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Essays on Modeling in Economics
Essays on Modeling in Economics
Essays on Modeling in Economics

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자료유형  
 학위논문 서양
최종처리일시  
20260209102853
ISBN  
9798291567265
DDC  
310
저자명  
Kosowsky, Conrad.
서명/저자  
Essays on Modeling in Economics
발행사항  
[Sl] : University of Michigan, 2025
발행사항  
Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2025
형태사항  
116 p
주기사항  
Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 87-03, Section: B.
주기사항  
Advisor: Eisenberg, Marisa;Leahy, John.
학위논문주기  
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Michigan, 2025.
초록/해제  
요약This thesis contains my research into economic models, their mathematical properties, and their solution behaviors. In the three chapters of this work, I investigate a variety of models from different perspectives. Chapter 1 is empirical and involves questions of parameter estimation and identifiability in the context of U.S. incomes. Chapter 2 is pure mathematical and applies general and algebraic topology to prove Nash equilibrium existence. Chapter 3 uses dynamic programming techniques to shed light on the incentives surrounding deadlines and procrastination. The topics of each chapter are very different, but I approached all of them with an eye towards understanding the technical aspects of the models at hand.Chapter 1 contains my work on the U.S. income distribution. In that chapter, I fit a variety of probability distributions to over fifty years of data on U.S. personal incomes, and to make these models match the small number of negative incomes that appear in the data, I incorporate a shift parameter. I highlight the shifted inverse-gamma distribution as a simple model that fits as well as current models, and it has the same or fewer parameters than all models from the literature. Additionally, the shifted inverse-gamma distribution captures overfitting in the data more clearly than the the other three-parameter distribution, and exploiting dependence between parameter estimates leads to a one-dimensional model of the U.S. income distribution.Chapter 2 contains my work from two pure-math papers on pure-strategy Nash equilibrium existence. Typical existence proofs for pure-strategy Nash equilibrium rely on convexity assumptions, and I show that if the game is "nice enough" and best-responses are null-homotopic, then the game has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium regardless of whether strategy spaces or best responses are convex. Investigating equilibrium existence in a different context, I then show that when moving from finite-player to infinite-player games, pure-strategy Nash equilibrium existence is equivalent to the axiom of choice.Chapter 3 contains the work from my paper on deadlines. I model a single rational agent who begins at time t and moves forward in time until a fixed, known future time T (the deadline), and until the deadline, the agent may spend resources at random opportunities. Away from the deadline, the agent attempts to smooth consumption, but near the deadline, the agent feels deadline pressure and eventually consumes as many resources as quickly as possible. If the agent misperceives the concavity of their instantaneous utility function or the nature of time in the model, we end up with a new model of procrastination.
일반주제명  
Statistics
일반주제명  
Mathematics
키워드  
Income distribution
키워드  
Nash equilibrium
키워드  
Deadline pressure
키워드  
Economic models
기타저자  
University of Michigan Economics
기본자료저록  
Dissertations Abstracts International. 87-03B.
전자적 위치 및 접속  
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MARC

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■1001  ▼aKosowsky,  Conrad.
■24510▼aEssays  on  Modeling  in  Economics
■260    ▼a[Sl]▼bUniversity  of  Michigan▼c2025
■260  1▼aAnn  Arbor▼bProQuest  Dissertations  &  Theses▼c2025
■300    ▼a116  p
■500    ▼aSource:  Dissertations  Abstracts  International,  Volume:  87-03,  Section:  B.
■500    ▼aAdvisor:  Eisenberg,  Marisa;Leahy,  John.
■5021  ▼aThesis  (Ph.D.)--University  of  Michigan,  2025.
■520    ▼aThis  thesis  contains  my  research  into  economic  models,  their  mathematical  properties,  and  their  solution  behaviors.  In  the  three  chapters  of  this  work,  I  investigate  a  variety  of  models  from  different  perspectives.  Chapter  1  is  empirical  and  involves  questions  of  parameter  estimation  and  identifiability  in  the  context  of  U.S.  incomes.  Chapter  2  is  pure  mathematical  and  applies  general  and  algebraic  topology  to  prove  Nash  equilibrium  existence.  Chapter  3  uses  dynamic  programming  techniques  to  shed  light  on  the  incentives  surrounding  deadlines  and  procrastination.  The  topics  of  each  chapter  are  very  different,  but  I  approached  all  of  them  with  an  eye  towards  understanding  the  technical  aspects  of  the  models  at  hand.Chapter  1  contains  my  work  on  the  U.S.  income  distribution.  In  that  chapter,  I  fit  a  variety  of  probability  distributions  to  over  fifty  years  of  data  on  U.S.  personal  incomes,  and  to  make  these  models  match  the  small  number  of  negative  incomes  that  appear  in  the  data,  I  incorporate  a  shift  parameter.  I  highlight  the  shifted  inverse-gamma  distribution  as  a  simple  model  that  fits  as  well  as  current  models,  and  it  has  the  same  or  fewer  parameters  than  all  models  from  the  literature.  Additionally,  the  shifted  inverse-gamma  distribution  captures  overfitting  in  the  data  more  clearly  than  the  the  other  three-parameter  distribution,  and  exploiting  dependence  between  parameter  estimates  leads  to  a  one-dimensional  model  of  the  U.S.  income  distribution.Chapter  2  contains  my  work  from  two  pure-math  papers  on  pure-strategy  Nash  equilibrium  existence.  Typical  existence  proofs  for  pure-strategy  Nash  equilibrium  rely  on  convexity  assumptions,  and  I  show  that  if  the  game  is  "nice  enough"  and  best-responses  are  null-homotopic,  then  the  game has  a  pure-strategy  Nash  equilibrium  regardless  of  whether  strategy  spaces  or  best  responses  are  convex.  Investigating  equilibrium  existence  in  a  different  context,  I  then  show  that  when  moving  from  finite-player  to  infinite-player  games,  pure-strategy  Nash  equilibrium  existence  is  equivalent  to  the  axiom  of  choice.Chapter  3  contains  the  work  from  my  paper  on  deadlines.  I  model  a  single  rational  agent  who  begins  at  time  t  and  moves  forward  in  time  until  a  fixed,  known  future  time  T  (the  deadline),  and  until  the  deadline,  the  agent  may  spend  resources  at  random  opportunities.  Away  from  the  deadline,  the  agent  attempts  to  smooth  consumption,  but  near  the  deadline,  the  agent  feels  deadline  pressure  and  eventually  consumes  as  many  resources  as  quickly  as  possible.  If  the  agent  misperceives  the  concavity  of  their  instantaneous  utility  function  or  the  nature  of  time  in  the  model,  we  end  up  with  a  new  model  of  procrastination.
■590    ▼aSchool  code:  0127.
■650  4▼aStatistics
■650  4▼aMathematics
■653    ▼aIncome  distribution
■653    ▼aNash  equilibrium
■653    ▼aDeadline  pressure
■653    ▼aEconomic  models
■690    ▼a0501
■690    ▼a0463
■690    ▼a0405
■690    ▼a0511
■71020▼aUniversity  of  Michigan▼bEconomics.
■7730  ▼tDissertations  Abstracts  International▼g87-03B.
■790    ▼a0127
■791    ▼aPh.D.
■792    ▼a2025
■793    ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17365911▼nKERIS▼z이  자료의  원문은  한국교육학술정보원에서  제공합니다.

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