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Reducing Web Attack Surface: Mitigating Social Engineering and Code Injection Threats
Reducing Web Attack Surface: Mitigating Social Engineering and Code Injection Threats
Reducing Web Attack Surface: Mitigating Social Engineering and Code Injection Threats

상세정보

자료유형  
 학위논문 서양
최종처리일시  
20260202105528
ISBN  
9798263351465
DDC  
005.1
저자명  
Yang, Zheng.
서명/저자  
Reducing Web Attack Surface: Mitigating Social Engineering and Code Injection Threats
발행사항  
[Sl] : Georgia Institute of Technology, 2025
발행사항  
Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2025
형태사항  
141 p
주기사항  
Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 87-05, Section: A.
주기사항  
Advisor: Lee, Wenke;Saltaformaggio, Brendan.
학위논문주기  
Thesis (Ph.D.)--Georgia Institute of Technology, 2025.
초록/해제  
요약The web ecosystem has become an essential platform for communication, business, and entertainment, yet it remains highly vulnerable to various forms of injection-based cyber threats. These include not only technical exploits like code injection attacks, but also social engineering threats that inject misleading content, invisible overlays, or malicious scripts to deceive users and compromise web applications. While existing security solutions tend to focus narrowly on either system hardening or user education, they often fall short in mitigating the increasingly sophisticated and blended attack techniques seen in the wild.This dissertation presents a unified, multi-layered defense strategy against such injection-based threats through the design and implementation of three novel security mechanisms: TRIDENT, COINDEF, and COINDX. Each system targets a different class of attack vector and collectively contributes to a reduced attack surface for both end-users and developers.We first introduce TRIDENT, a browser-based defense system that detects and blocks social engineering attacks distributed through low-tier ad networks. By analyzing ad script behaviors, TRIDENT identifies and mitigates deceptive content injected to ad publisher websites that lead users to social engineering websites. Then, we propose COINDEF, a customized Electron engine designed to prevent code injection attacks by enforcing execution policies. Unlike traditional XSS mitigation strategies that focus on browser isolation, COINDEF ensures that only trusted code executes within the Electron environment by validating the structural integrity of JavaScript's abstract syntax tree and execution context. Last, we present COINDX, a root cause analysis framework for code injection attacks in JavaScript applications. Given the complexity of JavaScript and its dynamic dependencies, traditional vulnerability detection methods struggle with state explosion or accuracy. COINDX addresses this by constructing a simplified program based on call stack traces and applying iterative symbolic analysis to reproduce the vulnerable state and pinpoint the root cause.By integrating these three systems, this dissertation advances web security through a proactive and automated defense model. Rather than reacting to known signatures or relying solely on user awareness, the proposed framework reduces the attack surface by preventing both social and technical injections before they can succeed. TRIDENT limits user exposure to deceptive web content, COINDEF safeguards execution environments in hybrid applications, and COINDX provides developers with precise tools for vulnerability remediation.Ultimately, this research underscores the importance of a holistic approach to web security-one that recognizes the convergence of social and technical vectors under the broader category of injection attacks. The solutions presented here contribute to a more resilient web ecosystem by bridging the gap between content-level, runtime, and developer-facing defenses.
일반주제명  
Scripts
일반주제명  
User training
일반주제명  
Threats
일반주제명  
Exploitation
일반주제명  
Design
일반주제명  
Websites
일반주제명  
Streaming media
일반주제명  
Defense
일반주제명  
Cybercrime
일반주제명  
Ecosystems
일반주제명  
JavaScript
일반주제명  
Criminology
일반주제명  
Film studies
일반주제명  
Web studies
기타저자  
Georgia Institute of Technology.
기본자료저록  
Dissertations Abstracts International. 87-05A.
전자적 위치 및 접속  
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MARC

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■1001  ▼aYang,  Zheng.
■24510▼aReducing  Web  Attack  Surface:  Mitigating  Social  Engineering  and  Code  Injection  Threats
■260    ▼a[Sl]▼bGeorgia  Institute  of  Technology▼c2025
■260  1▼aAnn  Arbor▼bProQuest  Dissertations  &  Theses▼c2025
■300    ▼a141  p
■500    ▼aSource:  Dissertations  Abstracts  International,  Volume:  87-05,  Section:  A.
■500    ▼aAdvisor:  Lee,  Wenke;Saltaformaggio,  Brendan.
■5021  ▼aThesis  (Ph.D.)--Georgia  Institute  of  Technology,  2025.
■520    ▼aThe  web  ecosystem  has  become  an  essential  platform  for  communication,  business,  and  entertainment,  yet  it  remains  highly  vulnerable  to  various  forms  of  injection-based  cyber  threats.  These  include  not  only  technical  exploits  like  code  injection  attacks,  but  also  social  engineering  threats  that  inject  misleading  content,  invisible  overlays,  or  malicious  scripts  to  deceive  users  and  compromise  web  applications.  While  existing  security  solutions  tend  to  focus  narrowly  on  either  system  hardening  or  user  education,  they  often  fall  short  in  mitigating  the  increasingly  sophisticated  and  blended  attack  techniques  seen  in  the  wild.This  dissertation  presents  a  unified,  multi-layered  defense  strategy  against  such  injection-based  threats  through  the  design  and  implementation  of  three  novel  security  mechanisms:  TRIDENT,  COINDEF,  and  COINDX.  Each  system  targets  a  different  class  of  attack  vector  and  collectively  contributes  to  a  reduced  attack  surface  for  both  end-users  and  developers.We  first  introduce  TRIDENT,  a  browser-based  defense  system  that  detects  and  blocks  social  engineering  attacks  distributed  through  low-tier  ad  networks.  By  analyzing  ad  script  behaviors,  TRIDENT  identifies  and  mitigates  deceptive  content  injected  to  ad  publisher  websites  that  lead  users  to  social  engineering  websites.  Then,  we  propose  COINDEF,  a  customized  Electron  engine  designed  to  prevent  code  injection  attacks  by  enforcing  execution  policies.  Unlike  traditional  XSS  mitigation  strategies  that  focus  on  browser  isolation,  COINDEF  ensures  that  only  trusted  code  executes  within  the  Electron  environment  by  validating  the  structural  integrity  of  JavaScript's  abstract  syntax  tree  and  execution  context.  Last,  we  present  COINDX,  a  root  cause  analysis  framework  for  code  injection  attacks  in  JavaScript  applications.  Given  the  complexity  of  JavaScript  and  its  dynamic  dependencies,  traditional  vulnerability  detection  methods  struggle  with  state  explosion  or  accuracy.  COINDX  addresses  this  by  constructing  a  simplified  program  based  on  call  stack  traces  and  applying  iterative  symbolic  analysis  to  reproduce  the  vulnerable  state  and  pinpoint  the  root  cause.By  integrating  these  three  systems,  this  dissertation  advances  web  security  through  a  proactive  and  automated  defense  model.  Rather  than  reacting  to  known  signatures  or  relying  solely  on  user  awareness,  the  proposed  framework  reduces  the  attack  surface  by  preventing  both  social  and  technical  injections  before  they  can  succeed.  TRIDENT  limits  user  exposure  to  deceptive  web  content,  COINDEF  safeguards  execution  environments  in  hybrid  applications,  and  COINDX  provides  developers  with  precise  tools  for  vulnerability  remediation.Ultimately,  this  research  underscores  the  importance  of  a  holistic  approach  to  web  security-one  that  recognizes  the  convergence  of  social  and  technical  vectors  under  the  broader  category  of  injection  attacks.  The  solutions  presented  here  contribute  to  a  more  resilient  web  ecosystem  by  bridging  the  gap  between  content-level,  runtime,  and  developer-facing  defenses.
■590    ▼aSchool  code:  0078.
■650  4▼aScripts
■650  4▼aUser  training
■650  4▼aThreats
■650  4▼aExploitation
■650  4▼aDesign
■650  4▼aWebsites
■650  4▼aStreaming  media
■650  4▼aDefense
■650  4▼aCybercrime
■650  4▼aEcosystems
■650  4▼aJavaScript
■650  4▼aCriminology
■650  4▼aFilm  studies
■650  4▼aWeb  studies
■690    ▼a0389
■690    ▼a0627
■690    ▼a0900
■690    ▼a0646
■690    ▼a0338
■71020▼aGeorgia  Institute  of  Technology.
■7730  ▼tDissertations  Abstracts  International▼g87-05A.
■790    ▼a0078
■791    ▼aPh.D.
■792    ▼a2025
■793    ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17360450▼nKERIS▼z이  자료의  원문은  한국교육학술정보원에서  제공합니다.

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