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Mary Shepherd's Emergentist Conception of Cause
Mary Shepherd's Emergentist Conception of Cause
상세정보
- 자료유형
- 학위논문 서양
- 최종처리일시
- 20250211152030
- ISBN
- 9798342710046
- DDC
- 100
- 서명/저자
- Mary Shepherds Emergentist Conception of Cause
- 발행사항
- [Sl] : New York University, 2024
- 발행사항
- Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2024
- 형태사항
- 220 p
- 주기사항
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-04, Section: A.
- 주기사항
- Advisor: Garrett, Don.
- 학위논문주기
- Thesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, 2024.
- 초록/해제
- 요약This dissertation develops a unified understanding of Mary Shepherd's metaphysics and epistemology. I argue that her system is founded on a weak emergentist conception of causation. The dissertation has three primary aims: (i) to lay out the evidence for the Weak Emergence Reading, (ii) to defend the viability of the metaphysical foundations of her emergentism, and (iii) to uncover the basic epistemological constraints this view imposes on scientific research. I begin with Shepherd's ontology: she believes the nature of all entities must be understood in terms of powers. These powers are dispositional, meaning entities are individuated in terms of the manifestations they would produce in different circumstances. I show in Chapter 1 that the first steps of Shepherd's 1824 Essay, including her proofs of modal principles, are best understood as an exploration of the logical implications of this ontology of powers. Having established the outlines of her ontology, I argue in Chapter 2 that Shepherd thinks every effect is a manifestation of its cause, but not just any manifestation. There must be some condition that determines whether a manifestation counts as a "new object exhibiting new qualities" (ERCE 50) and therefore requires a cause for its existence. In Chapter 3 I identify the substantive criterion that determines which manifestations count as effects: the powers of an effect must constitute a "new nature" (ERCE 63). On the basis of Shepherd's historical context together with her overall views on metaphysics and the philosophy of science, I argue that this New Nature Condition should be understood as an emergentist constraint on causation. Effects count as new natures because they are characterized by emergent qualities that are metaphysically autonomous even though they depend on an underlying causal basis. I combine Shepherd's powers-based ontology with the New Nature Condition in Chapter 4, arguing that Shepherd's analysis of causation is best understood as a theory of weak metaphysical emergence. Effects inherit each of their powers from their cause, but still count as metaphysically autonomous because they have an irreducible causal role: their distinctive power profile is indispensable for explaining the existence of further effects. I conclude the dissertation in Chapter 5 by arguing that this emergentist metaphysical picture imposes an experimentalist constraint on the epistemology of science, meaning science should answer only to observation and not to speculative reasoning or intuition. I contrast this with David Hume's experimentalism to show how Shepherd's emergentist metaphysics challenges Humean assumptions that still remain dominant in the foundations of science.
- 일반주제명
- Philosophy
- 일반주제명
- History
- 일반주제명
- Epistemology
- 일반주제명
- Metaphysics
- 키워드
- Emergence
- 키워드
- Experimentalism
- 키워드
- Ontology
- 기타저자
- New York University Philosophy
- 기본자료저록
- Dissertations Abstracts International. 86-04A.
- 전자적 위치 및 접속
- 로그인 후 원문을 볼 수 있습니다.
MARC
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■00520250211152030
■006m o d
■007cr#unu||||||||
■020 ▼a9798342710046
■035 ▼a(MiAaPQ)AAI31334149
■040 ▼aMiAaPQ▼cMiAaPQ
■0820 ▼a100
■1001 ▼aMelamedoff, Ariel.
■24510▼aMary Shepherd's Emergentist Conception of Cause
■260 ▼a[Sl]▼bNew York University▼c2024
■260 1▼aAnn Arbor▼bProQuest Dissertations & Theses▼c2024
■300 ▼a220 p
■500 ▼aSource: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-04, Section: A.
■500 ▼aAdvisor: Garrett, Don.
■5021 ▼aThesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, 2024.
■520 ▼aThis dissertation develops a unified understanding of Mary Shepherd's metaphysics and epistemology. I argue that her system is founded on a weak emergentist conception of causation. The dissertation has three primary aims: (i) to lay out the evidence for the Weak Emergence Reading, (ii) to defend the viability of the metaphysical foundations of her emergentism, and (iii) to uncover the basic epistemological constraints this view imposes on scientific research. I begin with Shepherd's ontology: she believes the nature of all entities must be understood in terms of powers. These powers are dispositional, meaning entities are individuated in terms of the manifestations they would produce in different circumstances. I show in Chapter 1 that the first steps of Shepherd's 1824 Essay, including her proofs of modal principles, are best understood as an exploration of the logical implications of this ontology of powers. Having established the outlines of her ontology, I argue in Chapter 2 that Shepherd thinks every effect is a manifestation of its cause, but not just any manifestation. There must be some condition that determines whether a manifestation counts as a "new object exhibiting new qualities" (ERCE 50) and therefore requires a cause for its existence. In Chapter 3 I identify the substantive criterion that determines which manifestations count as effects: the powers of an effect must constitute a "new nature" (ERCE 63). On the basis of Shepherd's historical context together with her overall views on metaphysics and the philosophy of science, I argue that this New Nature Condition should be understood as an emergentist constraint on causation. Effects count as new natures because they are characterized by emergent qualities that are metaphysically autonomous even though they depend on an underlying causal basis. I combine Shepherd's powers-based ontology with the New Nature Condition in Chapter 4, arguing that Shepherd's analysis of causation is best understood as a theory of weak metaphysical emergence. Effects inherit each of their powers from their cause, but still count as metaphysically autonomous because they have an irreducible causal role: their distinctive power profile is indispensable for explaining the existence of further effects. I conclude the dissertation in Chapter 5 by arguing that this emergentist metaphysical picture imposes an experimentalist constraint on the epistemology of science, meaning science should answer only to observation and not to speculative reasoning or intuition. I contrast this with David Hume's experimentalism to show how Shepherd's emergentist metaphysics challenges Humean assumptions that still remain dominant in the foundations of science.
■590 ▼aSchool code: 0146.
■650 4▼aPhilosophy
■650 4▼aHistory
■650 4▼aEpistemology
■650 4▼aMetaphysics
■653 ▼aEmergence
■653 ▼aExperimentalism
■653 ▼aOntology
■653 ▼aWeak Emergence Reading
■690 ▼a0422
■690 ▼a0578
■690 ▼a0393
■690 ▼a0396
■71020▼aNew York University▼bPhilosophy.
■7730 ▼tDissertations Abstracts International▼g86-04A.
■790 ▼a0146
■791 ▼aPh.D.
■792 ▼a2024
■793 ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17162594▼nKERIS▼z이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.
