Hierarchy and Equality
Hierarchy and Equality
상세정보
- 자료유형
- 학위논문 서양
- 최종처리일시
- 20250211151105
- ISBN
- 9798383161661
- DDC
- 100
- 저자명
- Zuehl, Jake.
- 서명/저자
- Hierarchy and Equality
- 발행사항
- [Sl] : New York University, 2024
- 발행사항
- Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2024
- 형태사항
- 168 p
- 주기사항
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-12, Section: A.
- 주기사항
- Advisor: Scheffler, Samuel.
- 학위논문주기
- Thesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, 2024.
- 초록/해제
- 요약Social hierarchies, or inequalities of social status, are all around us. But what are they, and are they morally objectionable in their own right? In this dissertation, I defend answers to both questions. Social hierarchies are constituted by unequal social entitlements to various kinds of respect; different kinds of hierarchy correspond to different kinds of respect. Not all kinds of hierarchy are intrinsically objectionable. In particular, hierarchies of prestige and authority are not intrinsically objectionable -- not even pro tanto, and not even presumptively. One kind of hierarchy, however, is intrinsically objectionable: hierarchy of de facto moral standing. Because we are 'basic' moral equals, it is intrinsically objectionable to relate to one another in fashion structured by unequal social entitlements to moral consideration. This has some interesting normative implications, but fewer than hierarchy's philosophical opponents may have hoped for.
- 일반주제명
- Philosophy
- 일반주제명
- Political science
- 일반주제명
- Sociology
- 키워드
- equality
- 키워드
- Social equality
- 키워드
- Social hierarchy
- 키워드
- Social status
- 기타저자
- New York University Philosophy
- 기본자료저록
- Dissertations Abstracts International. 85-12A.
- 전자적 위치 및 접속
- 로그인 후 원문을 볼 수 있습니다.
MARC
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■020 ▼a9798383161661
■035 ▼a(MiAaPQ)AAI31143466
■040 ▼aMiAaPQ▼cMiAaPQ
■0820 ▼a100
■1001 ▼aZuehl, Jake.
■24510▼aHierarchy and Equality
■260 ▼a[Sl]▼bNew York University▼c2024
■260 1▼aAnn Arbor▼bProQuest Dissertations & Theses▼c2024
■300 ▼a168 p
■500 ▼aSource: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-12, Section: A.
■500 ▼aAdvisor: Scheffler, Samuel.
■5021 ▼aThesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, 2024.
■520 ▼aSocial hierarchies, or inequalities of social status, are all around us. But what are they, and are they morally objectionable in their own right? In this dissertation, I defend answers to both questions. Social hierarchies are constituted by unequal social entitlements to various kinds of respect; different kinds of hierarchy correspond to different kinds of respect. Not all kinds of hierarchy are intrinsically objectionable. In particular, hierarchies of prestige and authority are not intrinsically objectionable -- not even pro tanto, and not even presumptively. One kind of hierarchy, however, is intrinsically objectionable: hierarchy of de facto moral standing. Because we are 'basic' moral equals, it is intrinsically objectionable to relate to one another in fashion structured by unequal social entitlements to moral consideration. This has some interesting normative implications, but fewer than hierarchy's philosophical opponents may have hoped for.
■590 ▼aSchool code: 0146.
■650 4▼aPhilosophy
■650 4▼aPolitical science
■650 4▼aSociology
■653 ▼aequality
■653 ▼aRelational equality
■653 ▼aSocial equality
■653 ▼aSocial hierarchy
■653 ▼aSocial status
■690 ▼a0422
■690 ▼a0615
■690 ▼a0626
■71020▼aNew York University▼bPhilosophy.
■7730 ▼tDissertations Abstracts International▼g85-12A.
■790 ▼a0146
■791 ▼aPh.D.
■792 ▼a2024
■793 ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17160717▼nKERIS▼z이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.
