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Enforcement Policy, Disclosure Regulation, and Investment Efficiency
Enforcement Policy, Disclosure Regulation, and Investment Efficiency
상세정보
- 자료유형
- 학위논문 서양
- 최종처리일시
- 20260311091519.5
- ISBN
- 9798270233051
- DDC
- 371.5
- 저자명
- Chen, Yiying
- 서명/저자
- Enforcement Policy, Disclosure Regulation, and Investment Efficiency / Yiying Chen
- 발행사항
- [Sl] : The University of Texas at Austin, 2025
- 형태사항
- 1 electronic resource (60 pages)
- 주기사항
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 87-06, Section: A.
- 주기사항
- Advisors: Laux, Volker Committee members: Aydogan, Alti; Hwang, Hyun; Zheng, Ronghuo.
- 학위논문주기
- - Ph.D. : The University of Texas at Austin, 2025.
- 초록/해제
- 요약The optimal enforcement policy of disclosure regulation remains debated. Some regulators argue for targeting serious violations alone, while others advocate pursuing even the smallest infractions. This paper develops an analytical model to examine how a chosen enforcement policy affects a firm's project selection. In the model, the manager chooses between a riskier project and a safer project and decides whether to disclose information about the firm's final payoff. The regulator mandates disclosure and commits to either a focused enforcement policy (i.e., pursuing only severe violations) or a uniform enforcement policy (i.e., pursuing violations regardless of severity). The main finding is that a focused enforcement policy discourages the manager from taking risks while a uniform enforcement policy encourages risk-taking. Therefore, a uniform policy enhances investment efficiency when the riskier project is efficient; in contrast, a focused policy enhances investment efficiency when the safer project is efficient. This paper provides insights into the regulatory debate on enforcement policy.
- 언어주기
- English
- 일반주제명
- Public policy
- 키워드
- Uniform policy
- 기타저자
- The University of Texas at Austin Accounting
- 기본자료저록
- Dissertations Abstracts International. 87-06A.
- 전자적 위치 및 접속
- 로그인 후 원문을 볼 수 있습니다.
MARC
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■006m o d
■007cr|nu||||||||
■020 ▼a9798270233051
■040 ▼aMiAaPQD▼beng▼cMiAaPQD▼erda
■082 ▼a371.5
■1001 ▼aChen, Yiying▼eauthor.
■24510▼aEnforcement Policy, Disclosure Regulation, and Investment Efficiency ▼cYiying Chen
■260 ▼a[Sl]▼bThe University of Texas at Austin▼c2025
■264 1▼aAnn Arbor▼bProQuest Dissertations & Theses▼c2025
■300 ▼a1 electronic resource (60 pages)
■336 ▼atext▼btxt▼2rdacontent
■337 ▼acomputer▼bc▼2rdamedia
■338 ▼aonline resource▼bcr▼2rdacarrier
■500 ▼aSource: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 87-06, Section: A.
■500 ▼aAdvisors: Laux, Volker Committee members: Aydogan, Alti; Hwang, Hyun; Zheng, Ronghuo.
■5021 ▼bPh.D.▼cThe University of Texas at Austin▼d2025.
■520 ▼aThe optimal enforcement policy of disclosure regulation remains debated. Some regulators argue for targeting serious violations alone, while others advocate pursuing even the smallest infractions. This paper develops an analytical model to examine how a chosen enforcement policy affects a firm's project selection. In the model, the manager chooses between a riskier project and a safer project and decides whether to disclose information about the firm's final payoff. The regulator mandates disclosure and commits to either a focused enforcement policy (i.e., pursuing only severe violations) or a uniform enforcement policy (i.e., pursuing violations regardless of severity). The main finding is that a focused enforcement policy discourages the manager from taking risks while a uniform enforcement policy encourages risk-taking. Therefore, a uniform policy enhances investment efficiency when the riskier project is efficient; in contrast, a focused policy enhances investment efficiency when the safer project is efficient. This paper provides insights into the regulatory debate on enforcement policy.
■546 ▼aEnglish
■590 ▼aSchool code: 0227
■650 4▼aPublic policy
■653 ▼aEnforcement policy
■653 ▼aDisclosure regulation
■653 ▼aInvestment efficiency
■653 ▼aUniform policy
■7102 ▼aThe University of Texas at Austin▼bAccounting.▼edegree granting institution.
■7201 ▼aLaux, Volker▼edegree supervisor.
■7730 ▼tDissertations Abstracts International▼g87-06A.
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17361251▼nKERIS▼z이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.
