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Primitive Social Action
Primitive Social Action
상세정보
- 자료유형
- 학위논문 서양
- 최종처리일시
- 20260202105641
- ISBN
- 9798265481153
- DDC
- 501
- 저자명
- Reid, Jacob.
- 서명/저자
- Primitive Social Action
- 발행사항
- [Sl] : University of California, Los Angeles, 2025
- 발행사항
- Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2025
- 형태사항
- 279 p
- 주기사항
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 87-06, Section: B.
- 주기사항
- Advisor: Burge, C. Tyler.
- 학위논문주기
- Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Los Angeles, 2025.
- 초록/해제
- 요약Action theory is concerned with the nature of action. Some actions are distinctively social. For example, two people painting a house together involves social actions. Accounts of social action in action theory largely emphasize its relatively sophisticated forms. In such cases, individuals exercise various intellectual capacities such as understanding and reasoning. There is nothing wrong with this emphasis per se. However, such accounts fail to apply to the actions of animals not known to have such capacities. I regard this as a shortcoming of action theory.A brief perusal of the biological literature suggests that the natural world is replete with animal social action. For example, various species of insect provision their offspring with various forms of aid such as food and protection. Despite their being intuitively social, action theory has yet to account for such actions due to its emphasis on sophisticated forms of social action.In this dissertation, I argue that actions such as those described above are social actions. Furthermore, they are understood to be social by the biological sciences that study them. However, the social actions of most if not all animals are not susceptible to the sophisticated accounts of social action typically found in action theory. I call social actions that are not susceptible to such accounts "primitive social actions". Primitive social action is the topic of this dissertation.The research strategy of this dissertation is heavily scientifically oriented. I assess cases of animal action gleaned from the biological literature to develop a conceptual framework for understanding primitive social action. Explanatory practice in the study of animal action distinguishes between two complementary forms of explanation. The first form illuminates the factors implicated in the production of action that are internal to the individual. The second illuminates the evolved function or adaptive value of action. A complete understanding of animal action is understood to appeal to both forms of explanation. However, accounts of primitive social action in biology tend to appeal only to an action's function or adaptive value. I argue that such an approach groups together forms of action that should be kept distinct. The framework developed in this dissertation enables such distinctions by appealing to the capacities enlisted in the initiation and guidance of a given form of action as well as its evolved function or adaptive value. As such, it constitutes a step toward a more complete understanding of primitive social action.The framework developed in this dissertation is of great utility to action theory. Action theory has largely confined its focus to relatively sophisticated forms of social action. That focus has resulted in a limited understanding of social action as a general kind. Understanding social action as a general kind is facilitated by understanding its various forms. Primitive social action constitutes one of these forms. As such, understanding of primitive social action contributes to understanding social action as a general kind.
- 일반주제명
- Philosophy of science
- 일반주제명
- Behavioral sciences
- 키워드
- Animal behavior
- 키워드
- Social action
- 기타저자
- University of California, Los Angeles Philosophy 0651
- 기본자료저록
- Dissertations Abstracts International. 87-06B.
- 전자적 위치 및 접속
- 로그인 후 원문을 볼 수 있습니다.
MARC
008260126s2025 us c eng d■001000017360939
■00520260202105641
■006m o d
■007cr#unu||||||||
■020 ▼a9798265481153
■035 ▼a(MiAaPQ)AAI32398248
■040 ▼aMiAaPQ▼cMiAaPQ
■0820 ▼a501
■1001 ▼aReid, Jacob.
■24510▼aPrimitive Social Action
■260 ▼a[Sl]▼bUniversity of California, Los Angeles▼c2025
■260 1▼aAnn Arbor▼bProQuest Dissertations & Theses▼c2025
■300 ▼a279 p
■500 ▼aSource: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 87-06, Section: B.
■500 ▼aAdvisor: Burge, C. Tyler.
■5021 ▼aThesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Los Angeles, 2025.
■520 ▼aAction theory is concerned with the nature of action. Some actions are distinctively social. For example, two people painting a house together involves social actions. Accounts of social action in action theory largely emphasize its relatively sophisticated forms. In such cases, individuals exercise various intellectual capacities such as understanding and reasoning. There is nothing wrong with this emphasis per se. However, such accounts fail to apply to the actions of animals not known to have such capacities. I regard this as a shortcoming of action theory.A brief perusal of the biological literature suggests that the natural world is replete with animal social action. For example, various species of insect provision their offspring with various forms of aid such as food and protection. Despite their being intuitively social, action theory has yet to account for such actions due to its emphasis on sophisticated forms of social action.In this dissertation, I argue that actions such as those described above are social actions. Furthermore, they are understood to be social by the biological sciences that study them. However, the social actions of most if not all animals are not susceptible to the sophisticated accounts of social action typically found in action theory. I call social actions that are not susceptible to such accounts "primitive social actions". Primitive social action is the topic of this dissertation.The research strategy of this dissertation is heavily scientifically oriented. I assess cases of animal action gleaned from the biological literature to develop a conceptual framework for understanding primitive social action. Explanatory practice in the study of animal action distinguishes between two complementary forms of explanation. The first form illuminates the factors implicated in the production of action that are internal to the individual. The second illuminates the evolved function or adaptive value of action. A complete understanding of animal action is understood to appeal to both forms of explanation. However, accounts of primitive social action in biology tend to appeal only to an action's function or adaptive value. I argue that such an approach groups together forms of action that should be kept distinct. The framework developed in this dissertation enables such distinctions by appealing to the capacities enlisted in the initiation and guidance of a given form of action as well as its evolved function or adaptive value. As such, it constitutes a step toward a more complete understanding of primitive social action.The framework developed in this dissertation is of great utility to action theory. Action theory has largely confined its focus to relatively sophisticated forms of social action. That focus has resulted in a limited understanding of social action as a general kind. Understanding social action as a general kind is facilitated by understanding its various forms. Primitive social action constitutes one of these forms. As such, understanding of primitive social action contributes to understanding social action as a general kind.
■590 ▼aSchool code: 0031.
■650 4▼aPhilosophy of science
■650 4▼aBehavioral sciences
■653 ▼aAnimal behavior
■653 ▼aPhilosophy of action
■653 ▼aSocial action
■690 ▼a0402
■690 ▼a0602
■71020▼aUniversity of California, Los Angeles▼bPhilosophy 0651.
■7730 ▼tDissertations Abstracts International▼g87-06B.
■790 ▼a0031
■791 ▼aPh.D.
■792 ▼a2025
■793 ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17360939▼nKERIS▼z이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.


