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Three Essays on the Politics of Protégés in Military Alliances and Its External Effects
Three Essays on the Politics of Protégés in Military Alliances and Its External Effects
상세정보
- 자료유형
- 학위논문 서양
- 최종처리일시
- 20260311091524.5
- ISBN
- 9798270230692
- DDC
- 355.02
- 저자명
- Masumura, Yuji
- 서명/저자
- Three Essays on the Politics of Protégés in Military Alliances and Its External Effects / Yuji Masumura
- 발행사항
- [Sl] : The University of Texas at Austin, 2025
- 형태사항
- 1 electronic resource (172 pages)
- 주기사항
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 87-06, Section: A.
- 주기사항
- Advisors: Wolford, Scott Committee members: Chapman, Terrence; McDonald, Patrick; Johnson, Jesse.
- 학위논문주기
- - Ph.D. : The University of Texas at Austin, 2025.
- 초록/해제
- 요약My dissertation consists of three essays on protégés in military alliances. The first essay investigates cost-sharing negotiations between allied countries. I analyze a formal model of cost-sharing negotiation with an element of domestic politics and investigate the conditions for successful negotiations, as well as their implication on deterrence. The model reveals two means by which cost-sharing negotiations sustain peace. First, successful negotiations keep a patron's involvement by reducing the alliance costs, but this happens when the patron is not committed. Second, failed negotiation signals the patron's commitment and panders to domestic isolationism at the same time. I confirmed the validity of my argument by examining the cost-sharing negotiations between the United States and Japan in 1978 and 2019. The second essay focuses on how alliances change the incentive for preventive war. I construct a formal model under which protégés' arming creates an incentive for preventive attack. The model reveals a screening effect of military alliances: alliances reveal the hidden intention of protégés by changing the value of arming, and this removes both the fear of large future power shifts for neighbors and the fear of mistaken preventive war for the protégé. In the third essay, I tested the implications of the screening effect. By analyzing quantitative data, I find that preventive war is less likely when states have an alliance even when power shifts are happening and that high arming costs decrease the military expenditure of protégés only when states have an alliance. All of the three essays contribute to our academic understanding of the role of military alliances in world politics.
- 언어주기
- English
- 일반주제명
- Political science
- 일반주제명
- Military studies
- 키워드
- Preventive war
- 기타저자
- The University of Texas at Austin Government
- 기본자료저록
- Dissertations Abstracts International. 87-06A.
- 전자적 위치 및 접속
- 로그인 후 원문을 볼 수 있습니다.
MARC
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■006m o d
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■020 ▼a9798270230692
■040 ▼aMiAaPQD▼beng▼cMiAaPQD▼erda
■082 ▼a355.02
■1001 ▼aMasumura, Yuji▼eauthor.
■24510▼aThree Essays on the Politics of Protégés in Military Alliances and Its External Effects ▼cYuji Masumura
■260 ▼a[Sl]▼bThe University of Texas at Austin▼c2025
■264 1▼aAnn Arbor▼bProQuest Dissertations & Theses▼c2025
■300 ▼a1 electronic resource (172 pages)
■336 ▼atext▼btxt▼2rdacontent
■337 ▼acomputer▼bc▼2rdamedia
■338 ▼aonline resource▼bcr▼2rdacarrier
■500 ▼aSource: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 87-06, Section: A.
■500 ▼aAdvisors: Wolford, Scott Committee members: Chapman, Terrence; McDonald, Patrick; Johnson, Jesse.
■5021 ▼bPh.D.▼cThe University of Texas at Austin▼d2025.
■520 ▼aMy dissertation consists of three essays on protégés in military alliances. The first essay investigates cost-sharing negotiations between allied countries. I analyze a formal model of cost-sharing negotiation with an element of domestic politics and investigate the conditions for successful negotiations, as well as their implication on deterrence. The model reveals two means by which cost-sharing negotiations sustain peace. First, successful negotiations keep a patron's involvement by reducing the alliance costs, but this happens when the patron is not committed. Second, failed negotiation signals the patron's commitment and panders to domestic isolationism at the same time. I confirmed the validity of my argument by examining the cost-sharing negotiations between the United States and Japan in 1978 and 2019. The second essay focuses on how alliances change the incentive for preventive war. I construct a formal model under which protégés' arming creates an incentive for preventive attack. The model reveals a screening effect of military alliances: alliances reveal the hidden intention of protégés by changing the value of arming, and this removes both the fear of large future power shifts for neighbors and the fear of mistaken preventive war for the protégé. In the third essay, I tested the implications of the screening effect. By analyzing quantitative data, I find that preventive war is less likely when states have an alliance even when power shifts are happening and that high arming costs decrease the military expenditure of protégés only when states have an alliance. All of the three essays contribute to our academic understanding of the role of military alliances in world politics.
■546 ▼aEnglish
■590 ▼aSchool code: 0227
■650 4▼aPolitical science
■650 4▼aMilitary studies
■653 ▼aMilitary alliances
■653 ▼aCost-sharing negotiations
■653 ▼aPreventive war
■7102 ▼aThe University of Texas at Austin▼bGovernment.▼edegree granting institution.
■7201 ▼aWolford, Scott▼edegree supervisor.
■7730 ▼tDissertations Abstracts International▼g87-06A.
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17361169▼nKERIS▼z이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.
