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Essays on Marketing and Information Acquisition
Essays on Marketing and Information Acquisition
Essays on Marketing and Information Acquisition

상세정보

자료유형  
 학위논문 서양
최종처리일시  
20260202103210
ISBN  
9798315797432
DDC  
320
저자명  
Zhao, Jason.
서명/저자  
Essays on Marketing and Information Acquisition
발행사항  
[Sl] : Northwestern University, 2025
발행사항  
Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2025
형태사항  
183 p
주기사항  
Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-12, Section: B.
주기사항  
Advisor: Gordon, Brett;Tuchman, Anna.
학위논문주기  
Thesis (Ph.D.)--Northwestern University, 2025.
초록/해제  
요약As consumers gain increasing access to vast quantities of information, a key challenge becomes where and how individuals should choose to acquire information. Consumers must decide among themselves not just which news outlets to trust, but how much attention to allocate across competing messages from firms in advertising and marketing communications. When consumer attention is increasingly pulled among many directions, it is valuable to understand what drives individuals to search for information from one source and not another, and how firms vie to be heard over the competition.This dissertation comprises three chapters that examine different aspects of these issues. First, I examine how both partisan differences in local news demand and newspapers' decisions on topic selection and political slant contribute to ideological segregation in news consumption. Second, I examine what incentives drive television viewers to choose to pay attention to political advertising. Third, I study the role of pharmaceutical marketing when medical practitioners increasingly prefer to acquire information from peer-to-peer sources compared to information provided by pharmaceutical firms. I show that physician gifts remain effective as a promotional tool because they ameliorate limited consideration in physicians, potentially improving prescription choices even without providing new information about treatment efficacy.The first chapter studies how local newspapers differentiate their news content, and how these editorial choices affect ideological segregation in news consumption. Specifically, I examine how firms position their products when Republicans and Democrats may differ in preferences for both ideologically slanted reporting as well as different topic coverage. To do so, I create a measure of partisan slant that separates politicized rhetoric from different topic selection between Democrats and Republicans. I use this measure to estimate a demand model in which Republican and Democratic consumers have separate, party-specific tastes for partisan slant and topic coverage. I find that consumers in both parties prefer partisan slant that favors their own ideological positions, with Democrats displaying a greater mean preference for like-minded slant. However, while Democrats prefer topic selection that mirrors that of major national papers, Republicans prefer more specialized reporting. I then model how firms choose slant and topic coverage in a simultaneous-move game. I show that because firms may differentiate over not just how but what they report on, policies aimed at limiting political slant in reporting are not sufficient to address polarization in news consumption. Moreover, I find in a counterfactual simulation that government subsidies promoting increased entry in local news may lead to both more extreme slant and increased ideological segregation in consumption.The second chapter examines viewers' choices to pay attention to advertising in order to shed light on mechanisms underlying advertising effects. Using data on viewer attention to political ads on television, I find evidence for both an informational and a complementary consumption role of advertising. During the primary election season, consumers pay more attention to political ads when their statewide electoral outcomes are more uncertain and information is thus more valuable, consistent with an informative effect. However, during the general election, the opposite is true, with attention higher in states where presidential polling strongly favors one candidate over the other. This is especially true for viewers who watch more television news, consistent with the idea that political ads are complementary to other forms of political behavior. I find further evidence of advertising complementarities during general election season: exposure to political ads increases consumption of TV news programs in the subsequent 24 hours. However, these effects are stronger when information does not drive political advertising consumption: during the general election, and more so in less-competitive races. This further suggests that consumption complementarities are more likely to drive political ad consumption during the general election, compared to an information acquisition motive.Finally, the third chapter studies physician gifts, which are a routine promotional practice of pharmaceutical firms. These gifts frequently raise concerns from regulators, as critics argue that the value of information provided by drug representatives is limited, while gifts could instead sway physicians towards inappropriate treatment options. I find that gifts are both prevalent and effective in increasing prescriptions, but their impact on patient well-being depends on the mechanisms through which gifts affect prescription behavior. Gifts could potentially distort choice by directly impacting physicians' preferences for drugs, but they could also improve limited consideration, leading to better patient outcomes. This consideration nudge may improve prescribing even if critics are correct in arguing that the informational role of pharmaceutical marketing has been superseded by other easily-accessible information sources. To disentangle these effects, I estimate a structural model of discrete choice under limited consideration in the market for atypical antipsychotics. The model estimates imply that on average physicians consider only 2.4 of the 8 most popular branded drugs, and that gifts primarily impact consideration with a near-zero impact on utility. I find that, across drugs, an additional gift of average value ($24) increases consideration probability by 14.5% on average, leading to a 0.22 standard deviation increase in prescribing. Since higher rates of consideration weakly benefit patients, strict regulation could lead to adverse outcomes by worsening limited consideration. However, because firms tend to target physicians that are more likely to consider the promoted drug, banning gifts only leads to small aggregate changes in prescribing despite the effectiveness of gifts in prompting consideration. In contrast, policies that place yearly caps on gifting encourage firms to reallocate gifts to a wider array of physicians, leading physicians to consider 26% more drugs on average.
일반주제명  
Political science
일반주제명  
Pharmaceutical sciences
키워드  
Consumers
키워드  
Information acquisition
키워드  
Marketing communications
키워드  
Local news
키워드  
Demand
기타저자  
Northwestern University Marketing
기본자료저록  
Dissertations Abstracts International. 86-12B.
전자적 위치 및 접속  
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MARC

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■035    ▼a(MiAaPQ)AAI32000829
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■1001  ▼aZhao,  Jason.▼0(orcid)0009-0001-6797-0664
■24510▼aEssays  on  Marketing  and  Information  Acquisition
■260    ▼a[Sl]▼bNorthwestern  University▼c2025
■260  1▼aAnn  Arbor▼bProQuest  Dissertations  &  Theses▼c2025
■300    ▼a183  p
■500    ▼aSource:  Dissertations  Abstracts  International,  Volume:  86-12,  Section:  B.
■500    ▼aAdvisor:  Gordon,  Brett;Tuchman,  Anna.
■5021  ▼aThesis  (Ph.D.)--Northwestern  University,  2025.
■520    ▼aAs  consumers  gain  increasing  access  to  vast  quantities  of  information,  a  key  challenge  becomes  where  and  how  individuals  should  choose  to  acquire  information.  Consumers  must  decide  among  themselves  not  just  which  news  outlets  to  trust,  but  how  much  attention  to  allocate  across  competing  messages  from  firms  in  advertising  and  marketing  communications.  When  consumer  attention  is  increasingly  pulled  among  many  directions,  it  is  valuable  to  understand  what  drives  individuals  to  search  for  information  from  one  source  and  not  another,  and  how  firms  vie  to  be  heard  over  the  competition.This  dissertation  comprises  three  chapters  that  examine  different  aspects  of  these  issues.  First,  I  examine  how  both  partisan  differences  in  local  news  demand  and  newspapers'  decisions  on  topic  selection  and  political  slant  contribute  to  ideological  segregation  in  news  consumption.  Second,  I  examine  what  incentives  drive  television  viewers  to  choose  to  pay  attention  to  political  advertising.  Third,  I  study  the  role  of  pharmaceutical  marketing  when  medical  practitioners  increasingly  prefer  to  acquire  information  from  peer-to-peer  sources  compared  to  information  provided  by  pharmaceutical  firms.  I  show  that  physician  gifts  remain  effective  as  a  promotional  tool  because  they  ameliorate  limited  consideration  in  physicians,  potentially  improving  prescription  choices  even  without  providing  new  information  about  treatment  efficacy.The  first  chapter  studies  how  local  newspapers  differentiate  their  news  content,  and  how  these  editorial  choices  affect  ideological  segregation  in  news  consumption.  Specifically,  I  examine  how  firms  position  their  products  when  Republicans  and  Democrats  may  differ  in  preferences  for  both  ideologically  slanted  reporting  as  well  as  different  topic  coverage.  To  do  so,  I  create  a  measure  of  partisan  slant  that  separates  politicized  rhetoric  from  different  topic  selection  between  Democrats  and  Republicans.  I  use  this  measure  to  estimate  a  demand  model  in  which  Republican  and  Democratic  consumers  have  separate,  party-specific  tastes  for  partisan  slant  and  topic  coverage.  I  find  that  consumers  in  both  parties  prefer  partisan  slant  that  favors  their  own  ideological  positions,  with  Democrats  displaying  a  greater  mean  preference  for  like-minded  slant.  However,  while  Democrats  prefer  topic  selection  that  mirrors  that  of  major  national  papers,  Republicans  prefer  more  specialized  reporting.  I  then  model  how  firms  choose  slant  and  topic  coverage  in  a  simultaneous-move  game.  I  show  that  because  firms  may  differentiate  over  not  just  how  but  what  they  report  on,  policies  aimed  at  limiting  political  slant  in  reporting  are  not  sufficient  to  address  polarization  in  news  consumption.  Moreover,  I  find  in  a  counterfactual  simulation  that  government  subsidies  promoting  increased  entry  in  local  news  may  lead  to  both  more  extreme  slant  and  increased  ideological  segregation  in  consumption.The  second  chapter  examines  viewers'  choices  to  pay  attention  to  advertising  in  order  to  shed  light  on  mechanisms  underlying  advertising  effects.  Using  data  on  viewer  attention  to  political  ads  on  television,  I  find  evidence  for  both  an  informational  and  a  complementary  consumption  role  of  advertising.  During  the  primary  election  season,  consumers  pay  more  attention  to  political  ads  when  their  statewide  electoral  outcomes  are  more  uncertain  and  information  is  thus  more  valuable,  consistent  with  an  informative  effect.  However,  during  the  general  election,  the  opposite  is  true,  with  attention  higher  in  states  where  presidential  polling  strongly  favors  one  candidate  over  the  other.  This  is  especially  true  for  viewers  who  watch  more  television  news,  consistent  with  the  idea  that  political  ads  are  complementary  to  other  forms  of  political  behavior.  I  find  further  evidence  of  advertising  complementarities  during  general  election  season:  exposure  to  political  ads  increases  consumption  of  TV  news  programs  in  the  subsequent  24  hours.  However,  these  effects  are  stronger  when  information  does  not  drive  political  advertising  consumption:  during  the  general  election,  and  more  so  in  less-competitive  races.  This  further  suggests  that  consumption  complementarities  are  more  likely  to  drive  political  ad  consumption  during  the  general  election,  compared  to  an  information  acquisition  motive.Finally,  the  third  chapter  studies  physician  gifts,  which  are  a  routine  promotional  practice  of  pharmaceutical  firms.  These  gifts  frequently  raise  concerns  from  regulators,  as  critics  argue  that  the  value  of  information  provided  by  drug  representatives  is  limited,  while  gifts  could  instead  sway  physicians  towards  inappropriate  treatment  options.  I  find  that  gifts  are  both  prevalent  and  effective  in  increasing  prescriptions,  but  their  impact  on  patient  well-being  depends  on  the  mechanisms  through  which  gifts  affect  prescription  behavior.  Gifts  could  potentially  distort  choice  by  directly  impacting  physicians'  preferences  for  drugs,  but  they  could  also  improve  limited  consideration,  leading  to  better  patient  outcomes.  This  consideration  nudge  may  improve  prescribing  even  if  critics  are  correct  in  arguing  that  the  informational  role  of  pharmaceutical  marketing  has  been  superseded  by  other  easily-accessible  information  sources.  To  disentangle  these  effects,  I  estimate  a  structural  model  of  discrete  choice  under  limited  consideration  in  the  market  for  atypical  antipsychotics.  The  model  estimates  imply  that  on  average  physicians  consider  only  2.4  of  the  8  most  popular  branded  drugs,  and  that  gifts  primarily  impact  consideration  with  a  near-zero  impact  on  utility.  I  find  that,  across  drugs,  an  additional  gift  of  average  value  ($24)  increases  consideration  probability  by  14.5%  on  average,  leading  to  a  0.22  standard  deviation  increase  in  prescribing.  Since  higher  rates  of  consideration  weakly  benefit  patients,  strict  regulation  could  lead  to  adverse  outcomes  by  worsening  limited  consideration.  However,  because  firms  tend  to  target  physicians  that  are  more  likely  to  consider  the  promoted  drug,  banning  gifts  only  leads  to  small  aggregate  changes  in  prescribing  despite  the  effectiveness  of  gifts  in  prompting  consideration.  In  contrast,  policies  that  place  yearly  caps  on  gifting  encourage  firms  to  reallocate  gifts  to  a  wider  array  of  physicians,  leading  physicians  to  consider  26%  more  drugs  on  average.
■590    ▼aSchool  code:  0163.
■650  4▼aPolitical  science
■650  4▼aPharmaceutical  sciences
■653    ▼aConsumers
■653    ▼aInformation  acquisition
■653    ▼aMarketing  communications
■653    ▼aLocal  news
■653    ▼aDemand
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■690    ▼a0501
■690    ▼a0615
■690    ▼a0572
■71020▼aNorthwestern  University▼bMarketing.
■7730  ▼tDissertations  Abstracts  International▼g86-12B.
■790    ▼a0163
■791    ▼aPh.D.
■792    ▼a2025
■793    ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17357337▼nKERIS▼z이  자료의  원문은  한국교육학술정보원에서  제공합니다.

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