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Essays on Political Economy of Finance
Essays on Political Economy of Finance
상세정보
- 자료유형
- 학위논문 서양
- 최종처리일시
- 20250211151334
- ISBN
- 9798382757711
- DDC
- 658
- 저자명
- Zhao, Weijia.
- 서명/저자
- Essays on Political Economy of Finance
- 발행사항
- [Sl] : Northwestern University, 2024
- 발행사항
- Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2024
- 형태사항
- 176 p
- 주기사항
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-11, Section: A.
- 주기사항
- Advisor: Sapienza, Paola.
- 학위논문주기
- Thesis (Ph.D.)--Northwestern University, 2024.
- 초록/해제
- 요약This thesis has two essays which are empirical studies at the intersection of political economy and finance. The topics include political alignment and municipal bond yield, and political turnover and government procurement. The essays hope to provide empirical evidence, using diverse approaches, to better understand the impact of politics (political favoritism) on various aspects of economic outcomes.The first essay is "Taking Sides: Political Alignment and Municipal Bond Yield", joint with Pengyu Ren. In this research, we show that politically misaligned counties face higher yield spreads while aligned ones benefit from lower spreads. The magnitude of the effect varies on bond characteristics: bonds with long maturity, backed by utility revenue, and issued by counties less reliant on state transfers are less sensitive to political alignment shock. In addition, yield spread variations correlate with changes in credit risk and inter-governmental transfers. Politically misaligned counties elevate bond issuance despite augmented costs, offsetting reductions in intergovernmental transfers.The second essay is "Riding on bureaucracy's coattails: leadership rotation and inter-municipality procurement". In this research, I show that when a municipal leader is appointed as the leader of a different city, the amount of government procurement contract allocated to suppliers located in the city where the leader previously worked increases, but not vice versa. This effect is more pronounced for when the new municipal leaders have closer ties to the cities they previously worked in, is net of changes in inter-regional trade volumes and investments, and reverses when the municipal leader steps down or is removed due to the anti-corruption campaign. Additionally, a close look at the standardized office equipment procurement demonstrates that governments pay, on average, a 14% higher premium for contractors from the leader's former area, challenging the cost-efficiency hypothesis.
- 일반주제명
- Finance
- 일반주제명
- Political science
- 키워드
- Municipal bond
- 키워드
- Procurement
- 기타저자
- Northwestern University Finance
- 기본자료저록
- Dissertations Abstracts International. 85-11A.
- 전자적 위치 및 접속
- 로그인 후 원문을 볼 수 있습니다.
MARC
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■00520250211151334
■006m o d
■007cr#unu||||||||
■020 ▼a9798382757711
■035 ▼a(MiAaPQ)AAI31241536
■040 ▼aMiAaPQ▼cMiAaPQ
■0820 ▼a658
■1001 ▼aZhao, Weijia.
■24510▼aEssays on Political Economy of Finance
■260 ▼a[Sl]▼bNorthwestern University▼c2024
■260 1▼aAnn Arbor▼bProQuest Dissertations & Theses▼c2024
■300 ▼a176 p
■500 ▼aSource: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-11, Section: A.
■500 ▼aAdvisor: Sapienza, Paola.
■5021 ▼aThesis (Ph.D.)--Northwestern University, 2024.
■520 ▼aThis thesis has two essays which are empirical studies at the intersection of political economy and finance. The topics include political alignment and municipal bond yield, and political turnover and government procurement. The essays hope to provide empirical evidence, using diverse approaches, to better understand the impact of politics (political favoritism) on various aspects of economic outcomes.The first essay is "Taking Sides: Political Alignment and Municipal Bond Yield", joint with Pengyu Ren. In this research, we show that politically misaligned counties face higher yield spreads while aligned ones benefit from lower spreads. The magnitude of the effect varies on bond characteristics: bonds with long maturity, backed by utility revenue, and issued by counties less reliant on state transfers are less sensitive to political alignment shock. In addition, yield spread variations correlate with changes in credit risk and inter-governmental transfers. Politically misaligned counties elevate bond issuance despite augmented costs, offsetting reductions in intergovernmental transfers.The second essay is "Riding on bureaucracy's coattails: leadership rotation and inter-municipality procurement". In this research, I show that when a municipal leader is appointed as the leader of a different city, the amount of government procurement contract allocated to suppliers located in the city where the leader previously worked increases, but not vice versa. This effect is more pronounced for when the new municipal leaders have closer ties to the cities they previously worked in, is net of changes in inter-regional trade volumes and investments, and reverses when the municipal leader steps down or is removed due to the anti-corruption campaign. Additionally, a close look at the standardized office equipment procurement demonstrates that governments pay, on average, a 14% higher premium for contractors from the leader's former area, challenging the cost-efficiency hypothesis.
■590 ▼aSchool code: 0163.
■650 4▼aFinance
■650 4▼aPolitical science
■653 ▼aMunicipal bond
■653 ▼aPolitical economy
■653 ▼aProcurement
■653 ▼aIntergovernmental transfers
■653 ▼aPolitical alignment
■690 ▼a0508
■690 ▼a0501
■690 ▼a0511
■690 ▼a0615
■71020▼aNorthwestern University▼bFinance.
■7730 ▼tDissertations Abstracts International▼g85-11A.
■790 ▼a0163
■791 ▼aPh.D.
■792 ▼a2024
■793 ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17161280▼nKERIS▼z이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.
