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Essays in Development Economics and Political Economy
Essays in Development Economics and Political Economy
상세정보
- 자료유형
- 학위논문 서양
- 최종처리일시
- 20260202103200
- ISBN
- 9798315797234
- DDC
- 310
- 저자명
- Matsuura, Ryu.
- 서명/저자
- Essays in Development Economics and Political Economy
- 발행사항
- [Sl] : Northwestern University, 2025
- 발행사항
- Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2025
- 형태사항
- 212 p
- 주기사항
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-12, Section: B.
- 주기사항
- Advisor: Udry, Chris.
- 학위논문주기
- Thesis (Ph.D.)--Northwestern University, 2025.
- 초록/해제
- 요약This dissertation consists of three chapters about political economy in developing countries. The first chapter, coauthored with Sebastian Javervall and Roza Khoban, examines political backlash among marginalized communities in India in response to trade liberalization in the 1990s. The second chapter, coauthored with Shubhro Bhattacharya and Utsav Manjeer, studies the persisting impact of colonial land tenure systems on political selection in India today. The third chapter, coauthored with Robin Burgess, Gerard Padro i Miquel, and Ameet Morjaria, analyzes the economic and welfare implications of fragmented international borders in Sub-Saharan Africa.In recent decades, many developing countries have integrated into the global economy through trade reforms. However, the gains from trade liberalization have been unevenly distributed among various economic and social groups. The first chapter of this dissertation examines how adverse economic shocks induced by trade liberalization influenced voting behavior and political representation among marginalized groups in India. By using exogenous variation in regional exposure to tariff reductions from India's 1990s trade liberalization and constructing a novel dataset that links politicians to social communities, we establish causal estimates of the economic and political effects of trade reforms. We find that trade liberalization led to a relative decline in consumption and earnings growth for marginalized workers. In response, these groups increased their political engagement, resulting in higher vote shares and representation for marginalized politicians, while non-marginalized politicians experienced a corresponding decline. We show that these political effects were most pronounced in districts with a significant marginalized population share, suggesting a political backlash from marginalized groups. Furthermore, we provide evidence that a redistributive policy mitigated these political changes, in line with an economic grievances channel.Is there a persistent impact of historical institutions on the selection of "bad" politicians? In the second chapter of this dissertation, we document the nuanced consequences of history on modern adverse political selection using variations in colonial land tenure systems during British rule in India. Politicians with criminal charges are significantly more likely to run for office, and win elections, in areas where extractive landlords historically held substantial property rights. Corrupt politicians who experience disproportionately large private financial gains in office, however, are significantly more likely to be in areas where individual cultivators historically held property rights. Our analysis establishes that these estimates are not biased by endogeneity concerns. Rather, a plausible mechanism indicates a comparative advantage for criminal politicians in the conflictual electoral environment of landlord areas. The relatively less competitive elections in non-landlord areas, instead, are susceptible to elite capture and subsequent wealth accumulation via corporate connections by politicians.Africa's colonial border design has been understood to be associated with detrimental contemporary socio-economic outcomes. Little attention however has been paid to the implication of those borders to intra-regional trade and thus economic growth. In the third chapter of this dissertation, we examine whether the removal of fragmented international borders in Africa improves the welfare of neighboring countries. We specifically consider different trade and colonial blocks and investigate to what extent frictions along the borders affect the patterns of infrastructure investment along links that play significant roles in international trade. Using a spatial general equilibrium model developed by Fajgelbaum and Schaal (2020), we show that existing links that are consequential for international trade and general trade are under-invested in the East African Community and West African Economic and Monetary Union. Moreover, we find that border frictions on trade and infrastructure resources allocation limit the investment along international trade links in British East Africa and the Southern African Development Community. Our approach provides important policy-relevant insights given that a range of countries in low-income regions are trying to lessen trade friction across the borders by forming free-trade areas and currency unions.
- 일반주제명
- Statistics
- 일반주제명
- Political science
- 일반주제명
- Public administration
- 키워드
- Voting behaviors
- 기타저자
- Northwestern University Economics
- 기본자료저록
- Dissertations Abstracts International. 86-12B.
- 전자적 위치 및 접속
- 로그인 후 원문을 볼 수 있습니다.
MARC
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■040 ▼aMiAaPQ▼cMiAaPQ
■0820 ▼a310
■1001 ▼aMatsuura, Ryu.
■24510▼aEssays in Development Economics and Political Economy
■260 ▼a[Sl]▼bNorthwestern University▼c2025
■260 1▼aAnn Arbor▼bProQuest Dissertations & Theses▼c2025
■300 ▼a212 p
■500 ▼aSource: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-12, Section: B.
■500 ▼aAdvisor: Udry, Chris.
■5021 ▼aThesis (Ph.D.)--Northwestern University, 2025.
■520 ▼aThis dissertation consists of three chapters about political economy in developing countries. The first chapter, coauthored with Sebastian Javervall and Roza Khoban, examines political backlash among marginalized communities in India in response to trade liberalization in the 1990s. The second chapter, coauthored with Shubhro Bhattacharya and Utsav Manjeer, studies the persisting impact of colonial land tenure systems on political selection in India today. The third chapter, coauthored with Robin Burgess, Gerard Padro i Miquel, and Ameet Morjaria, analyzes the economic and welfare implications of fragmented international borders in Sub-Saharan Africa.In recent decades, many developing countries have integrated into the global economy through trade reforms. However, the gains from trade liberalization have been unevenly distributed among various economic and social groups. The first chapter of this dissertation examines how adverse economic shocks induced by trade liberalization influenced voting behavior and political representation among marginalized groups in India. By using exogenous variation in regional exposure to tariff reductions from India's 1990s trade liberalization and constructing a novel dataset that links politicians to social communities, we establish causal estimates of the economic and political effects of trade reforms. We find that trade liberalization led to a relative decline in consumption and earnings growth for marginalized workers. In response, these groups increased their political engagement, resulting in higher vote shares and representation for marginalized politicians, while non-marginalized politicians experienced a corresponding decline. We show that these political effects were most pronounced in districts with a significant marginalized population share, suggesting a political backlash from marginalized groups. Furthermore, we provide evidence that a redistributive policy mitigated these political changes, in line with an economic grievances channel.Is there a persistent impact of historical institutions on the selection of "bad" politicians? In the second chapter of this dissertation, we document the nuanced consequences of history on modern adverse political selection using variations in colonial land tenure systems during British rule in India. Politicians with criminal charges are significantly more likely to run for office, and win elections, in areas where extractive landlords historically held substantial property rights. Corrupt politicians who experience disproportionately large private financial gains in office, however, are significantly more likely to be in areas where individual cultivators historically held property rights. Our analysis establishes that these estimates are not biased by endogeneity concerns. Rather, a plausible mechanism indicates a comparative advantage for criminal politicians in the conflictual electoral environment of landlord areas. The relatively less competitive elections in non-landlord areas, instead, are susceptible to elite capture and subsequent wealth accumulation via corporate connections by politicians.Africa's colonial border design has been understood to be associated with detrimental contemporary socio-economic outcomes. Little attention however has been paid to the implication of those borders to intra-regional trade and thus economic growth. In the third chapter of this dissertation, we examine whether the removal of fragmented international borders in Africa improves the welfare of neighboring countries. We specifically consider different trade and colonial blocks and investigate to what extent frictions along the borders affect the patterns of infrastructure investment along links that play significant roles in international trade. Using a spatial general equilibrium model developed by Fajgelbaum and Schaal (2020), we show that existing links that are consequential for international trade and general trade are under-invested in the East African Community and West African Economic and Monetary Union. Moreover, we find that border frictions on trade and infrastructure resources allocation limit the investment along international trade links in British East Africa and the Southern African Development Community. Our approach provides important policy-relevant insights given that a range of countries in low-income regions are trying to lessen trade friction across the borders by forming free-trade areas and currency unions.
■590 ▼aSchool code: 0163.
■650 4▼aStatistics
■650 4▼aPolitical science
■650 4▼aPublic administration
■653 ▼aPolitical economy
■653 ▼aDevelopment economics
■653 ▼aTrade liberalization
■653 ▼aWinning candidates
■653 ▼aVoting behaviors
■690 ▼a0501
■690 ▼a0617
■690 ▼a0615
■690 ▼a0463
■71020▼aNorthwestern University▼bEconomics.
■7730 ▼tDissertations Abstracts International▼g86-12B.
■790 ▼a0163
■791 ▼aPh.D.
■792 ▼a2025
■793 ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17357278▼nKERIS▼z이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.


