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Organizational Emergence in the Federal Reserve System: A Negotiated Order Perspective
Organizational Emergence in the Federal Reserve System: A Negotiated Order Perspective
상세정보
- 자료유형
- 학위논문 서양
- 최종처리일시
- 20250211151951
- ISBN
- 9798383164150
- DDC
- 301
- 저자명
- Lista, Peter.
- 서명/저자
- Organizational Emergence in the Federal Reserve System: A Negotiated Order Perspective
- 발행사항
- [Sl] : Indiana University, 2024
- 발행사항
- Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2024
- 형태사항
- 157 p
- 주기사항
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-12, Section: A.
- 주기사항
- Advisor: Rojas, Fabio.
- 학위논문주기
- Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, 2024.
- 초록/해제
- 요약The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 was a compromise between Senate Republicans-who wanted to create a private European-style central bank-and House Democrats-who wanted a public institution that could avoid becoming a "bankers' monopoly." The outcome of their negotiations created a decentralized, bifurcated institution that ostensibly vested supervisory authority in the public Federal Reserve Board and operational authority in the twelve private Federal Reserve Banks. However, the 1913 Act also lacked clear rules defining who had ultimate authority over monetary policy-making within the Federal Reserve System, especially when the interests of the Board and the Banks came into conflict. Absent explicit rules to define their formal responsibilities, neither the Board, the Banks, nor the Treasury had the legal standing (nor political legitimacy) to claim sole authority. This created conflict among the System's stakeholders, as each tried to gain control over monetary policy-making. Between 1914 and 1935 the System underwent a significant shift in its organizational structure, moving from its original decentralized governance model to that of a "real" central bank. In this dissertation, I apply the negotiated order perspective to the case of the Federal Reserve System's governance structure and show that both its initial decentralized structure (as prescribed by the 1913 Act) and the subsequent structural changes (leading to the 1935 Act), were a result of negotiation and a "structural process" extending back decades. Using this historical case, I show that the negotiated order perspective can provide a more comprehensive account of organizational change, generally, and of the emergence of organizational structures, specifically.
- 일반주제명
- Sociology
- 일반주제명
- Law
- 키워드
- Emergence
- 키워드
- Negotiated order
- 키워드
- Organization
- 기타저자
- Indiana University Sociology
- 기본자료저록
- Dissertations Abstracts International. 85-12A.
- 전자적 위치 및 접속
- 로그인 후 원문을 볼 수 있습니다.
MARC
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■00520250211151951
■006m o d
■007cr#unu||||||||
■020 ▼a9798383164150
■035 ▼a(MiAaPQ)AAI31328391
■040 ▼aMiAaPQ▼cMiAaPQ
■0820 ▼a301
■1001 ▼aLista, Peter.▼0(orcid)0000-0002-6582-8226
■24510▼aOrganizational Emergence in the Federal Reserve System: A Negotiated Order Perspective
■260 ▼a[Sl]▼bIndiana University▼c2024
■260 1▼aAnn Arbor▼bProQuest Dissertations & Theses▼c2024
■300 ▼a157 p
■500 ▼aSource: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-12, Section: A.
■500 ▼aAdvisor: Rojas, Fabio.
■5021 ▼aThesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, 2024.
■520 ▼aThe Federal Reserve Act of 1913 was a compromise between Senate Republicans-who wanted to create a private European-style central bank-and House Democrats-who wanted a public institution that could avoid becoming a "bankers' monopoly." The outcome of their negotiations created a decentralized, bifurcated institution that ostensibly vested supervisory authority in the public Federal Reserve Board and operational authority in the twelve private Federal Reserve Banks. However, the 1913 Act also lacked clear rules defining who had ultimate authority over monetary policy-making within the Federal Reserve System, especially when the interests of the Board and the Banks came into conflict. Absent explicit rules to define their formal responsibilities, neither the Board, the Banks, nor the Treasury had the legal standing (nor political legitimacy) to claim sole authority. This created conflict among the System's stakeholders, as each tried to gain control over monetary policy-making. Between 1914 and 1935 the System underwent a significant shift in its organizational structure, moving from its original decentralized governance model to that of a "real" central bank. In this dissertation, I apply the negotiated order perspective to the case of the Federal Reserve System's governance structure and show that both its initial decentralized structure (as prescribed by the 1913 Act) and the subsequent structural changes (leading to the 1935 Act), were a result of negotiation and a "structural process" extending back decades. Using this historical case, I show that the negotiated order perspective can provide a more comprehensive account of organizational change, generally, and of the emergence of organizational structures, specifically.
■590 ▼aSchool code: 0093.
■650 4▼aSociology
■650 4▼aLaw
■653 ▼aEmergence
■653 ▼aFederal Reserve System
■653 ▼aNegotiated order
■653 ▼aOrganization
■653 ▼aOrganizational structures
■690 ▼a0626
■690 ▼a0398
■690 ▼a0635
■71020▼aIndiana University▼bSociology.
■7730 ▼tDissertations Abstracts International▼g85-12A.
■790 ▼a0093
■791 ▼aPh.D.
■792 ▼a2024
■793 ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17162255▼nKERIS▼z이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.
