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Norms of Inquiry
Norms of Inquiry
상세정보
- 자료유형
- 학위논문 서양
- 최종처리일시
- 20260202103658
- ISBN
- 9798314892510
- DDC
- 100
- 서명/저자
- Norms of Inquiry
- 발행사항
- [Sl] : The Ohio State University, 2025
- 발행사항
- Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2025
- 형태사항
- 112 p
- 주기사항
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-11, Section: A.
- 주기사항
- Advisor: Smithies, Declan.
- 학위논문주기
- Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Ohio State University, 2025.
- 초록/해제
- 요약In my first substantive chapter, I aim to answer the following question: how does the value of knowledge illuminate the epistemic significance of inquiry? I argue that when we appreciate knowledge's value, we'll anticipate important normative roles for knowledge that extend to inquiry by mandating its closure. In light of these considerations, I argue that we should accept the Ignorance Norm of Inquiry (INI), which prohibits inquiring about the answer to a question while at the same time knowing the answer to that question. Moreover, when we understand the value of knowledge, we are left with important defensive resources that enable us to rebut challenges to INI that have recently been proposed.In my second substantive chapter, I'll motivate and defend a new argument for DBI-the idea that one ought not believe p at t while inquiring into whether p at t. To do this, I'll defend the premises of the following argument:INI You ought: if you know p, not inquire into whether p.KNB You ought: if you believe p, know p. Therefore,DBI You ought: if you believe p, not inquire into whether p.I'll suggest that intuitions about cases, linguistic data, and reflection on the value of knowledge support INI. Meanwhile, I'll motivate KNB by reflecting on (i) the defects associated with Moorean sentences, as well as (ii) defective assertion. An important observation that arises from this discussion of assertion is that we'll need to draw a distinction between weak and strong belief in order to explain the intuitive permissibility of hedged assertion. Once we better understand this distinction between weak and strong belief, however, I'll argue that we should construe DBI to regulate strong but not weak belief. This surprising conclusion will clarify the limitations of DBI, mitigate the force of recently-proposed counterarguments, and preserve an interesting conception of strong belief that is governed by DBI.In my third substantive chapter, I discuss whether the norms of inquiry undermine evidentialism. One influential argument from Friedman (2020) suggests that zetetic norms conflict with evidentialism and can even requiring us to reject evidentialist norms. In defense of evidentialism, I develop a way of understanding evidentialist norms according to which they function as norms of ideal epistemic rationality. I suggest that due to our finite nature and cognitive limitations, it's not always feasible to conform to ideal epistemic standards during our inquiries. But when it's not feasible for us to comply with ideal standards, I argue that there are norms of non-ideal rationality that help us to salvage what we can from our sub-optimal epistemic positions. Importantly though, I suggest that ideal and non-ideal requirements cannot conflict in the way needed to generate a genuine dilemma, which mitigates the force of challenges to evidentialism.
- 일반주제명
- Philosophy
- 일반주제명
- Epistemology
- 일반주제명
- Logic
- 키워드
- Inquiry
- 키워드
- Knowledge
- 키워드
- Norms of inquiry
- 키워드
- Knowledge norms
- 키워드
- Belief
- 기타저자
- The Ohio State University Philosophy
- 기본자료저록
- Dissertations Abstracts International. 86-11A.
- 전자적 위치 및 접속
- 로그인 후 원문을 볼 수 있습니다.
MARC
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■006m o d
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■020 ▼a9798314892510
■035 ▼a(MiAaPQ)AAI32112028
■040 ▼aMiAaPQ▼cMiAaPQ
■0820 ▼a100
■1001 ▼aSoles, Donald Elwood.
■24510▼aNorms of Inquiry
■260 ▼a[Sl]▼bThe Ohio State University▼c2025
■260 1▼aAnn Arbor▼bProQuest Dissertations & Theses▼c2025
■300 ▼a112 p
■500 ▼aSource: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-11, Section: A.
■500 ▼aAdvisor: Smithies, Declan.
■5021 ▼aThesis (Ph.D.)--The Ohio State University, 2025.
■520 ▼aIn my first substantive chapter, I aim to answer the following question: how does the value of knowledge illuminate the epistemic significance of inquiry? I argue that when we appreciate knowledge's value, we'll anticipate important normative roles for knowledge that extend to inquiry by mandating its closure. In light of these considerations, I argue that we should accept the Ignorance Norm of Inquiry (INI), which prohibits inquiring about the answer to a question while at the same time knowing the answer to that question. Moreover, when we understand the value of knowledge, we are left with important defensive resources that enable us to rebut challenges to INI that have recently been proposed.In my second substantive chapter, I'll motivate and defend a new argument for DBI-the idea that one ought not believe p at t while inquiring into whether p at t. To do this, I'll defend the premises of the following argument:INI You ought: if you know p, not inquire into whether p.KNB You ought: if you believe p, know p. Therefore,DBI You ought: if you believe p, not inquire into whether p.I'll suggest that intuitions about cases, linguistic data, and reflection on the value of knowledge support INI. Meanwhile, I'll motivate KNB by reflecting on (i) the defects associated with Moorean sentences, as well as (ii) defective assertion. An important observation that arises from this discussion of assertion is that we'll need to draw a distinction between weak and strong belief in order to explain the intuitive permissibility of hedged assertion. Once we better understand this distinction between weak and strong belief, however, I'll argue that we should construe DBI to regulate strong but not weak belief. This surprising conclusion will clarify the limitations of DBI, mitigate the force of recently-proposed counterarguments, and preserve an interesting conception of strong belief that is governed by DBI.In my third substantive chapter, I discuss whether the norms of inquiry undermine evidentialism. One influential argument from Friedman (2020) suggests that zetetic norms conflict with evidentialism and can even requiring us to reject evidentialist norms. In defense of evidentialism, I develop a way of understanding evidentialist norms according to which they function as norms of ideal epistemic rationality. I suggest that due to our finite nature and cognitive limitations, it's not always feasible to conform to ideal epistemic standards during our inquiries. But when it's not feasible for us to comply with ideal standards, I argue that there are norms of non-ideal rationality that help us to salvage what we can from our sub-optimal epistemic positions. Importantly though, I suggest that ideal and non-ideal requirements cannot conflict in the way needed to generate a genuine dilemma, which mitigates the force of challenges to evidentialism.
■590 ▼aSchool code: 0168.
■650 4▼aPhilosophy
■650 4▼aEpistemology
■650 4▼aLogic
■653 ▼aInquiry
■653 ▼aKnowledge
■653 ▼aNorms of inquiry
■653 ▼aKnowledge norms
■653 ▼aBelief
■653 ▼aIdeal rationality
■653 ▼aZetetic epistemology
■690 ▼a0422
■690 ▼a0393
■690 ▼a0395
■71020▼aThe Ohio State University▼bPhilosophy.
■7730 ▼tDissertations Abstracts International▼g86-11A.
■790 ▼a0168
■791 ▼aPh.D.
■792 ▼a2025
■793 ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17358202▼nKERIS▼z이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.
