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Essays in Development Economics and Political Economy
Essays in Development Economics and Political Economy
Essays in Development Economics and Political Economy

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자료유형  
 학위논문 서양
최종처리일시  
20260202103200
ISBN  
9798315797234
DDC  
310
저자명  
Matsuura, Ryu.
서명/저자  
Essays in Development Economics and Political Economy
발행사항  
[Sl] : Northwestern University, 2025
발행사항  
Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2025
형태사항  
212 p
주기사항  
Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-12, Section: B.
주기사항  
Advisor: Udry, Chris.
학위논문주기  
Thesis (Ph.D.)--Northwestern University, 2025.
초록/해제  
요약This dissertation consists of three chapters about political economy in developing countries. The first chapter, coauthored with Sebastian Javervall and Roza Khoban, examines political backlash among marginalized communities in India in response to trade liberalization in the 1990s. The second chapter, coauthored with Shubhro Bhattacharya and Utsav Manjeer, studies the persisting impact of colonial land tenure systems on political selection in India today. The third chapter, coauthored with Robin Burgess, Gerard Padro i Miquel, and Ameet Morjaria, analyzes the economic and welfare implications of fragmented international borders in Sub-Saharan Africa.In recent decades, many developing countries have integrated into the global economy through trade reforms. However, the gains from trade liberalization have been unevenly distributed among various economic and social groups. The first chapter of this dissertation examines how adverse economic shocks induced by trade liberalization influenced voting behavior and political representation among marginalized groups in India. By using exogenous variation in regional exposure to tariff reductions from India's 1990s trade liberalization and constructing a novel dataset that links politicians to social communities, we establish causal estimates of the economic and political effects of trade reforms. We find that trade liberalization led to a relative decline in consumption and earnings growth for marginalized workers. In response, these groups increased their political engagement, resulting in higher vote shares and representation for marginalized politicians, while non-marginalized politicians experienced a corresponding decline. We show that these political effects were most pronounced in districts with a significant marginalized population share, suggesting a political backlash from marginalized groups. Furthermore, we provide evidence that a redistributive policy mitigated these political changes, in line with an economic grievances channel.Is there a persistent impact of historical institutions on the selection of "bad" politicians? In the second chapter of this dissertation, we document the nuanced consequences of history on modern adverse political selection using variations in colonial land tenure systems during British rule in India. Politicians with criminal charges are significantly more likely to run for office, and win elections, in areas where extractive landlords historically held substantial property rights. Corrupt politicians who experience disproportionately large private financial gains in office, however, are significantly more likely to be in areas where individual cultivators historically held property rights. Our analysis establishes that these estimates are not biased by endogeneity concerns. Rather, a plausible mechanism indicates a comparative advantage for criminal politicians in the conflictual electoral environment of landlord areas. The relatively less competitive elections in non-landlord areas, instead, are susceptible to elite capture and subsequent wealth accumulation via corporate connections by politicians.Africa's colonial border design has been understood to be associated with detrimental contemporary socio-economic outcomes. Little attention however has been paid to the implication of those borders to intra-regional trade and thus economic growth. In the third chapter of this dissertation, we examine whether the removal of fragmented international borders in Africa improves the welfare of neighboring countries. We specifically consider different trade and colonial blocks and investigate to what extent frictions along the borders affect the patterns of infrastructure investment along links that play significant roles in international trade. Using a spatial general equilibrium model developed by Fajgelbaum and Schaal (2020), we show that existing links that are consequential for international trade and general trade are under-invested in the East African Community and West African Economic and Monetary Union. Moreover, we find that border frictions on trade and infrastructure resources allocation limit the investment along international trade links in British East Africa and the Southern African Development Community. Our approach provides important policy-relevant insights given that a range of countries in low-income regions are trying to lessen trade friction across the borders by forming free-trade areas and currency unions.
일반주제명  
Statistics
일반주제명  
Political science
일반주제명  
Public administration
키워드  
Political economy
키워드  
Development economics
키워드  
Trade liberalization
키워드  
Winning candidates
키워드  
Voting behaviors
기타저자  
Northwestern University Economics
기본자료저록  
Dissertations Abstracts International. 86-12B.
전자적 위치 및 접속  
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MARC

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■1001  ▼aMatsuura,  Ryu.
■24510▼aEssays  in  Development  Economics  and  Political  Economy
■260    ▼a[Sl]▼bNorthwestern  University▼c2025
■260  1▼aAnn  Arbor▼bProQuest  Dissertations  &  Theses▼c2025
■300    ▼a212  p
■500    ▼aSource:  Dissertations  Abstracts  International,  Volume:  86-12,  Section:  B.
■500    ▼aAdvisor:  Udry,  Chris.
■5021  ▼aThesis  (Ph.D.)--Northwestern  University,  2025.
■520    ▼aThis  dissertation  consists  of  three  chapters  about  political  economy  in  developing  countries.  The  first  chapter,  coauthored  with  Sebastian  Javervall  and  Roza  Khoban,  examines  political  backlash  among  marginalized  communities  in  India  in  response  to  trade  liberalization  in  the  1990s.  The  second  chapter,  coauthored  with  Shubhro  Bhattacharya  and  Utsav  Manjeer,  studies  the  persisting  impact  of  colonial  land  tenure  systems  on  political  selection  in  India  today.  The  third  chapter,  coauthored  with  Robin  Burgess,  Gerard  Padro  i  Miquel,  and  Ameet  Morjaria,  analyzes  the  economic  and  welfare  implications  of  fragmented  international  borders  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa.In  recent  decades,  many  developing  countries  have  integrated  into  the  global  economy  through  trade  reforms.  However,  the  gains  from  trade  liberalization  have  been  unevenly  distributed  among  various  economic  and  social  groups.  The  first  chapter  of  this  dissertation  examines  how  adverse  economic  shocks  induced  by  trade  liberalization  influenced  voting  behavior  and  political  representation  among  marginalized  groups  in  India.  By  using  exogenous  variation  in  regional  exposure  to  tariff  reductions  from  India's  1990s  trade  liberalization  and  constructing  a  novel  dataset  that  links  politicians  to  social  communities,  we  establish  causal  estimates  of  the  economic  and  political  effects  of  trade  reforms.  We  find  that  trade  liberalization  led  to  a  relative  decline  in  consumption  and  earnings  growth  for  marginalized  workers.  In  response,  these  groups  increased  their  political  engagement,  resulting  in  higher  vote  shares  and  representation  for  marginalized  politicians,  while  non-marginalized  politicians  experienced  a  corresponding  decline.  We  show  that  these  political  effects  were  most  pronounced  in  districts  with  a  significant  marginalized  population  share,  suggesting  a  political  backlash  from  marginalized  groups.  Furthermore,  we  provide  evidence  that  a  redistributive  policy  mitigated  these  political  changes,  in  line  with  an  economic  grievances  channel.Is  there  a  persistent  impact  of  historical  institutions  on  the  selection  of  "bad"  politicians?  In  the  second  chapter  of  this  dissertation,  we  document  the  nuanced  consequences  of  history  on  modern  adverse  political  selection  using  variations  in  colonial  land  tenure  systems  during  British  rule  in  India.  Politicians  with  criminal  charges  are  significantly  more  likely  to  run  for  office,  and  win  elections,  in  areas  where  extractive  landlords  historically  held  substantial  property  rights.  Corrupt  politicians  who  experience  disproportionately  large  private  financial  gains  in  office,  however,  are  significantly  more  likely  to  be  in  areas  where  individual  cultivators  historically  held  property  rights.  Our  analysis  establishes  that  these  estimates  are  not  biased  by  endogeneity  concerns.  Rather,  a  plausible  mechanism  indicates  a  comparative  advantage  for  criminal  politicians  in  the  conflictual  electoral  environment  of  landlord  areas.  The  relatively  less  competitive  elections  in  non-landlord  areas,  instead,  are  susceptible  to  elite  capture  and  subsequent  wealth  accumulation  via  corporate  connections  by  politicians.Africa's  colonial  border  design  has  been  understood  to  be  associated  with  detrimental  contemporary  socio-economic  outcomes.  Little  attention  however  has  been  paid  to  the  implication  of  those  borders  to  intra-regional  trade  and  thus  economic  growth.  In  the  third  chapter  of  this  dissertation,  we  examine  whether  the  removal  of  fragmented  international  borders  in  Africa  improves  the  welfare  of  neighboring  countries.  We  specifically  consider  different  trade  and  colonial  blocks  and  investigate  to  what  extent  frictions  along  the  borders  affect  the  patterns  of  infrastructure  investment  along  links  that  play  significant  roles  in  international  trade.  Using  a  spatial  general  equilibrium  model  developed  by  Fajgelbaum  and  Schaal  (2020),  we  show  that  existing  links  that  are  consequential  for  international  trade  and  general  trade  are  under-invested  in  the  East  African  Community  and  West  African  Economic  and  Monetary  Union.  Moreover,  we  find  that  border  frictions  on  trade  and  infrastructure  resources  allocation  limit  the  investment  along  international  trade  links  in  British  East  Africa  and  the  Southern  African  Development  Community.  Our  approach  provides  important  policy-relevant  insights  given  that  a  range  of  countries  in  low-income  regions  are  trying  to  lessen  trade  friction  across  the  borders  by  forming  free-trade  areas  and  currency  unions.
■590    ▼aSchool  code:  0163.
■650  4▼aStatistics
■650  4▼aPolitical  science
■650  4▼aPublic  administration
■653    ▼aPolitical  economy
■653    ▼aDevelopment  economics
■653    ▼aTrade  liberalization
■653    ▼aWinning  candidates
■653    ▼aVoting  behaviors
■690    ▼a0501
■690    ▼a0617
■690    ▼a0615
■690    ▼a0463
■71020▼aNorthwestern  University▼bEconomics.
■7730  ▼tDissertations  Abstracts  International▼g86-12B.
■790    ▼a0163
■791    ▼aPh.D.
■792    ▼a2025
■793    ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17357278▼nKERIS▼z이  자료의  원문은  한국교육학술정보원에서  제공합니다.

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