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The Subnational Roots of Democratic Stability
The Subnational Roots of Democratic Stability
상세정보
- 자료유형
- 학위논문 서양
- 최종처리일시
- 20250211152821
- ISBN
- 9798384045120
- DDC
- 320
- 저자명
- Michel, Julian.
- 서명/저자
- The Subnational Roots of Democratic Stability
- 발행사항
- [Sl] : University of California, Los Angeles, 2024
- 발행사항
- Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2024
- 형태사항
- 232 p
- 주기사항
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-03, Section: A.
- 주기사항
- Advisor: Geddes, Barbara;Treisman, Daniel S.
- 학위논문주기
- Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Los Angeles, 2024.
- 초록/해제
- 요약Do opposition-led subnational governments reduce opportunities for the national government to undermine democracy? Over 89% of democratic country-years after 1990 consist of multi-level democracies. Control over subnational government provides opposition parties with state resources and visibility, which allow them to: (a) become more competitive in national elections, (b) incentivize office-seeking MPs to exert more legislative constraints, and (c) ultimately reduce executive aggrandizement. Leveraging close races for highest subnational executive office in Latin America (1990-2021), I find that oppositions experience electoral gains of 17 percentage points in national legislative elections in states they marginally won. At the country level, I employ panel models and the newly assembled Subnational Elections Database - the largest dataset on subnational election outcomes, which covers results from 84 democracies (1990-2021). These analyses reveal that subnational opposition control, even in unitary countries, increases horizontal accountability and reduces aggrandizement in the form of constitutional violations. Overall, in stark contrast to subnational governments as "laboratories against democracy" in the U.S. in recent years (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018; Grumbach 2022), this research illustrates that oppositions since 1990 have better protected democracy against executive aggrandizement when they exerted more subnational control.
- 일반주제명
- Political science
- 일반주제명
- Latin American studies
- 일반주제명
- Public administration
- 키워드
- Democracy
- 키워드
- Elections
- 키워드
- Protests
- 키워드
- Regime change
- 기타저자
- University of California, Los Angeles Political Science 0699
- 기본자료저록
- Dissertations Abstracts International. 86-03A.
- 전자적 위치 및 접속
- 로그인 후 원문을 볼 수 있습니다.
MARC
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■00520250211152821
■006m o d
■007cr#unu||||||||
■020 ▼a9798384045120
■035 ▼a(MiAaPQ)AAI31559341
■040 ▼aMiAaPQ▼cMiAaPQ
■0820 ▼a320
■1001 ▼aMichel, Julian.
■24510▼aThe Subnational Roots of Democratic Stability
■260 ▼a[Sl]▼bUniversity of California, Los Angeles▼c2024
■260 1▼aAnn Arbor▼bProQuest Dissertations & Theses▼c2024
■300 ▼a232 p
■500 ▼aSource: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-03, Section: A.
■500 ▼aAdvisor: Geddes, Barbara;Treisman, Daniel S.
■5021 ▼aThesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Los Angeles, 2024.
■520 ▼aDo opposition-led subnational governments reduce opportunities for the national government to undermine democracy? Over 89% of democratic country-years after 1990 consist of multi-level democracies. Control over subnational government provides opposition parties with state resources and visibility, which allow them to: (a) become more competitive in national elections, (b) incentivize office-seeking MPs to exert more legislative constraints, and (c) ultimately reduce executive aggrandizement. Leveraging close races for highest subnational executive office in Latin America (1990-2021), I find that oppositions experience electoral gains of 17 percentage points in national legislative elections in states they marginally won. At the country level, I employ panel models and the newly assembled Subnational Elections Database - the largest dataset on subnational election outcomes, which covers results from 84 democracies (1990-2021). These analyses reveal that subnational opposition control, even in unitary countries, increases horizontal accountability and reduces aggrandizement in the form of constitutional violations. Overall, in stark contrast to subnational governments as "laboratories against democracy" in the U.S. in recent years (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018; Grumbach 2022), this research illustrates that oppositions since 1990 have better protected democracy against executive aggrandizement when they exerted more subnational control.
■590 ▼aSchool code: 0031.
■650 4▼aPolitical science
■650 4▼aLatin American studies
■650 4▼aPublic administration
■653 ▼aDemocracy
■653 ▼aDemocratic backsliding
■653 ▼aElections
■653 ▼aMulti-level governance
■653 ▼aProtests
■653 ▼aRegime change
■690 ▼a0615
■690 ▼a0501
■690 ▼a0617
■690 ▼a0550
■71020▼aUniversity of California, Los Angeles▼bPolitical Science 0699.
■7730 ▼tDissertations Abstracts International▼g86-03A.
■790 ▼a0031
■791 ▼aPh.D.
■792 ▼a2024
■793 ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17164012▼nKERIS▼z이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.
