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Essays on Modeling in Economics
Essays on Modeling in Economics
상세정보
- 자료유형
- 학위논문 서양
- 최종처리일시
- 20260209102853
- ISBN
- 9798291567265
- DDC
- 310
- 서명/저자
- Essays on Modeling in Economics
- 발행사항
- [Sl] : University of Michigan, 2025
- 발행사항
- Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2025
- 형태사항
- 116 p
- 주기사항
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 87-03, Section: B.
- 주기사항
- Advisor: Eisenberg, Marisa;Leahy, John.
- 학위논문주기
- Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Michigan, 2025.
- 초록/해제
- 요약This thesis contains my research into economic models, their mathematical properties, and their solution behaviors. In the three chapters of this work, I investigate a variety of models from different perspectives. Chapter 1 is empirical and involves questions of parameter estimation and identifiability in the context of U.S. incomes. Chapter 2 is pure mathematical and applies general and algebraic topology to prove Nash equilibrium existence. Chapter 3 uses dynamic programming techniques to shed light on the incentives surrounding deadlines and procrastination. The topics of each chapter are very different, but I approached all of them with an eye towards understanding the technical aspects of the models at hand.Chapter 1 contains my work on the U.S. income distribution. In that chapter, I fit a variety of probability distributions to over fifty years of data on U.S. personal incomes, and to make these models match the small number of negative incomes that appear in the data, I incorporate a shift parameter. I highlight the shifted inverse-gamma distribution as a simple model that fits as well as current models, and it has the same or fewer parameters than all models from the literature. Additionally, the shifted inverse-gamma distribution captures overfitting in the data more clearly than the the other three-parameter distribution, and exploiting dependence between parameter estimates leads to a one-dimensional model of the U.S. income distribution.Chapter 2 contains my work from two pure-math papers on pure-strategy Nash equilibrium existence. Typical existence proofs for pure-strategy Nash equilibrium rely on convexity assumptions, and I show that if the game is "nice enough" and best-responses are null-homotopic, then the game has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium regardless of whether strategy spaces or best responses are convex. Investigating equilibrium existence in a different context, I then show that when moving from finite-player to infinite-player games, pure-strategy Nash equilibrium existence is equivalent to the axiom of choice.Chapter 3 contains the work from my paper on deadlines. I model a single rational agent who begins at time t and moves forward in time until a fixed, known future time T (the deadline), and until the deadline, the agent may spend resources at random opportunities. Away from the deadline, the agent attempts to smooth consumption, but near the deadline, the agent feels deadline pressure and eventually consumes as many resources as quickly as possible. If the agent misperceives the concavity of their instantaneous utility function or the nature of time in the model, we end up with a new model of procrastination.
- 일반주제명
- Statistics
- 일반주제명
- Mathematics
- 키워드
- Nash equilibrium
- 키워드
- Economic models
- 기타저자
- University of Michigan Economics
- 기본자료저록
- Dissertations Abstracts International. 87-03B.
- 전자적 위치 및 접속
- 로그인 후 원문을 볼 수 있습니다.
MARC
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■006m o d
■007cr#unu||||||||
■020 ▼a9798291567265
■035 ▼a(MiAaPQ)AAI32271895
■035 ▼a(MiAaPQ)umichrackham006254
■040 ▼aMiAaPQ▼cMiAaPQ
■0820 ▼a310
■1001 ▼aKosowsky, Conrad.
■24510▼aEssays on Modeling in Economics
■260 ▼a[Sl]▼bUniversity of Michigan▼c2025
■260 1▼aAnn Arbor▼bProQuest Dissertations & Theses▼c2025
■300 ▼a116 p
■500 ▼aSource: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 87-03, Section: B.
■500 ▼aAdvisor: Eisenberg, Marisa;Leahy, John.
■5021 ▼aThesis (Ph.D.)--University of Michigan, 2025.
■520 ▼aThis thesis contains my research into economic models, their mathematical properties, and their solution behaviors. In the three chapters of this work, I investigate a variety of models from different perspectives. Chapter 1 is empirical and involves questions of parameter estimation and identifiability in the context of U.S. incomes. Chapter 2 is pure mathematical and applies general and algebraic topology to prove Nash equilibrium existence. Chapter 3 uses dynamic programming techniques to shed light on the incentives surrounding deadlines and procrastination. The topics of each chapter are very different, but I approached all of them with an eye towards understanding the technical aspects of the models at hand.Chapter 1 contains my work on the U.S. income distribution. In that chapter, I fit a variety of probability distributions to over fifty years of data on U.S. personal incomes, and to make these models match the small number of negative incomes that appear in the data, I incorporate a shift parameter. I highlight the shifted inverse-gamma distribution as a simple model that fits as well as current models, and it has the same or fewer parameters than all models from the literature. Additionally, the shifted inverse-gamma distribution captures overfitting in the data more clearly than the the other three-parameter distribution, and exploiting dependence between parameter estimates leads to a one-dimensional model of the U.S. income distribution.Chapter 2 contains my work from two pure-math papers on pure-strategy Nash equilibrium existence. Typical existence proofs for pure-strategy Nash equilibrium rely on convexity assumptions, and I show that if the game is "nice enough" and best-responses are null-homotopic, then the game has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium regardless of whether strategy spaces or best responses are convex. Investigating equilibrium existence in a different context, I then show that when moving from finite-player to infinite-player games, pure-strategy Nash equilibrium existence is equivalent to the axiom of choice.Chapter 3 contains the work from my paper on deadlines. I model a single rational agent who begins at time t and moves forward in time until a fixed, known future time T (the deadline), and until the deadline, the agent may spend resources at random opportunities. Away from the deadline, the agent attempts to smooth consumption, but near the deadline, the agent feels deadline pressure and eventually consumes as many resources as quickly as possible. If the agent misperceives the concavity of their instantaneous utility function or the nature of time in the model, we end up with a new model of procrastination.
■590 ▼aSchool code: 0127.
■650 4▼aStatistics
■650 4▼aMathematics
■653 ▼aIncome distribution
■653 ▼aNash equilibrium
■653 ▼aDeadline pressure
■653 ▼aEconomic models
■690 ▼a0501
■690 ▼a0463
■690 ▼a0405
■690 ▼a0511
■71020▼aUniversity of Michigan▼bEconomics.
■7730 ▼tDissertations Abstracts International▼g87-03B.
■790 ▼a0127
■791 ▼aPh.D.
■792 ▼a2025
■793 ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17365911▼nKERIS▼z이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.


