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Political Commitment and Signaling in the International Arms Trade
Political Commitment and Signaling in the International Arms Trade
상세정보
- 자료유형
- 학위논문 서양
- 최종처리일시
- 20260202105116
- ISBN
- 9798270296827
- DDC
- 320
- 서명/저자
- Political Commitment and Signaling in the International Arms Trade
- 발행사항
- [Sl] : The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2025
- 발행사항
- Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2025
- 형태사항
- 191 p
- 주기사항
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 87-07, Section: A.
- 주기사항
- Advisor: Crescenzi, Mark J. C.
- 학위논문주기
- Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2025.
- 초록/해제
- 요약The politics of the international arms trade is a consequential yet undertheorized component of international relations, particularly with respect to our understanding of how individual states make their arms trade partnership decisions. To build upon the existing arms trade literature, this dissertation examines the international political dimensions of state-level arms trade decision-making in the post-Cold War era. Using illustrative cases of major arms acquisition decisions made in Norway, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar, I employ the canonical rationalist bargaining theory framework to resolve certain state-level arms acquisition behavior that is puzzling from a purely economic and national security-based perspective. First, I explore the United States' enduring post-Cold War dominance of the international arms market through the lens of Norway's 2008 decision to purchase the American F-35 fighter jet over the Swedish JAS 39 Gripen fighter jet in a direct competition between the two aircraft. Next, I examine the tendency of certain states to amass stocks of major weapons in excess of what is required to meet genuine national security needs, as well as the costly and inefficient decision of certain states to purchase operationally redundant major weaponry from multiple international arms suppliers. To resolve instances of what I term major conventional weapons ``abundance" and ``redundancy," I examine the emergence of these two phenomena in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar in the post-Cold War era. To resolve each of these three puzzles, I both theorize and demonstrate that international political considerations are often decisive in driving state-level arms trade decision-making. Specifically, I demonstrate that states engaged in the international arms trade are often motivated primarily by the need to overcome the significant credible commitment problems inherent to the buying and selling of major weapons, and by their desire to use major arms transfers to send costly and credible signals to outside audiences. When viewed in this political light, I also demonstrate that states often use major arms transfers as a deliberate foreign policy tool to manage international political relationships, which can lead to counterintuitive outcomes. Taken together, these findings shed considerable light on how the contemporary international arms market works, and on the centrality of international political considerations to our understanding of state-level arms trade decision-making. These findings also carry significant lessons and insights for principals in industry, government, and defense.
- 일반주제명
- Political science
- 일반주제명
- International law
- 기타저자
- The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Political Science
- 기본자료저록
- Dissertations Abstracts International. 87-07A.
- 전자적 위치 및 접속
- 로그인 후 원문을 볼 수 있습니다.
MARC
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■020 ▼a9798270296827
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■040 ▼aMiAaPQ▼cMiAaPQ
■0820 ▼a320
■1001 ▼aFisher, Noah Castle.
■24510▼aPolitical Commitment and Signaling in the International Arms Trade
■260 ▼a[Sl]▼bThe University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill▼c2025
■260 1▼aAnn Arbor▼bProQuest Dissertations & Theses▼c2025
■300 ▼a191 p
■500 ▼aSource: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 87-07, Section: A.
■500 ▼aAdvisor: Crescenzi, Mark J. C.
■5021 ▼aThesis (Ph.D.)--The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2025.
■520 ▼aThe politics of the international arms trade is a consequential yet undertheorized component of international relations, particularly with respect to our understanding of how individual states make their arms trade partnership decisions. To build upon the existing arms trade literature, this dissertation examines the international political dimensions of state-level arms trade decision-making in the post-Cold War era. Using illustrative cases of major arms acquisition decisions made in Norway, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar, I employ the canonical rationalist bargaining theory framework to resolve certain state-level arms acquisition behavior that is puzzling from a purely economic and national security-based perspective. First, I explore the United States' enduring post-Cold War dominance of the international arms market through the lens of Norway's 2008 decision to purchase the American F-35 fighter jet over the Swedish JAS 39 Gripen fighter jet in a direct competition between the two aircraft. Next, I examine the tendency of certain states to amass stocks of major weapons in excess of what is required to meet genuine national security needs, as well as the costly and inefficient decision of certain states to purchase operationally redundant major weaponry from multiple international arms suppliers. To resolve instances of what I term major conventional weapons ``abundance" and ``redundancy," I examine the emergence of these two phenomena in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar in the post-Cold War era. To resolve each of these three puzzles, I both theorize and demonstrate that international political considerations are often decisive in driving state-level arms trade decision-making. Specifically, I demonstrate that states engaged in the international arms trade are often motivated primarily by the need to overcome the significant credible commitment problems inherent to the buying and selling of major weapons, and by their desire to use major arms transfers to send costly and credible signals to outside audiences. When viewed in this political light, I also demonstrate that states often use major arms transfers as a deliberate foreign policy tool to manage international political relationships, which can lead to counterintuitive outcomes. Taken together, these findings shed considerable light on how the contemporary international arms market works, and on the centrality of international political considerations to our understanding of state-level arms trade decision-making. These findings also carry significant lessons and insights for principals in industry, government, and defense.
■590 ▼aSchool code: 0153.
■650 4▼aPolitical science
■650 4▼aInternational law
■653 ▼aPolitical commitment
■653 ▼aInternational arms trade
■653 ▼aTrade decision-making
■653 ▼aPost-Cold War era
■690 ▼a0601
■690 ▼a0615
■690 ▼a0616
■71020▼aThe University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill▼bPolitical Science.
■7730 ▼tDissertations Abstracts International▼g87-07A.
■790 ▼a0153
■791 ▼aPh.D.
■792 ▼a2025
■793 ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17359416▼nKERIS▼z이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.
