서브메뉴
검색
A Political Economy Theory of Military Power
A Political Economy Theory of Military Power
상세정보
- 자료유형
- 학위논문 서양
- 최종처리일시
- 20260202103636
- ISBN
- 9798280761322
- DDC
- 320
- 저자명
- Plithides, Max.
- 서명/저자
- A Political Economy Theory of Military Power
- 발행사항
- [Sl] : University of California, Los Angeles, 2025
- 발행사항
- Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2025
- 형태사항
- 253 p
- 주기사항
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-12, Section: A.
- 주기사항
- Advisor: Peters, Margaret E.;Stein, Arthur A.
- 학위논문주기
- Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Los Angeles, 2025.
- 초록/해제
- 요약What is military power? How do states produce it? And how do states use it to fight wars? The most prominent scholarship on war focuses on its causes and resolutions. Yet the actual conduct of war remains relatively less appreciated. Drawing on economic concepts such as "factors of production" and "comparative advantage," this book constructs a new political economy theory of how states produce and use military power. Power Production Theory argues that operational military power is a function of capital (high-skilled officers, technicians, and equipment) and labor (low-skilled enlisted men), which are substitutable. The optimal mix of military factors for a state depends on their relative costs, which is determined by a state's stock of civilian land, labor, and capital. This book seeks to demonstrate the empirical validity of Power Production Theory. It finds that most states constitute militaries during peacetime that reflect their civilian economies, and states that do not create such militaries - either by compulsion in the case of resource-rich states or by selection in many other instances - suffer from reduced military effectiveness during wartime. It also evidences that states at war emphasize targeting their opponents' lagging factor of production to maximize their attacks' marginal effects. In short, this book demonstrates that war's conduct is deeply rooted in economic logic and has substantial implications for understanding force constitution, military effectiveness, and operational targeting.
- 일반주제명
- Political science
- 일반주제명
- Military studies
- 키워드
- Security
- 키워드
- War
- 기타저자
- University of California, Los Angeles Political Science 0699
- 기본자료저록
- Dissertations Abstracts International. 86-12A.
- 전자적 위치 및 접속
- 로그인 후 원문을 볼 수 있습니다.
MARC
008260126s2025 us c eng d■001000017358047
■00520260202103636
■006m o d
■007cr#unu||||||||
■020 ▼a9798280761322
■035 ▼a(MiAaPQ)AAI32047672
■040 ▼aMiAaPQ▼cMiAaPQ
■0820 ▼a320
■1001 ▼aPlithides, Max.
■24512▼aA Political Economy Theory of Military Power
■260 ▼a[Sl]▼bUniversity of California, Los Angeles▼c2025
■260 1▼aAnn Arbor▼bProQuest Dissertations & Theses▼c2025
■300 ▼a253 p
■500 ▼aSource: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-12, Section: A.
■500 ▼aAdvisor: Peters, Margaret E.;Stein, Arthur A.
■5021 ▼aThesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Los Angeles, 2025.
■520 ▼aWhat is military power? How do states produce it? And how do states use it to fight wars? The most prominent scholarship on war focuses on its causes and resolutions. Yet the actual conduct of war remains relatively less appreciated. Drawing on economic concepts such as "factors of production" and "comparative advantage," this book constructs a new political economy theory of how states produce and use military power. Power Production Theory argues that operational military power is a function of capital (high-skilled officers, technicians, and equipment) and labor (low-skilled enlisted men), which are substitutable. The optimal mix of military factors for a state depends on their relative costs, which is determined by a state's stock of civilian land, labor, and capital. This book seeks to demonstrate the empirical validity of Power Production Theory. It finds that most states constitute militaries during peacetime that reflect their civilian economies, and states that do not create such militaries - either by compulsion in the case of resource-rich states or by selection in many other instances - suffer from reduced military effectiveness during wartime. It also evidences that states at war emphasize targeting their opponents' lagging factor of production to maximize their attacks' marginal effects. In short, this book demonstrates that war's conduct is deeply rooted in economic logic and has substantial implications for understanding force constitution, military effectiveness, and operational targeting.
■590 ▼aSchool code: 0031.
■650 4▼aPolitical science
■650 4▼aMilitary studies
■653 ▼aInternational political economy
■653 ▼aMilitary procurement
■653 ▼aSecurity
■653 ▼aPower Production Theory
■653 ▼aWar
■690 ▼a0601
■690 ▼a0750
■690 ▼a0629
■690 ▼a0615
■690 ▼a0511
■71020▼aUniversity of California, Los Angeles▼bPolitical Science 0699.
■7730 ▼tDissertations Abstracts International▼g86-12A.
■790 ▼a0031
■791 ▼aPh.D.
■792 ▼a2025
■793 ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17358047▼nKERIS▼z이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.
