서브메뉴
검색
Essays on Finance and Innovation
Essays on Finance and Innovation
상세정보
- 자료유형
- 학위논문 서양
- 최종처리일시
- 20260202103526
- ISBN
- 9798315797302
- DDC
- 658
- 저자명
- Yang, Jinpu.
- 서명/저자
- Essays on Finance and Innovation
- 발행사항
- [Sl] : Northwestern University, 2025
- 발행사항
- Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2025
- 형태사항
- 135 p
- 주기사항
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-12, Section: B.
- 주기사항
- Advisor: Matvos, Gregor.
- 학위논문주기
- Thesis (Ph.D.)--Northwestern University, 2025.
- 초록/해제
- 요약Chapter 1 studies how size-based interest rate cap regulation, which is designed to protect borrowers from financial stress, could cause borrowers to overborrow from unregulated alternatives and therefore expose them to greater financial stress. Interest rate caps on small-dollar loans could make it unprofitable for lenders to serve the market, restricting small-dollar loan access for borrowers and exposing them to unregulated alternatives. This study leverages a randomized controlled trial (RCT) implemented by a fintech lender in California and its Utah bank partner to assess these effects. Findings show no impact on loan take-up, and caps lead borrowers to over-borrow from larger, unregulated loans when they restrict borrower access to small-dollar amounts. Without the interest rate cap, high-risk borrowers self-select into small-dollar loans, and the access to small-dollar loans can reduce their default rates. Heterogeneity analysis reveals greater benefits for financially fragile borrowers, especially low-income and underserved groups. Evidence shows that interest rate caps on small-dollar loans prevent borrowers from replicating favorable repayment schedules with larger loans, leading them to delay prepayment at a higher cost.Chapter 2 studies the bias against female inventors in the patent examination process at the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). Exploiting the quasi-random assignment of patent examiners and applying textual analysis, we use Becker's outcome test to assess bias against female inventors at the approval margin. We find that patent applications granted to female inventors by more lenient examiners have a higher downstream impact by 75%-160% compared with these granted to male inventors, suggesting the presence of implicit bias against female inventors in the examination process. This bias is partially mitigated for experienced female inventors and is varies across technology categories-appearing as more favorable treatment in fields such as medicine, pharmaceuticals, and mechanics, which either have greater female representation or involve less complex examination procedures. Further analysis of examiner-inventor homophily analysis reveals that the bias against female inventors is concentrated among patent applications examined by junior male examiners, who may have stronger promotion incentives under the USPTO's productivity-driven evaluation system. These findings indicate that both individual-level statistical discrimination and organizational-level taste-based discrimination can co-exist with the system, shaped in part by the institutional incentive structure within the USPTO.
- 일반주제명
- Finance
- 일반주제명
- Home economics
- 키워드
- Innovation
- 기타저자
- Northwestern University Finance
- 기본자료저록
- Dissertations Abstracts International. 86-12B.
- 전자적 위치 및 접속
- 로그인 후 원문을 볼 수 있습니다.
MARC
008260126s2025 us c eng d■001000017357540
■00520260202103526
■006m o d
■007cr#unu||||||||
■020 ▼a9798315797302
■035 ▼a(MiAaPQ)AAI32039346
■040 ▼aMiAaPQ▼cMiAaPQ
■0820 ▼a658
■1001 ▼aYang, Jinpu.
■24510▼aEssays on Finance and Innovation
■260 ▼a[Sl]▼bNorthwestern University▼c2025
■260 1▼aAnn Arbor▼bProQuest Dissertations & Theses▼c2025
■300 ▼a135 p
■500 ▼aSource: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-12, Section: B.
■500 ▼aAdvisor: Matvos, Gregor.
■5021 ▼aThesis (Ph.D.)--Northwestern University, 2025.
■520 ▼aChapter 1 studies how size-based interest rate cap regulation, which is designed to protect borrowers from financial stress, could cause borrowers to overborrow from unregulated alternatives and therefore expose them to greater financial stress. Interest rate caps on small-dollar loans could make it unprofitable for lenders to serve the market, restricting small-dollar loan access for borrowers and exposing them to unregulated alternatives. This study leverages a randomized controlled trial (RCT) implemented by a fintech lender in California and its Utah bank partner to assess these effects. Findings show no impact on loan take-up, and caps lead borrowers to over-borrow from larger, unregulated loans when they restrict borrower access to small-dollar amounts. Without the interest rate cap, high-risk borrowers self-select into small-dollar loans, and the access to small-dollar loans can reduce their default rates. Heterogeneity analysis reveals greater benefits for financially fragile borrowers, especially low-income and underserved groups. Evidence shows that interest rate caps on small-dollar loans prevent borrowers from replicating favorable repayment schedules with larger loans, leading them to delay prepayment at a higher cost.Chapter 2 studies the bias against female inventors in the patent examination process at the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). Exploiting the quasi-random assignment of patent examiners and applying textual analysis, we use Becker's outcome test to assess bias against female inventors at the approval margin. We find that patent applications granted to female inventors by more lenient examiners have a higher downstream impact by 75%-160% compared with these granted to male inventors, suggesting the presence of implicit bias against female inventors in the examination process. This bias is partially mitigated for experienced female inventors and is varies across technology categories-appearing as more favorable treatment in fields such as medicine, pharmaceuticals, and mechanics, which either have greater female representation or involve less complex examination procedures. Further analysis of examiner-inventor homophily analysis reveals that the bias against female inventors is concentrated among patent applications examined by junior male examiners, who may have stronger promotion incentives under the USPTO's productivity-driven evaluation system. These findings indicate that both individual-level statistical discrimination and organizational-level taste-based discrimination can co-exist with the system, shaped in part by the institutional incentive structure within the USPTO.
■590 ▼aSchool code: 0163.
■650 4▼aFinance
■650 4▼aHome economics
■653 ▼aHousehold finance
■653 ▼aInnovation
■653 ▼aRandomized controlled trial
■653 ▼aSmall dollar loans
■653 ▼aInterest rate regulation
■653 ▼aConsumer credit market
■690 ▼a0508
■690 ▼a0501
■690 ▼a0770
■690 ▼a0386
■71020▼aNorthwestern University▼bFinance.
■7730 ▼tDissertations Abstracts International▼g86-12B.
■790 ▼a0163
■791 ▼aPh.D.
■792 ▼a2025
■793 ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17357540▼nKERIS▼z이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.
