본문

서브메뉴

Financial Bubble Riding and Beyond: A Study of Mean Field Games With Common Noise
Financial Bubble Riding and Beyond: A Study of Mean Field Games With Common Noise
Financial Bubble Riding and Beyond: A Study of Mean Field Games With Common Noise

Detailed Information

자료유형  
 학위논문 서양
최종처리일시  
20260202103003
ISBN  
9798280749368
DDC  
519
저자명  
Wang, Shichun.
서명/저자  
Financial Bubble Riding and Beyond: A Study of Mean Field Games With Common Noise
발행사항  
[Sl] : Princeton University, 2025
발행사항  
Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2025
형태사항  
256 p
주기사항  
Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-12, Section: B.
주기사항  
Advisor: Tangpi, Ludovic.
학위논문주기  
Thesis (Ph.D.)--Princeton University, 2025.
초록/해제  
요약This thesis develops the theory of Mean Field Games (MFGs) to study optimal liquidation in the presence of an asset bubble in a large-population setting. We propose a game-theoretic model on financial bubbles where inflows of traders and capital fuel its growth and excessive selling triggers its burst. To capture the inherent large-population characteristics, we introduce a class of MFGs with varying entry times. We prove the existence of a Mean Field Equilibrium (MFE) and demonstrate that equilibrium strategies naturally split into pre- and post-burst components, each part depending only on market information and whether the burst has occurred. Numerical simulations further illustrate the relationship between equilibrium strategies and bubble dynamics.Next, we extend our model to allow price-dependent entry, resulting in a random-entry MFG with common noise. This noise comes from two sources: the price dynamics and the unanticipated, exogenous burst time. As the model satisfies no monotonicity conditions, we establish the existence of MFE in the weak formulation by compactifying the domain of solution space via a discretization scheme, thereby obtaining a solution adapted to a filtration possibly larger than the natural filtration of the common noise. To avoid discretizing common noise and taking weak limits, for a special class of MFGs we present a simpler existence proof for strong equilibria (adapted to common noise) by an L 2 compactness criterion using Malliavin calculus. Notably, the drift and cost functionals are only required to be measurable with respect to the state variable.Lastly, we study the connections between single-period, discrete-time, and continuous-time MFE. We establish single-period MFE existence and prove a back propagation property of Lasry-Lions monotonicity through the value function. Then we construct multi-period MFE by recursively pasting the equilibria of suitable single-period games, and show that any sequence of multi-period discrete-time MFE has a subsequence converging to a continuous-time MFE as discretization mesh size approaches zero. Under Lasry-Lions monotonicity conditions, we further strengthen this tightness result by providing convergence rates.
일반주제명  
Applied mathematics
일반주제명  
Finance
일반주제명  
Computer science
키워드  
Common noise
키워드  
Equilibria pasting
키워드  
Financial bubble
키워드  
Malliavin calculus
키워드  
Mean Field Games
키워드  
Varying entry times
기타저자  
Princeton University Operations Research and Financial Engineering
기본자료저록  
Dissertations Abstracts International. 86-12B.
전자적 위치 및 접속  
로그인 후 원문을 볼 수 있습니다.

MARC

 008260126s2025        us                              c    eng  d
■001000017356614
■00520260202103003
■006m          o    d                
■007cr#unu||||||||
■020    ▼a9798280749368
■035    ▼a(MiAaPQ)AAI31840477
■040    ▼aMiAaPQ▼cMiAaPQ
■0820  ▼a519
■1001  ▼aWang,  Shichun.▼0(orcid)0000-0001-7409-9363
■24510▼aFinancial  Bubble  Riding  and  Beyond:  A  Study  of  Mean  Field  Games  With  Common  Noise
■260    ▼a[Sl]▼bPrinceton  University▼c2025
■260  1▼aAnn  Arbor▼bProQuest  Dissertations  &  Theses▼c2025
■300    ▼a256  p
■500    ▼aSource:  Dissertations  Abstracts  International,  Volume:  86-12,  Section:  B.
■500    ▼aAdvisor:  Tangpi,  Ludovic.
■5021  ▼aThesis  (Ph.D.)--Princeton  University,  2025.
■520    ▼aThis  thesis  develops  the  theory  of  Mean  Field  Games  (MFGs)  to  study  optimal  liquidation  in  the  presence  of  an  asset  bubble  in  a  large-population  setting. We  propose  a  game-theoretic  model  on  financial  bubbles  where  inflows  of  traders  and  capital  fuel  its  growth  and  excessive  selling  triggers  its  burst.  To  capture  the  inherent  large-population  characteristics,  we  introduce  a  class  of  MFGs  with  varying  entry  times.  We  prove  the  existence  of  a  Mean  Field  Equilibrium  (MFE)  and  demonstrate  that  equilibrium  strategies  naturally  split  into  pre-  and  post-burst  components,  each  part  depending  only  on  market  information  and  whether  the  burst  has  occurred.  Numerical  simulations  further  illustrate  the  relationship  between  equilibrium  strategies  and  bubble  dynamics.Next,  we  extend  our  model  to  allow  price-dependent  entry,  resulting  in  a  random-entry  MFG  with  common  noise.  This  noise  comes  from  two  sources:  the  price  dynamics  and  the  unanticipated,  exogenous  burst  time.  As  the  model  satisfies  no  monotonicity  conditions,  we  establish  the  existence  of  MFE  in  the  weak  formulation  by  compactifying  the  domain  of  solution  space  via  a  discretization  scheme,  thereby  obtaining  a  solution  adapted  to  a  filtration  possibly  larger  than  the  natural  filtration  of  the  common  noise.  To  avoid  discretizing  common  noise  and  taking  weak  limits,  for  a  special  class  of  MFGs  we  present  a  simpler  existence  proof  for  strong  equilibria  (adapted  to  common  noise)  by  an  L  2  compactness  criterion  using  Malliavin  calculus.  Notably,  the  drift  and  cost  functionals  are  only  required  to  be  measurable  with  respect  to  the  state  variable.Lastly,  we  study  the  connections  between  single-period,  discrete-time,  and  continuous-time  MFE.  We  establish  single-period  MFE  existence  and  prove  a  back  propagation  property  of  Lasry-Lions  monotonicity  through  the  value  function.  Then  we  construct  multi-period  MFE  by  recursively  pasting  the  equilibria  of  suitable  single-period  games,  and  show  that  any  sequence  of  multi-period  discrete-time  MFE  has  a  subsequence  converging  to  a  continuous-time  MFE  as  discretization  mesh  size  approaches  zero.  Under  Lasry-Lions  monotonicity  conditions,  we  further  strengthen  this  tightness  result  by  providing  convergence  rates.
■590    ▼aSchool  code:  0181.
■650  4▼aApplied  mathematics
■650  4▼aFinance
■650  4▼aComputer  science
■653    ▼aCommon  noise
■653    ▼aEquilibria  pasting
■653    ▼aFinancial  bubble
■653    ▼aMalliavin  calculus
■653    ▼aMean  Field  Games
■653    ▼aVarying  entry  times
■690    ▼a0364
■690    ▼a0796
■690    ▼a0508
■690    ▼a0984
■71020▼aPrinceton  University▼bOperations  Research  and  Financial  Engineering.
■7730  ▼tDissertations  Abstracts  International▼g86-12B.
■790    ▼a0181
■791    ▼aPh.D.
■792    ▼a2025
■793    ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17356614▼nKERIS▼z이  자료의  원문은  한국교육학술정보원에서  제공합니다.

Preview

Export

ChatGPT Discussion

AI Recommended Related Books


    New Books MORE
    Statistics for the past 3 years. Go to brief

    Подробнее информация.

    • Бронирование
    • не существует
    • моя папка
    • Первый запрос зрения
    • Non-Book Loan Application
    • Nighttime Book Loan Application
    материал
    Reg No. Количество платежных Местоположение статус Ленд информации
    TF15365 전자도서 대출가능 My Folder 부재도서신고 비도서대출신청 야간 도서대출신청

    * Бронирование доступны в заимствований книги. Чтобы сделать предварительный заказ, пожалуйста, нажмите кнопку бронирование

    Books borrowed together with this book

    Related Popular Books

    Available after logging in.