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Pragmatist Realism in the Metaphysics of Science
Pragmatist Realism in the Metaphysics of Science
상세정보
- 자료유형
- 학위논문 서양
- 최종처리일시
- 20260202103654
- ISBN
- 9798314889480
- DDC
- 100
- 서명/저자
- Pragmatist Realism in the Metaphysics of Science
- 발행사항
- [Sl] : The Ohio State University, 2025
- 발행사항
- Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2025
- 형태사항
- 119 p
- 주기사항
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-11, Section: A.
- 주기사항
- Advisor: Pincock, Christopher.
- 학위논문주기
- Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Ohio State University, 2025.
- 초록/해제
- 요약This dissertation develops and defends a version of ``pragmatist realism'' within the metaphysics of science. The pragmatist realist maintains a robust metaphysical realism about various scientific entities and concepts, and thus rejects various expressivisms and projectivisms, despite sharing with those positions a pragmatist starting point. The pragmatist starting point is to begin philosophical inquiry by examining the functional role that the relevant concept plays in the cognitive and practical lives of creatures like us.I advance pragmatist realism through three arguments. First, I argue for the untenability of global pragmatism the neo pragmatist view that all language, including scientific discourse, serves non-representational functions. Through what I term the ``reflexivity worry,'' I show that global pragmatists face a circularity problem when attempting to explain pragmatic discourse without appealing to representational resources. This counterexample shows that the viability of the neo pragmatist approach must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis rather than accepted globally.Second, I examine pragmatist accounts of causation, contrasting Jim Woodward's non-perspectival causal pragmatism with the perspectivalist positions of Huw Price and Jenann Ismael. Against the "Perspectivalist Contention" that pragmatism about causation entails that causes are essentially tied to human agency?I defend an augmented Woodwardian realism about causation. This position not only withstands Price's critiques of non-perspectival causal pragmatism, but proves compatible with Ismael's thin perspectivalism about causes.Third, I analyze scientific metaphysical necessities and possibilities a posteriori claims of metaphysical modality concerning natural kinds, such as ``water is necessarily H2O.'' Comparing Amie Thomasson's neopragmatist modal normativism with Barbara Vetter's potentialism, I demonstrate that potentialism captures the same epistemological and metaphysical benefits as normativism while making fewer problematic assumptions. Specifically, normativism's additional semantic commitments regarding natural kinds are vulnerable to empirical challenges, rendering potentialism the preferable account.Through these arguments, I demonstrate that pragmatist realism offers superior accounts of key metaphysical concepts in science compared to neopragmatist alternatives. This dissertation thus contributes to both the revival of pragmatism in contemporary philosophy of science and the ongoing development of naturalistic approaches to metaphysics, advancing a realist framework that remains faithful to pragmatism's core methodological insights while avoiding potential neopragmatist pitfalls.
- 일반주제명
- Philosophy
- 일반주제명
- Philosophy of science
- 키워드
- Pragmatism
- 키워드
- Realism
- 키워드
- Metaphysics
- 키워드
- Causation
- 기타저자
- The Ohio State University Philosophy
- 기본자료저록
- Dissertations Abstracts International. 86-11A.
- 전자적 위치 및 접속
- 로그인 후 원문을 볼 수 있습니다.
MARC
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■035 ▼a(MiAaPQ)OhioLINKosu1744727559902456
■040 ▼aMiAaPQ▼cMiAaPQ
■0820 ▼a100
■1001 ▼aDeWitt, Jason Alen.
■24510▼aPragmatist Realism in the Metaphysics of Science
■260 ▼a[Sl]▼bThe Ohio State University▼c2025
■260 1▼aAnn Arbor▼bProQuest Dissertations & Theses▼c2025
■300 ▼a119 p
■500 ▼aSource: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-11, Section: A.
■500 ▼aAdvisor: Pincock, Christopher.
■5021 ▼aThesis (Ph.D.)--The Ohio State University, 2025.
■520 ▼aThis dissertation develops and defends a version of ``pragmatist realism'' within the metaphysics of science. The pragmatist realist maintains a robust metaphysical realism about various scientific entities and concepts, and thus rejects various expressivisms and projectivisms, despite sharing with those positions a pragmatist starting point. The pragmatist starting point is to begin philosophical inquiry by examining the functional role that the relevant concept plays in the cognitive and practical lives of creatures like us.I advance pragmatist realism through three arguments. First, I argue for the untenability of global pragmatism the neo pragmatist view that all language, including scientific discourse, serves non-representational functions. Through what I term the ``reflexivity worry,'' I show that global pragmatists face a circularity problem when attempting to explain pragmatic discourse without appealing to representational resources. This counterexample shows that the viability of the neo pragmatist approach must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis rather than accepted globally.Second, I examine pragmatist accounts of causation, contrasting Jim Woodward's non-perspectival causal pragmatism with the perspectivalist positions of Huw Price and Jenann Ismael. Against the "Perspectivalist Contention" that pragmatism about causation entails that causes are essentially tied to human agency?I defend an augmented Woodwardian realism about causation. This position not only withstands Price's critiques of non-perspectival causal pragmatism, but proves compatible with Ismael's thin perspectivalism about causes.Third, I analyze scientific metaphysical necessities and possibilities a posteriori claims of metaphysical modality concerning natural kinds, such as ``water is necessarily H2O.'' Comparing Amie Thomasson's neopragmatist modal normativism with Barbara Vetter's potentialism, I demonstrate that potentialism captures the same epistemological and metaphysical benefits as normativism while making fewer problematic assumptions. Specifically, normativism's additional semantic commitments regarding natural kinds are vulnerable to empirical challenges, rendering potentialism the preferable account.Through these arguments, I demonstrate that pragmatist realism offers superior accounts of key metaphysical concepts in science compared to neopragmatist alternatives. This dissertation thus contributes to both the revival of pragmatism in contemporary philosophy of science and the ongoing development of naturalistic approaches to metaphysics, advancing a realist framework that remains faithful to pragmatism's core methodological insights while avoiding potential neopragmatist pitfalls.
■590 ▼aSchool code: 0168.
■650 4▼aPhilosophy
■650 4▼aPhilosophy of science
■653 ▼aPragmatism
■653 ▼aRealism
■653 ▼aMetaphysics
■653 ▼aPhilosophy of science
■653 ▼aMetaphysics of science
■653 ▼aCausation
■690 ▼a0402
■690 ▼a0422
■71020▼aThe Ohio State University▼bPhilosophy.
■7730 ▼tDissertations Abstracts International▼g86-11A.
■790 ▼a0168
■791 ▼aPh.D.
■792 ▼a2025
■793 ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17358168▼nKERIS▼z이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.
