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Incentive Mechanisms for Collaborative Routing Factoring Individual Heterogeneities
Incentive Mechanisms for Collaborative Routing Factoring Individual Heterogeneities
Incentive Mechanisms for Collaborative Routing Factoring Individual Heterogeneities

상세정보

자료유형  
 학위논문 서양
최종처리일시  
20260202105543
ISBN  
9798265400130
DDC  
384
저자명  
Wang, Chaojie.
서명/저자  
Incentive Mechanisms for Collaborative Routing Factoring Individual Heterogeneities
발행사항  
[Sl] : Georgia Institute of Technology, 2024
발행사항  
Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2024
형태사항  
446 p
주기사항  
Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 87-05, Section: B.
주기사항  
Advisor: Peeta, Srinivas.
학위논문주기  
Thesis (Ph.D.)--Georgia Institute of Technology, 2024.
초록/해제  
요약Behavioral interventions have been widely examined and employed in transportation systems to alleviate traffic congestion. In contrast to penalty-based solutions such as traffic tolls, incentive mechanisms are garnering interest as they do not impose additional costs on travelers and are therefore more politically acceptable. Emerging communication technologies also provide incentive mechanisms with the potential to influence routing behaviors through on-board units in connected and autonomous vehicles (CAVs) and smartphones used by human drivers. Nevertheless, several challenges may undermine their effectiveness and practical deployment, including: (i) the need to account for individual heterogeneities, (ii) the assumption of behavioral obligation that overlooks the participation willingness of CAVs and human-driven vehicles (HDVs), (iii) the need to factor budget constraints that could otherwise compromise the sustainability of the mechanism, and (iv) the absence of efficient decentralized solution algorithms for large-scale implementations.To address the above challenges, this dissertation aims to create personalized incentive mechanisms that influence individual route choices without assuming behavioral compliance. It leverages efficient decentralized computational frameworks enabled by emerging connectivity technologies to ensure computational feasibility. Further, it seeks to find an optimal balance within the associated trilemma that includes the incentive mechanism's effectiveness in improving system performance, the users' willingness to participate, and the budget sustainability for traffic operators, under diverse real-world scenarios.The dissertation first develops a personalized incentive mechanism in a pure CAV environment. CAVs may exhibit willingness to participate even under negative incentives, provided their utility gains from participation outweigh the costs. Exploiting the flexible participation criteria of CAVs, a hierarchical incentive-based cooperative routing approach is proposed to decouple route optimization and incentive optimization, thereby enabling the real-time computation of personalized incentives. The associated incentive mechanism yields individual rationality, budget balance, and incentive compatibility. Next, the dissertation formulates a personalized incentive mechanism for mixed traffic flow of CAVs and HDVs, aiming to enhance the system performance during the transition to the fully autonomous future. Unlike CAVs, HDVs are posited to require strictly non-negative incentives due to the cognitive load involved in processing the implications of negative incentives. To computationally facilitate the corresponding incentive mechanisms, collaborative routing is proposed, allowing CAV groups and individual HDVs to negotiate tentative routing preferences and CAV flows and request necessary incentives until a consensus is reached. A crucial insight is that relying solely on cash incentives may not be sustainable from the budget perspective when CAVs are sparse in the traffic flow. Consequently, the third dissertation topic extends the collaborative routing strategy by integrating an incentive bundle optimization model, capable of generating personalized bundles consisting of various non-cash incentive types to influence human drivers' routing behavior effectively and sustainably. The fourth topic investigates the potential of personalized incentive mechanisms to enhance equity in transportation systems. It defines and proposes three types of equity: (i) accessibility equity, implying equal access to employment, services, and educational opportunities for all users; (ii) inclusion equity, aimed at generating routing preferences and incentives that do not disproportionately benefit some users over others; and (iii) utility equity, which seeks envy-free solutions whereby no user perceives that the route options and incentives allocated to others are unduly favorable. The associated incentive mechanism seeks an optimal balance within the trilemma, encapsulating system objectives that encompass both efficiency and equity considerations. Finally, the fifth topic addresses privacy concerns associated with personalized incentive mechanisms by employing secure multiparty computation (MPC) and blockchain technologies.In summary, by investigating the potential of personalized incentive mechanisms under various dimensions, this dissertation provides a pragmatic paradigm and framework for personalized incentive mechanism design to influence route choices to enhance traffic network performance and manage congestion.
일반주제명  
Communication
일반주제명  
Fines & penalties
일반주제명  
Traffic flow
일반주제명  
Traffic assignment
일반주제명  
Privacy
일반주제명  
Realism
일반주제명  
Route choice
일반주제명  
Route optimization
일반주제명  
Decision making
일반주제명  
Autonomous vehicles
일반주제명  
Sustainability
일반주제명  
Behavior modification
일반주제명  
Design
일반주제명  
Travel
일반주제명  
Rationality
일반주제명  
Computer science
일반주제명  
Transportation
기타저자  
Georgia Institute of Technology.
기본자료저록  
Dissertations Abstracts International. 87-05B.
전자적 위치 및 접속  
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■1001  ▼aWang,  Chaojie.
■24510▼aIncentive  Mechanisms  for  Collaborative  Routing  Factoring  Individual  Heterogeneities
■260    ▼a[Sl]▼bGeorgia  Institute  of  Technology▼c2024
■260  1▼aAnn  Arbor▼bProQuest  Dissertations  &  Theses▼c2024
■300    ▼a446  p
■500    ▼aSource:  Dissertations  Abstracts  International,  Volume:  87-05,  Section:  B.
■500    ▼aAdvisor:  Peeta,  Srinivas.
■5021  ▼aThesis  (Ph.D.)--Georgia  Institute  of  Technology,  2024.
■520    ▼aBehavioral  interventions  have  been  widely  examined  and  employed  in  transportation  systems  to  alleviate  traffic  congestion.  In  contrast  to  penalty-based  solutions  such  as  traffic  tolls,  incentive  mechanisms  are  garnering  interest  as  they  do  not  impose  additional  costs  on  travelers  and  are  therefore  more  politically  acceptable.  Emerging  communication  technologies  also  provide  incentive  mechanisms  with  the  potential  to  influence  routing  behaviors  through  on-board  units  in  connected  and  autonomous  vehicles  (CAVs)  and  smartphones  used  by  human  drivers.  Nevertheless,  several  challenges  may  undermine  their  effectiveness  and  practical  deployment,  including:  (i)  the  need  to  account  for  individual  heterogeneities,  (ii)  the  assumption  of  behavioral  obligation  that  overlooks  the  participation  willingness  of  CAVs  and  human-driven  vehicles  (HDVs),  (iii)  the  need  to  factor  budget  constraints  that  could  otherwise  compromise  the  sustainability  of  the  mechanism,  and  (iv)  the  absence  of  efficient  decentralized  solution  algorithms  for  large-scale  implementations.To  address  the  above  challenges,  this  dissertation  aims  to  create  personalized  incentive  mechanisms  that  influence  individual  route  choices  without  assuming  behavioral  compliance.  It  leverages  efficient  decentralized  computational  frameworks  enabled  by  emerging  connectivity  technologies  to  ensure  computational  feasibility.  Further,  it  seeks  to  find  an  optimal  balance  within  the  associated  trilemma  that  includes  the  incentive  mechanism's  effectiveness  in  improving  system  performance,  the  users'  willingness  to  participate,  and  the  budget  sustainability  for  traffic  operators,  under  diverse  real-world  scenarios.The  dissertation  first  develops  a  personalized  incentive  mechanism  in  a  pure  CAV  environment.  CAVs  may  exhibit  willingness  to  participate  even  under  negative  incentives,  provided  their  utility  gains  from  participation  outweigh  the  costs.  Exploiting  the  flexible  participation  criteria  of  CAVs,  a  hierarchical  incentive-based  cooperative  routing  approach  is  proposed  to  decouple  route  optimization  and  incentive  optimization,  thereby  enabling  the  real-time  computation  of  personalized  incentives.  The  associated  incentive  mechanism  yields  individual  rationality,  budget  balance,  and  incentive  compatibility.  Next,  the  dissertation  formulates  a  personalized  incentive  mechanism  for  mixed  traffic  flow  of  CAVs  and  HDVs,  aiming  to  enhance  the  system  performance  during  the  transition  to  the  fully  autonomous  future.  Unlike  CAVs,  HDVs  are  posited  to  require  strictly  non-negative  incentives  due  to  the  cognitive  load  involved  in  processing  the  implications  of  negative  incentives.  To  computationally  facilitate  the  corresponding  incentive  mechanisms,  collaborative  routing  is  proposed,  allowing  CAV  groups  and  individual  HDVs  to  negotiate  tentative  routing  preferences  and  CAV  flows  and  request  necessary  incentives  until  a  consensus  is  reached.  A  crucial  insight  is  that  relying  solely  on  cash  incentives  may  not  be  sustainable  from  the  budget  perspective  when  CAVs  are  sparse  in  the  traffic  flow.  Consequently,  the  third  dissertation  topic  extends  the  collaborative  routing  strategy  by  integrating  an  incentive  bundle  optimization  model,  capable  of  generating  personalized  bundles  consisting  of  various  non-cash  incentive  types  to  influence  human  drivers'  routing  behavior  effectively  and  sustainably.  The  fourth  topic  investigates  the  potential  of  personalized  incentive  mechanisms  to  enhance  equity  in  transportation  systems.  It  defines  and  proposes  three  types  of  equity:  (i)  accessibility  equity,  implying  equal  access  to  employment,  services,  and  educational  opportunities  for  all  users;  (ii)  inclusion  equity,  aimed  at  generating  routing  preferences  and  incentives  that  do  not  disproportionately  benefit  some  users  over  others;  and  (iii)  utility  equity,  which  seeks  envy-free  solutions  whereby  no  user  perceives  that  the  route  options  and  incentives  allocated  to  others  are  unduly  favorable.  The  associated  incentive  mechanism  seeks  an  optimal  balance  within  the  trilemma,  encapsulating  system  objectives  that  encompass  both  efficiency  and  equity  considerations.  Finally,  the  fifth  topic  addresses  privacy  concerns  associated  with  personalized  incentive  mechanisms  by  employing  secure  multiparty  computation  (MPC)  and  blockchain  technologies.In  summary,  by  investigating  the  potential  of  personalized  incentive  mechanisms  under  various  dimensions,  this  dissertation  provides  a  pragmatic  paradigm  and  framework  for  personalized  incentive  mechanism  design  to  influence  route  choices  to  enhance  traffic  network  performance  and  manage  congestion.
■590    ▼aSchool  code:  0078.
■650  4▼aCommunication
■650  4▼aFines  &  penalties
■650  4▼aTraffic  flow
■650  4▼aTraffic  assignment
■650  4▼aPrivacy
■650  4▼aRealism
■650  4▼aRoute  choice
■650  4▼aRoute  optimization
■650  4▼aDecision  making
■650  4▼aAutonomous  vehicles
■650  4▼aSustainability
■650  4▼aBehavior  modification
■650  4▼aDesign
■650  4▼aTravel
■650  4▼aRationality
■650  4▼aComputer  science
■650  4▼aTransportation
■690    ▼a0389
■690    ▼a0640
■690    ▼a0459
■690    ▼a0984
■690    ▼a0801
■690    ▼a0796
■690    ▼a0709
■71020▼aGeorgia  Institute  of  Technology.
■7730  ▼tDissertations  Abstracts  International▼g87-05B.
■790    ▼a0078
■791    ▼aPh.D.
■792    ▼a2024
■793    ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17360537▼nKERIS▼z이  자료의  원문은  한국교육학술정보원에서  제공합니다.

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