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The Moral Psychology of Implicit Bias: Interpretations, Obligations, and Responsibilities
The Moral Psychology of Implicit Bias: Interpretations, Obligations, and Responsibilities
상세정보
- 자료유형
- 학위논문 서양
- 최종처리일시
- 20250211152713
- ISBN
- 9798384097259
- DDC
- 100
- 저자명
- Lackey, Nathan.
- 서명/저자
- The Moral Psychology of Implicit Bias: Interpretations, Obligations, and Responsibilities
- 발행사항
- [Sl] : University of Minnesota, 2024
- 발행사항
- Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2024
- 형태사항
- 97 p
- 주기사항
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-03, Section: B.
- 주기사항
- Advisor: Love, Alan C.;Tiberius, Valerie.
- 학위논문주기
- Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Minnesota, 2024.
- 초록/해제
- 요약In recent years, psychologists have developed indirect measures to observe unconscious prejudices that diverge from the egalitarian views directly reported by test subjects. This unconscious prejudice is termed implicit bias. It has been used to scientifically explain a variety of broad social phenomena (e.g. persisting inequality between various demographic groups). My dissertation is focused on the relationships between scientific characterizations of implicit bias, our moral responsibility for it, and how these accounts translate into applications in real-world settings. At the center of my work is the view that philosophical theorizing regarding implicit bias should be informed by careful attention to the nuances of relevant contemporary conceptual models of implicit bias. There are multiple models of implicit bias, each of which provides a unique conceptual characterization of the same phenomena. My research is focused mainly (although not exclusively) on the most recent conceptualization of implicit bias in the relevant science: situationist models. Situationist models have the potential to fundamentally change how we think about moral responsibility for actions related to implicit bias, and what we must do to mitigate its effects in the future. There has been little attention given to developing the implications of this model in philosophical work on implicit bias and my dissertation addresses this lacuna. I argue for a pluralistic approach to moral responsibility for implicit bias. Just as there are different models of implicit bias, there are also corresponding different senses of moral responsibility associated with implicit bias. This represents a novel contribution to the philosophical literature on implicit bias.
- 일반주제명
- Philosophy
- 일반주제명
- Philosophy of science
- 일반주제명
- Ethics
- 일반주제명
- Personality psychology
- 일반주제명
- Social psychology
- 키워드
- Applied ethics
- 키워드
- Implicit bias
- 키워드
- Moral psychology
- 키워드
- Social phenomena
- 기타저자
- University of Minnesota Philosophy
- 기본자료저록
- Dissertations Abstracts International. 86-03B.
- 전자적 위치 및 접속
- 로그인 후 원문을 볼 수 있습니다.
MARC
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■020 ▼a9798384097259
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■040 ▼aMiAaPQ▼cMiAaPQ
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■1001 ▼aLackey, Nathan.
■24510▼aThe Moral Psychology of Implicit Bias: Interpretations, Obligations, and Responsibilities
■260 ▼a[Sl]▼bUniversity of Minnesota▼c2024
■260 1▼aAnn Arbor▼bProQuest Dissertations & Theses▼c2024
■300 ▼a97 p
■500 ▼aSource: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-03, Section: B.
■500 ▼aAdvisor: Love, Alan C.;Tiberius, Valerie.
■5021 ▼aThesis (Ph.D.)--University of Minnesota, 2024.
■520 ▼aIn recent years, psychologists have developed indirect measures to observe unconscious prejudices that diverge from the egalitarian views directly reported by test subjects. This unconscious prejudice is termed implicit bias. It has been used to scientifically explain a variety of broad social phenomena (e.g. persisting inequality between various demographic groups). My dissertation is focused on the relationships between scientific characterizations of implicit bias, our moral responsibility for it, and how these accounts translate into applications in real-world settings. At the center of my work is the view that philosophical theorizing regarding implicit bias should be informed by careful attention to the nuances of relevant contemporary conceptual models of implicit bias. There are multiple models of implicit bias, each of which provides a unique conceptual characterization of the same phenomena. My research is focused mainly (although not exclusively) on the most recent conceptualization of implicit bias in the relevant science: situationist models. Situationist models have the potential to fundamentally change how we think about moral responsibility for actions related to implicit bias, and what we must do to mitigate its effects in the future. There has been little attention given to developing the implications of this model in philosophical work on implicit bias and my dissertation addresses this lacuna. I argue for a pluralistic approach to moral responsibility for implicit bias. Just as there are different models of implicit bias, there are also corresponding different senses of moral responsibility associated with implicit bias. This represents a novel contribution to the philosophical literature on implicit bias.
■590 ▼aSchool code: 0130.
■650 4▼aPhilosophy
■650 4▼aPhilosophy of science
■650 4▼aEthics
■650 4▼aPersonality psychology
■650 4▼aSocial psychology
■653 ▼aApplied ethics
■653 ▼aImplicit bias
■653 ▼aMoral psychology
■653 ▼aSocial phenomena
■653 ▼aMoral responsibility
■690 ▼a0422
■690 ▼a0402
■690 ▼a0394
■690 ▼a0625
■690 ▼a0451
■71020▼aUniversity of Minnesota▼bPhilosophy.
■7730 ▼tDissertations Abstracts International▼g86-03B.
■790 ▼a0130
■791 ▼aPh.D.
■792 ▼a2024
■793 ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17163479▼nKERIS▼z이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.
