서브메뉴
검색
Essays on Finance, Regulation, and Competition
Essays on Finance, Regulation, and Competition
상세정보
- 자료유형
- 학위논문 서양
- 최종처리일시
- 20260202104853
- ISBN
- 9798288814792
- DDC
- 658
- 저자명
- Cherry, Susan.
- 서명/저자
- Essays on Finance, Regulation, and Competition
- 발행사항
- [Sl] : Stanford University, 2025
- 발행사항
- Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2025
- 형태사항
- 202 p
- 주기사항
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 87-02, Section: A.
- 주기사항
- Advisor: Seru, Amit.
- 학위논문주기
- Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2025.
- 초록/해제
- 요약Price regulation and increased regulatory oversight can unintentionally reduce credit access and raise prices in the consumer credit market by leading to the exit of lenders with advanced screening technologies. I focus on the sudden enforcement of these regulations at the state level in the U.S. nonbank personal loan market. While prior research often assumes a fixed market structure, I find that these regulations inadvertently drive out lenders with better risk-screening models by reducing lender profits. Remaining lenders rely on traditional credit scores and have less information about borrower default risk, leading to disproportionate effects on borrowers with lower credit scores and limited credit histories. These shifts negatively impact loan performance, borrower outcomes, and financial inclusion. To analyze these effects, I develop a structural lending model that disentangles the impacts of shifting lender composition and changes in market power from those of interest rate caps. This model, which incorporates borrower heterogeneity, lender screening technologies, and adverse selection, reveals that interest rate caps and increased oversight harm borrowers who are truly low-risk but appear risky under conventional scoring methods. Counterfactual simulations suggest that raising the rate cap from 21% to 28% and reducing fixed regulatory costs by 45% could significantly improve credit access for subprime borrowers.
- 일반주제명
- Finance
- 키워드
- Price regulation
- 기타저자
- Stanford University.
- 기본자료저록
- Dissertations Abstracts International. 87-02A.
- 전자적 위치 및 접속
- 로그인 후 원문을 볼 수 있습니다.
MARC
008260126s2025 us c eng d■001000017359231
■00520260202104853
■006m o d
■007cr#unu||||||||
■020 ▼a9798288814792
■035 ▼a(MiAaPQ)AAI32200981
■035 ▼a(MiAaPQ)Stanfordqt254qw2558
■040 ▼aMiAaPQ▼cMiAaPQ
■0820 ▼a658
■1001 ▼aCherry, Susan.
■24510▼aEssays on Finance, Regulation, and Competition
■260 ▼a[Sl]▼bStanford University▼c2025
■260 1▼aAnn Arbor▼bProQuest Dissertations & Theses▼c2025
■300 ▼a202 p
■500 ▼aSource: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 87-02, Section: A.
■500 ▼aAdvisor: Seru, Amit.
■5021 ▼aThesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2025.
■520 ▼aPrice regulation and increased regulatory oversight can unintentionally reduce credit access and raise prices in the consumer credit market by leading to the exit of lenders with advanced screening technologies. I focus on the sudden enforcement of these regulations at the state level in the U.S. nonbank personal loan market. While prior research often assumes a fixed market structure, I find that these regulations inadvertently drive out lenders with better risk-screening models by reducing lender profits. Remaining lenders rely on traditional credit scores and have less information about borrower default risk, leading to disproportionate effects on borrowers with lower credit scores and limited credit histories. These shifts negatively impact loan performance, borrower outcomes, and financial inclusion. To analyze these effects, I develop a structural lending model that disentangles the impacts of shifting lender composition and changes in market power from those of interest rate caps. This model, which incorporates borrower heterogeneity, lender screening technologies, and adverse selection, reveals that interest rate caps and increased oversight harm borrowers who are truly low-risk but appear risky under conventional scoring methods. Counterfactual simulations suggest that raising the rate cap from 21% to 28% and reducing fixed regulatory costs by 45% could significantly improve credit access for subprime borrowers.
■590 ▼aSchool code: 0212.
■650 4▼aFinance
■653 ▼aCounterfactual simulations
■653 ▼aLender screening technologies
■653 ▼aPrice regulation
■690 ▼a0511
■690 ▼a0501
■690 ▼a0508
■71020▼aStanford University.
■7730 ▼tDissertations Abstracts International▼g87-02A.
■790 ▼a0212
■791 ▼aPh.D.
■792 ▼a2025
■793 ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17359231▼nKERIS▼z이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.
