서브메뉴
검색
Essays in Behavioral Law and Economics
Essays in Behavioral Law and Economics
상세정보
- 자료유형
- 학위논문 서양
- 최종처리일시
- 20260202105622
- ISBN
- 9798265429384
- DDC
- 340
- 서명/저자
- Essays in Behavioral Law and Economics
- 발행사항
- [Sl] : Stanford University, 2023
- 발행사항
- Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2023
- 형태사항
- 116 p
- 주기사항
- Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 87-05, Section: A.
- 주기사항
- Advisor: MacCoun, Rob;Melamed, A. Douglas.
- 학위논문주기
- Thesis (J.S.D.)--Stanford University, 2023.
- 초록/해제
- 요약The Big Data revolution has allowed companies to steer their users' behavior with astonishing effectiveness.1 While antitrust scholarship had tended to stay away from the influx of behavioral economics,2 enforcers, policymakers, and scholars have recently suggested that firms tend to exploit behavioral biases to monopolize markets.3 This is especially common in platform markets,4 in which a company may not only own the technology infrastructure that allows firms to operate in the platform but may also compete in it downstream (e.g., Microsoft Windows' tying of Internet Explorer, and Android's tying of Chrome). A hypothesis that has gained considerable traction in the last few years is that agreements to set an application as a default unfairly restrict competition, regardless of whether the platform is vertically integrated or not (e.g., Google pays Apple to have its search engine as Apple's default)Because people rarely change defaults, conventional wisdom holds that default agreements amount to exclusivity arrangements. 6 Furthermore, it suggests that because dominant firms take advantage of their users' lack of choice, forcing users to choose their defaults is the best regulatory remedy for correcting market concentration.In my JSD dissertation, I criticized the behavioral premise that conventional wisdom assumes, as well as the legal categorizations and policy implications that follow from it.8 My work proposes a richer analytical framework to predict when default effects9 are likely,10 calls into question the theory that default agreements are de facto exclusive dealing, and criticizes the effectiveness of forced-choice remedies. Nevertheless, my research suggests that forced choice may sometimes be necessary to encourage the entry of potential competitors.11 These articles have significant implications for the interpretation of monopolization standards in exclusive dealingand monopoly maintenance cases, for applying potential competition theories to antitrust enforcement, and for the design and implementation-either by regulators orjudges-of effective remedies to promote competition in digital markets.i. Active Choice vs. Inertia? An Exploratory Assessment of the European Microsoft Case's Choice ScreenThis article assesses the choice screen European competition authorities mandated Microsoft to display in March 2010. The European enforcers assumed that Microsoft exploited its users' inertia by preinstalling IE and presetting it as its users' default. Thus, forcing people to choose their preferred internet browser would lower IE's market share to the point in which it would reflect consumers' actual preferences. After the intervention, IE's market share went down in the European Economic Area and continued decreasing for several years. But the same trend was evident in many developed countries that serve as a comparison group (and most of the world), in which no choice screen was displayed. When considering this common trend, the choicescreen's impact is, at most, a decrease of 2% of IE's market share. What explains IE's lower market share is Chrome's entry and Firefox's expansion. In other words, most people switched to a better internet browser regardless of whether they were forced to choose their preferred one.ii. Taking Behavioral Antitrust Seriously: On Default Agreements as Exclusive Dealing and Default Randomization as an Antitrust Remedy.
- 일반주제명
- Law
- 기타저자
- Stanford University.
- 기본자료저록
- Dissertations Abstracts International. 87-05A.
- 전자적 위치 및 접속
- 로그인 후 원문을 볼 수 있습니다.
MARC
008260126s2023 us c eng d■001000017360803
■00520260202105622
■006m o d
■007cr#unu||||||||
■020 ▼a9798265429384
■035 ▼a(MiAaPQ)AAI32316511
■035 ▼a(MiAaPQ)Stanfordmh103fq4241
■040 ▼aMiAaPQ▼cMiAaPQ
■0820 ▼a340
■1001 ▼aDuque, Omar Vasquez.
■24510▼aEssays in Behavioral Law and Economics
■260 ▼a[Sl]▼bStanford University▼c2023
■260 1▼aAnn Arbor▼bProQuest Dissertations & Theses▼c2023
■300 ▼a116 p
■500 ▼aSource: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 87-05, Section: A.
■500 ▼aAdvisor: MacCoun, Rob;Melamed, A. Douglas.
■5021 ▼aThesis (J.S.D.)--Stanford University, 2023.
■520 ▼aThe Big Data revolution has allowed companies to steer their users' behavior with astonishing effectiveness.1 While antitrust scholarship had tended to stay away from the influx of behavioral economics,2 enforcers, policymakers, and scholars have recently suggested that firms tend to exploit behavioral biases to monopolize markets.3 This is especially common in platform markets,4 in which a company may not only own the technology infrastructure that allows firms to operate in the platform but may also compete in it downstream (e.g., Microsoft Windows' tying of Internet Explorer, and Android's tying of Chrome). A hypothesis that has gained considerable traction in the last few years is that agreements to set an application as a default unfairly restrict competition, regardless of whether the platform is vertically integrated or not (e.g., Google pays Apple to have its search engine as Apple's default)Because people rarely change defaults, conventional wisdom holds that default agreements amount to exclusivity arrangements. 6 Furthermore, it suggests that because dominant firms take advantage of their users' lack of choice, forcing users to choose their defaults is the best regulatory remedy for correcting market concentration.In my JSD dissertation, I criticized the behavioral premise that conventional wisdom assumes, as well as the legal categorizations and policy implications that follow from it.8 My work proposes a richer analytical framework to predict when default effects9 are likely,10 calls into question the theory that default agreements are de facto exclusive dealing, and criticizes the effectiveness of forced-choice remedies. Nevertheless, my research suggests that forced choice may sometimes be necessary to encourage the entry of potential competitors.11 These articles have significant implications for the interpretation of monopolization standards in exclusive dealingand monopoly maintenance cases, for applying potential competition theories to antitrust enforcement, and for the design and implementation-either by regulators orjudges-of effective remedies to promote competition in digital markets.i. Active Choice vs. Inertia? An Exploratory Assessment of the European Microsoft Case's Choice ScreenThis article assesses the choice screen European competition authorities mandated Microsoft to display in March 2010. The European enforcers assumed that Microsoft exploited its users' inertia by preinstalling IE and presetting it as its users' default. Thus, forcing people to choose their preferred internet browser would lower IE's market share to the point in which it would reflect consumers' actual preferences. After the intervention, IE's market share went down in the European Economic Area and continued decreasing for several years. But the same trend was evident in many developed countries that serve as a comparison group (and most of the world), in which no choice screen was displayed. When considering this common trend, the choicescreen's impact is, at most, a decrease of 2% of IE's market share. What explains IE's lower market share is Chrome's entry and Firefox's expansion. In other words, most people switched to a better internet browser regardless of whether they were forced to choose their preferred one.ii. Taking Behavioral Antitrust Seriously: On Default Agreements as Exclusive Dealing and Default Randomization as an Antitrust Remedy.
■590 ▼aSchool code: 0212.
■650 4▼aLaw
■690 ▼a0398
■71020▼aStanford University.
■7730 ▼tDissertations Abstracts International▼g87-05A.
■790 ▼a0212
■791 ▼aJ.S.D.
■792 ▼a2023
■793 ▼aEnglish
■85640▼uhttp://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T17360803▼nKERIS▼z이 자료의 원문은 한국교육학술정보원에서 제공합니다.
