구기호 소장처 대출가능여부 대출정보
    TF12941 전자도서 대출가능 마이폴더 부재도서신고 비도서대출신청 야간 도서대출신청

    * 대출중인 자료에 한하여 예약이 가능합니다. 예약을 원하시면 예약버튼을 클릭하십시오.

    해당 도서를 다른 이용자가 함께 대출한 도서

    관련 인기도서

    로그인 후 이용 가능합니다.