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Essays in Industrial Organization
Essays in Industrial Organization
상세정보
- 자료유형
- 학위논문 서양
- 최종처리일시
- 20260202103531
- ISBN
- 9798288862199
- DDC
- 300
- 저자명
- Ito, Yuki.
- 서명/저자
- Essays in Industrial Organization
- 발행사항
- [Sl] : University of California, Berkeley, 2025
- 발행사항
- Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2025
- 형태사항
- 131 p
- 주기사항
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 87-01, Section: B.
- 주기사항
- Advisor: Handel, Benjamin.
- 학위논문주기
- Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 2025.
- 초록/해제
- 요약This dissertation develops and applies economic frameworks in industrial organization that allow us to empirically study policy-related questions.Chapter 1 considers how the possibility of credible announcements about firms' entry would alter market outcomes. If a firm can announce its intent to enter a market in a credible manner, it may be able to deter rival firms from entering. However, such an announcement may also provoke more aggressive competition from entrants, compared to remaining silent. In a setup of procurement auctions, we analyze the equilibrium effects of credible entry announcements, while firms face this strategic trade-off. The empirical setting I study is procurement auctions conducted by Montana Department of Transportation, where a designated online Q&A forum serves as an entry disclosure device. I specify and estimate a model of procurement auctions with costly entry, in which firms have the option to disclose entry during a period before the bids are submitted. We find that a disclosure deters entry from other firms, but leads remaining entrants to bid more aggressively. Overall, disclosure is beneficial for a firm if they can disclose at an early period. The availability of disclosure device decreases the auctioneer's payment by 6.3%, while increasing the winner's construction costs by 4.5% and decreasing the total entry costs by 11.1%.Chapter 2, co-authored with Konan Hara and Paul Koh, studies identification and estimation of dynamic games when the underlying information structure is unknown to the researcher. To tractably characterize the set of Markov perfect equilibrium predictions while maintaining weak assumptions on players' information, we introduce Markov correlated equilibrium, a dynamic analog of Bayes correlated equilibrium. The set of Markov correlated equilibrium predictions coincides with the set of Markov perfect equilibrium predictions that can arise when the players can observe more signals than assumed by the analyst. Using Markov correlated equilibrium as the solution concept, we propose tractable computational strategies for informationally robust estimation, inference, and counterfactual analysis that deal with the non-convexities arising in dynamic environments. By applying this method, we analyze the dynamic entry game between Starbucks and Dunkin' in the US and the role of informational assumptions.Chapter 3, co-authored with Konan Hara, investigates the role of racial concordance among doctors, specialists, and patients in doctors' referral decisions. Using a 20% random sample of Medicare beneficiaries from 1999-2019 in the United States, we find that doctors are more likely to refer patients to specialists of the same race, especially when the patient also shares that race. To isolate the effect of racial concordance from differences in expected health outcomes and travel distance, we develop a structural model of referral decisions. The results indicate that Asian, Black, and Hispanic patients are, on average, referred to specialists with worse expected health outcomes than they would be in the absence of racial concordance preferences.
- 키워드
- Auctions
- 키워드
- Dynamic games
- 기타저자
- University of California, Berkeley Economics
- 기본자료저록
- Dissertations Abstracts International. 87-01B.
- 전자적 위치 및 접속
- 로그인 후 원문을 볼 수 있습니다.
MARC
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■007cr#unu||||||||
■020 ▼a9798288862199
■035 ▼a(MiAaPQ)AAI32039956
■040 ▼aMiAaPQ▼cMiAaPQ
■0820 ▼a300
■1001 ▼aIto, Yuki.
■24510▼aEssays in Industrial Organization
■260 ▼a[Sl]▼bUniversity of California, Berkeley▼c2025
■260 1▼aAnn Arbor▼bProQuest Dissertations & Theses▼c2025
■300 ▼a131 p
■500 ▼aSource: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 87-01, Section: B.
■500 ▼aAdvisor: Handel, Benjamin.
■5021 ▼aThesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 2025.
■520 ▼aThis dissertation develops and applies economic frameworks in industrial organization that allow us to empirically study policy-related questions.Chapter 1 considers how the possibility of credible announcements about firms' entry would alter market outcomes. If a firm can announce its intent to enter a market in a credible manner, it may be able to deter rival firms from entering. However, such an announcement may also provoke more aggressive competition from entrants, compared to remaining silent. In a setup of procurement auctions, we analyze the equilibrium effects of credible entry announcements, while firms face this strategic trade-off. The empirical setting I study is procurement auctions conducted by Montana Department of Transportation, where a designated online Q&A forum serves as an entry disclosure device. I specify and estimate a model of procurement auctions with costly entry, in which firms have the option to disclose entry during a period before the bids are submitted. We find that a disclosure deters entry from other firms, but leads remaining entrants to bid more aggressively. Overall, disclosure is beneficial for a firm if they can disclose at an early period. The availability of disclosure device decreases the auctioneer's payment by 6.3%, while increasing the winner's construction costs by 4.5% and decreasing the total entry costs by 11.1%.Chapter 2, co-authored with Konan Hara and Paul Koh, studies identification and estimation of dynamic games when the underlying information structure is unknown to the researcher. To tractably characterize the set of Markov perfect equilibrium predictions while maintaining weak assumptions on players' information, we introduce Markov correlated equilibrium, a dynamic analog of Bayes correlated equilibrium. The set of Markov correlated equilibrium predictions coincides with the set of Markov perfect equilibrium predictions that can arise when the players can observe more signals than assumed by the analyst. Using Markov correlated equilibrium as the solution concept, we propose tractable computational strategies for informationally robust estimation, inference, and counterfactual analysis that deal with the non-convexities arising in dynamic environments. By applying this method, we analyze the dynamic entry game between Starbucks and Dunkin' in the US and the role of informational assumptions.Chapter 3, co-authored with Konan Hara, investigates the role of racial concordance among doctors, specialists, and patients in doctors' referral decisions. Using a 20% random sample of Medicare beneficiaries from 1999-2019 in the United States, we find that doctors are more likely to refer patients to specialists of the same race, especially when the patient also shares that race. To isolate the effect of racial concordance from differences in expected health outcomes and travel distance, we develop a structural model of referral decisions. The results indicate that Asian, Black, and Hispanic patients are, on average, referred to specialists with worse expected health outcomes than they would be in the absence of racial concordance preferences.
■590 ▼aSchool code: 0028.
■653 ▼aAuctions
■653 ▼aDynamic games
■653 ▼aHealthcare economics
■653 ▼aIndustrial organization
■653 ▼aMedicare beneficiaries
■690 ▼a0501
■690 ▼a0796
■690 ▼a0511
■690 ▼a0338
■71020▼aUniversity of California, Berkeley▼bEconomics.
■7730 ▼tDissertations Abstracts International▼g87-01B.
■790 ▼a0028
■791 ▼aPh.D.
■792 ▼a2025
■793 ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17357573▼nKERIS▼z이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.
