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Analysis and Design of Blockchain Systems
Analysis and Design of Blockchain Systems
상세정보
- 자료유형
- 학위논문 서양
- 최종처리일시
- 20260311091547.5
- ISBN
- 9798270232559
- DDC
- 005.8
- 서명/저자
- Analysis and Design of Blockchain Systems / Yanni Georghiades
- 발행사항
- [Sl] : The University of Texas at Austin, 2025
- 형태사항
- 1 electronic resource (120 pages)
- 주기사항
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 87-06, Section: A.
- 주기사항
- Advisors: Vishwanath, Sriram; Garg, Vijay Committee members: John, Lizy K.; Fracassi, Cesare; Anand, Tej.
- 학위논문주기
- - Ph.D. : The University of Texas at Austin, 2025.
- 초록/해제
- 요약Since the advent of Bitcoin in 2008, cryptocurrencies and the blockchain systems they are built upon have seen parabolic growth in almost every aspect of human culture. As blockchain technology continues to evolve, the need for rigorous analysis and thoughtful design of blockchain protocols has become increasingly critical. This work focuses on the fundamental principles of blockchain systems, with a particular emphasis on analyzing Proof-of-Work (PoW) blockchains and designing new algorithms and incentive mechanisms to enhance their performance and security. Central to the design of these protocols is the need to characterize and incentivize rational behavior, as cryptocurrencies depend on it to function. Understanding how participants, such as miners and users, behave strategically within a decentralized environment is crucial to ensuring the security, efficiency, and scalability of blockchain networks. In this dissertation, three major contributions are presented which explore the incentives, decision-making processes, and potential vulnerabilities inherent to these systems in order to provide insights that aim to improve both the design and operation of future blockchain protocols.The first contribution introduces BlockReduce, a novel Layer 1 PoW cryptocurrency designed to address the long-standing scalability problem. By analyzing the core architectural bottlenecks that limit throughput in existing PoW blockchains, BlockReduce proposes targeted protocol-level enhancements that significantly increase transaction throughput while maintaining the same degree of security as a traditional PoW system.The second contribution explores the behavior of rational miners under adversarial conditions, specifically in the context of double-spend attacks. It proposes a new reward function that incorporates the incentive for an attacker to attempt a double-spend, thereby internalizing the security risks posed by high-value transactions. The analysis frames mining as a dynamic mean-field game, identifying equilibrium strategies which guarantee that an attacker cannot profit from a double-spend attack.The third contribution presents a formal computational framework for understanding miner behavior in PoW systems, with a specific emphasis on the strategies miners follow in selecting which block to extend. By modeling blockchain growth as a Partially Observable Stochastic Game (POSG) and reducing it to a class of Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes (POMDPs) through application of the the mean field assumption, this work offers a rigorous method to analyze the stationary behavior of PoW systems under various system conditions and miner strategies. In so doing, this work provides the first proof of optimality of Bitcoin's Longest Chain Rule (LCR).
- 언어주기
- English
- 일반주제명
- Information science
- 키워드
- Proof-of-Work
- 기타저자
- The University of Texas at Austin Electrical and Computer Engineering
- 기본자료저록
- Dissertations Abstracts International. 87-06A.
- 전자적 위치 및 접속
- 로그인 후 원문을 볼 수 있습니다.
MARC
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■020 ▼a9798270232559
■040 ▼aMiAaPQD▼beng▼cMiAaPQD▼erda
■082 ▼a005.8
■1001 ▼aGeorghiades, Yanni▼eauthor.
■24510▼aAnalysis and Design of Blockchain Systems ▼cYanni Georghiades
■260 ▼a[Sl]▼bThe University of Texas at Austin▼c2025
■264 1▼aAnn Arbor▼bProQuest Dissertations & Theses▼c2025
■300 ▼a1 electronic resource (120 pages)
■336 ▼atext▼btxt▼2rdacontent
■337 ▼acomputer▼bc▼2rdamedia
■338 ▼aonline resource▼bcr▼2rdacarrier
■500 ▼aSource: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 87-06, Section: A.
■500 ▼aAdvisors: Vishwanath, Sriram; Garg, Vijay Committee members: John, Lizy K.; Fracassi, Cesare; Anand, Tej.
■5021 ▼bPh.D.▼cThe University of Texas at Austin▼d2025.
■520 ▼aSince the advent of Bitcoin in 2008, cryptocurrencies and the blockchain systems they are built upon have seen parabolic growth in almost every aspect of human culture. As blockchain technology continues to evolve, the need for rigorous analysis and thoughtful design of blockchain protocols has become increasingly critical. This work focuses on the fundamental principles of blockchain systems, with a particular emphasis on analyzing Proof-of-Work (PoW) blockchains and designing new algorithms and incentive mechanisms to enhance their performance and security. Central to the design of these protocols is the need to characterize and incentivize rational behavior, as cryptocurrencies depend on it to function. Understanding how participants, such as miners and users, behave strategically within a decentralized environment is crucial to ensuring the security, efficiency, and scalability of blockchain networks. In this dissertation, three major contributions are presented which explore the incentives, decision-making processes, and potential vulnerabilities inherent to these systems in order to provide insights that aim to improve both the design and operation of future blockchain protocols.The first contribution introduces BlockReduce, a novel Layer 1 PoW cryptocurrency designed to address the long-standing scalability problem. By analyzing the core architectural bottlenecks that limit throughput in existing PoW blockchains, BlockReduce proposes targeted protocol-level enhancements that significantly increase transaction throughput while maintaining the same degree of security as a traditional PoW system.The second contribution explores the behavior of rational miners under adversarial conditions, specifically in the context of double-spend attacks. It proposes a new reward function that incorporates the incentive for an attacker to attempt a double-spend, thereby internalizing the security risks posed by high-value transactions. The analysis frames mining as a dynamic mean-field game, identifying equilibrium strategies which guarantee that an attacker cannot profit from a double-spend attack.The third contribution presents a formal computational framework for understanding miner behavior in PoW systems, with a specific emphasis on the strategies miners follow in selecting which block to extend. By modeling blockchain growth as a Partially Observable Stochastic Game (POSG) and reducing it to a class of Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes (POMDPs) through application of the the mean field assumption, this work offers a rigorous method to analyze the stationary behavior of PoW systems under various system conditions and miner strategies. In so doing, this work provides the first proof of optimality of Bitcoin's Longest Chain Rule (LCR).
■546 ▼aEnglish
■590 ▼aSchool code: 0227
■650 4▼aInformation science
■653 ▼aProof-of-Work
■653 ▼aLongest Chain Rule
■653 ▼aPartially Observable Stochastic Game
■653 ▼aBlockchain systems
■7102 ▼aThe University of Texas at Austin▼bElectrical and Computer Engineering.▼edegree granting institution.
■7201 ▼aVishwanath, Sriram▼edegree supervisor.
■7201 ▼aGarg, Vijay▼edegree supervisor.
■7730 ▼tDissertations Abstracts International▼g87-06A.
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17361232▼nKERIS▼z이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.
