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Privatizing Economic Statecraft: How State-Directed Private Governance Shapes Business Compliance with US Sanctions
Privatizing Economic Statecraft: How State-Directed Private Governance Shapes Business Compliance with US Sanctions
상세정보
- 자료유형
- 학위논문 서양
- 최종처리일시
- 20260311091544.5
- ISBN
- 9798270229375
- DDC
- 320.6
- 저자명
- Lu, Zhizhen
- 서명/저자
- Privatizing Economic Statecraft: How State-Directed Private Governance Shapes Business Compliance with US Sanctions / Zhizhen Lu
- 발행사항
- [Sl] : The University of Texas at Austin, 2025
- 형태사항
- 1 electronic resource (153 pages)
- 주기사항
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 87-06, Section: A.
- 주기사항
- Advisors: Jensen, Nathan Committee members: Chapman, Terrence L.; Bapat, Navin A.; Nielson, Daniel; Wellhausen, Rachel L.
- 학위논문주기
- - Ph.D. : The University of Texas at Austin, 2025.
- 초록/해제
- 요약Over the past decade, the US government has gradually introduced private governance in economic sanctions enforcement by outsourcing regulatory functions to businesses. A private governance regime features management-based corporate self-regulation and information disclosure mechanisms, carried out through internal compliance offices or third-party service providers. Scholars and policy-makers have long questioned the effectiveness of business self-regulation, arguing such initiatives are formalities that prioritize procedures over outcomes. Why does the US government still embrace private governance in a high-stake regulatory domain such as economic sanctions? I argue that private governance enables the US government to establish "cooperative control" over business decisions on sanctions compliance, refining the conventional enforcement model based on punitive administrative measures and regulatory deterrence. By collaborating with businesses in the regulatory process, the state preserves, and potentially expands, its access to firm-level operational information while reducing the frequency of direct investigations. However, ensuring firms' commitment to self-regulation requires a combination of positive incentives, such as post-violation leniency, and the credible threat of future investigations. To unpack this argument, I first trace the recent history of how the US adopted private governance in sanctions enforcement based on its successful experience with this regulatory model in counter-terrorist financing and anti-money laundering, improving the coercion-based approach. Then I present a game-theoretic model on state-business interactions to derive theoretical conditions sustaining the private governance equilibrium. I show that the state can incentivize firms at risk of future violations through substantial post-violation leniency while maintaining probabilistic investigations to generate strategic uncertainty and conserve investigative resources. Finally, I find that a major US guideline for private sanctions compliance issued in 2019 prompted global firms at risk of sanctions violations to be more selective of investment targets, especially when deal-specific uncertainties are high. Taken together, this dissertation highlights the value of regulatory politics as a productive path for studying economic statecraft. It also emphasizes the potential for private governance to complement state oversight in shaping the business decisions of international firms, strengthening the state's global regulatory power.
- 언어주기
- English
- 키워드
- Self-regulation
- 기타저자
- The University of Texas at Austin Government
- 기본자료저록
- Dissertations Abstracts International. 87-06A.
- 전자적 위치 및 접속
- 로그인 후 원문을 볼 수 있습니다.
MARC
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■020 ▼a9798270229375
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■1001 ▼aLu, Zhizhen▼eauthor.
■24510▼aPrivatizing Economic Statecraft: How State-Directed Private Governance Shapes Business Compliance with US Sanctions ▼cZhizhen Lu
■260 ▼a[Sl]▼bThe University of Texas at Austin▼c2025
■264 1▼aAnn Arbor▼bProQuest Dissertations & Theses▼c2025
■300 ▼a1 electronic resource (153 pages)
■336 ▼atext▼btxt▼2rdacontent
■337 ▼acomputer▼bc▼2rdamedia
■338 ▼aonline resource▼bcr▼2rdacarrier
■500 ▼aSource: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 87-06, Section: A.
■500 ▼aAdvisors: Jensen, Nathan Committee members: Chapman, Terrence L.; Bapat, Navin A.; Nielson, Daniel; Wellhausen, Rachel L.
■5021 ▼bPh.D.▼cThe University of Texas at Austin▼d2025.
■520 ▼aOver the past decade, the US government has gradually introduced private governance in economic sanctions enforcement by outsourcing regulatory functions to businesses. A private governance regime features management-based corporate self-regulation and information disclosure mechanisms, carried out through internal compliance offices or third-party service providers. Scholars and policy-makers have long questioned the effectiveness of business self-regulation, arguing such initiatives are formalities that prioritize procedures over outcomes. Why does the US government still embrace private governance in a high-stake regulatory domain such as economic sanctions? I argue that private governance enables the US government to establish "cooperative control" over business decisions on sanctions compliance, refining the conventional enforcement model based on punitive administrative measures and regulatory deterrence. By collaborating with businesses in the regulatory process, the state preserves, and potentially expands, its access to firm-level operational information while reducing the frequency of direct investigations. However, ensuring firms' commitment to self-regulation requires a combination of positive incentives, such as post-violation leniency, and the credible threat of future investigations. To unpack this argument, I first trace the recent history of how the US adopted private governance in sanctions enforcement based on its successful experience with this regulatory model in counter-terrorist financing and anti-money laundering, improving the coercion-based approach. Then I present a game-theoretic model on state-business interactions to derive theoretical conditions sustaining the private governance equilibrium. I show that the state can incentivize firms at risk of future violations through substantial post-violation leniency while maintaining probabilistic investigations to generate strategic uncertainty and conserve investigative resources. Finally, I find that a major US guideline for private sanctions compliance issued in 2019 prompted global firms at risk of sanctions violations to be more selective of investment targets, especially when deal-specific uncertainties are high. Taken together, this dissertation highlights the value of regulatory politics as a productive path for studying economic statecraft. It also emphasizes the potential for private governance to complement state oversight in shaping the business decisions of international firms, strengthening the state's global regulatory power.
■546 ▼aEnglish
■590 ▼aSchool code: 0227
■653 ▼aCooperative control
■653 ▼aPrivate governance
■653 ▼aSelf-regulation
■653 ▼aRegulatory politics
■7102 ▼aThe University of Texas at Austin▼bGovernment.▼edegree granting institution.
■7201 ▼aJensen, Nathan▼edegree supervisor.
■7730 ▼tDissertations Abstracts International▼g87-06A.
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17361133▼nKERIS▼z이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.
